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TAX DEPRECIATION AND RISK
Jeff Strnad*
major issue under an accretion tax is how to treat depreciableA assets, assets that tend to decline in value with time and use. The
classic theoretical ideal is economic depreciation, a stream of de-
ductions that exactly replicates the decline in value of each asset over
time.' Although some parts of U.S. law aim to replicate economic depre-
ciation, tax depreciation is normally allowed at a rate that is faster than
economic depreciation. The goal of "accelerated depreciation" is to pro-
vide a general subsidy to investment without distorting the choice be-
tween assets. Thus, the ideal is to allow acceleration of tax depreciation
for all assets but to tailor the degree of acceleration for each asset so that
no asset is favored over another strictly due to the tax depreciation rules.
Risk affects depreciable assets. For example, it is uncertain how long
an asset will function. Some assets wear out and fail much earlier than
others. This type of risk is "retirement risk." Retirement risk plays a
special role in the analysis of depreciation rules.
There are other types of risk that affect depreciable assets. For exam-
ple, there is "revenue risk." Assuming that an asset survives through a
particular future year, the revenues from asset output and the future costs
of operating the asset during that year are uncertain.2
Risk can have a significant impact on the optimal design of deprecia-
tion rules. This Article analyzes that impact in two steps. Before starting
the two step analysis, Part I discusses current law and the basic impact of
risk on the depreciation system.
© Jeff Strnad, 1999.
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1. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF IN-
COME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 23-10 (2d ed. 1988); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 391 (2d ed. 1988).
In the framework of an annual accounting period, economic depreciation of an asset
calls for a deduction each year equal to the decline in value of the asset during that year.
2. No attempt will be made to separate risk rigorously into mutually exclusive and
exhaustive categories. Such a categorization is not necessary for the analysis in the Article.
It is convenient at several points, however, to treat retirement risk as a distinct kind of risk.
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Part II contains the first step: an analysis under the assumption that
the future price path of surviving units is known when an asset is put in
service. This assumption is restrictive because the future price path for
surviving units normally is uncertain. Nonetheless, this assumption im-
plies that an especially simple set of rules results in a tax treatment that
matches economic depreciation. In particular, the statutory schedule
should consist of the expected price path for surviving assets. When an
asset is retired, appropriate treatment is assured by allowing a deduction
for the adjusted basis at the time of retirement. There is no need to ad-
just the statutory schedule to take retirement risk into account.
Given this simple rule as a baseline, Part 11 examines two prominent
approaches for replicating economic depreciation: the leading academic
approach originating in a paper by Charles Hulten and Frank Wykoff,3
and the government approach used by the Treasury Department to deter-
mine class lives. Part II concludes that the Hulten and Wykoff approach
results in depreciation rates that are much faster than economic deprecia-
tion. The government approach is conceptually sound, but one of the two
major ways that the government uses to implement that approach results
in large errors. Although the government position was formed too re-
cently to have had much impact on actual depreciation rules, 4 the Hulten
and Wykoff approach has had a substantial impact on current law. 5
Part II goes on to point out that even though retirement risk need not
be taken into account in designing a schedule that results in a treatment
equivalent to economic depreciation, retirement risk must be taken into
account in designing an accelerated schedule that does not favor some
assets over others. If two assets are subject to different rates of retire-
ment risk, very different degrees of acceleration may be appropriate for
the assets even though they would have the same depreciation schedule
under a scheme that replicates economic depreciation.
Part III considers the complications that arise in the more general and
realistic case where the asset price path for surviving units is not known in
advance. Given that it is still necessary to establish a single ex ante de-
preciation schedule for each asset, "strategic loss-taking" comes promi-
nently into play: There is an incentive to trade depreciable assets to
establish price paths that fall below the statutory schedule. Part III dis-
cusses potential responses to this phenomenon.
The most promising general responses consist of changes in the "dispo-
sition" rules for depreciable assets combined with adjustments in the ex
ante depreciation schedule. Under current law, dispositions result in an
immediate tax on loss or gain. It is this feature that allows taxpayers to
take losses strategically. Part III considers several alternative disposition
3. Charles R. Hulten & Frank C. Wykoff, The Measurement of Economic Deprecia-
tion, in DEPRECIATION, INFLATION, AND THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 81(Charles R. Hulten ed., 1981). For a discussion of the high esteem for this approach and its
influence on existing law, see infra note 46.
4. See infra note 24 and text accompanying notes 64-66.
5. See infra note 46.
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rules such as not taxing dispositions at all and levying a tax on the gross
proceeds (without subtracting adjusted basis). Applying these rules re-
quires an accelerated ex ante depreciation schedule since the disposition
rules no longer allow a deduction for the loss upon retirement of an asset.
None of the combinations of disposition rules and ex ante schedule ad-
justments emerges as a dominant approach. Part III explores the trade-
offs inherent in choosing one alternative over another.
Part IV applies the results from Part III to "group accounting" rules for
depreciable assets. These rules permit groups of assets to be depreciated
as if they were a single asset. The rules are important because group
accounting can significantly lower administrative and compliance costs
for some taxpayers. However, strategic loss-taking is a serious problem
for some types of group accounts. As a result, a study of group account-
ing policy is an important and natural application of the theory developed
in Part III. Part IV concludes that two of the special disposition rules
studied in Part III are very promising approaches for the most trouble-
some types of group accounts.
Part V summarizes the main conclusions reached in the Article. These
conclusions and results are relevant not only for the task of reforming the
general depreciation rules in the tax code but also for addressing any tax
problem involving assets that tend to depreciate in value.
I. BASIC DEPRECIATION POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND
CURRENT LAW
Before engaging in substantive analysis of depreciation and risk, it is
important to set the stage by discussing current law and some general
properties of tax depreciation in a risky environment. Section A dis-
cusses the basic choices that must be made in designing a depreciation
system composed of depreciation schedules set in advance. Attention is
devoted to asset retirement patterns and strategic loss-taking since these
phenomena may have an important impact in such a depreciation system.
Section B discusses the depreciation methods used under both individual
item accounting and group accounting, the two major accounting ap-
proaches employed under current law.
A. BASIC DEPRECIATION POLICY CHOICES, ASSET RETIREMENT
PATTERNS, AND STRATEGIC TRADING
Current tax depreciation rules contain both ex ante and ex post ele-
ments. Instead of taking the ex post approach of observing the actual
decline in value suffered by each asset each year, a tax depreciation
schedule is set in advance at the time the asset is placed in service. This
schedule is the ex ante element of the tax depreciation rules. The two
crucial features of the schedule are the total time period over which de-
preciation deductions will be allowed and the pattern of deductions dur-
ing that "recovery period." A taxpayer facing constant marginal tax rates
and a positive interest rate over time will prefer to have a short recovery
1999]
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period and a front-loaded pattern of deductions that shifts deductions
into earlier years.
Although the tax depreciation schedule is set ex ante, ex post adjust-
ments occur if the taxpayer sells or disposes of the asset. Two sale and
disposition events are of particular interest: asset retirements and strate-
gic trades. Asset retirement occurs when the asset reaches the end of its
economic life and is discarded.6 Strategic trading occurs when a taxpayer
chooses to sell a depreciating asset in order to achieve a favorable tax
result. To illustrate the nature of these events and their impact on the tax
depreciation schedule, two examples follow.
In both examples, we will assume that the tax treatment of dispositions
will be the one currently applied under "individual item accounting."
That treatment consists of the taxpayer realizing a gain or a loss equal to
the amount realized, if any, on disposition minus the adjusted basis. 7
Since this treatment is linked to individual item accounting, we shall refer
to it as the "individual item method" when discussing alternative treat-
ments of asset dispositions. Individual item accounting itself will be de-
6. I assume that salvage value is zero throughout the Article. This assumption simpli-
fies the analysis, and the main results would not be affected by assuming a nonzero salvage
value.
7. Dispositions of depreciable assets may result in capital gains and losses or ordinary
gains and losses. The rules are moderately complex. Because most depreciable assets are
used in a trade or business, these assets normally are subject to the provisions in section
1231. See I.R.C. § 1231(a)(3). That section aggregates gains and losses for assets covered
by the section, and if there is a net gain in aggregate, it is treated as a capital gain. See id.
1231(a)(1). If there is a net loss in aggregate, the loss is treated as an ordinary loss. See id.
§ 1231 (a)(2).
Section 1231 is not the end of the story. The "recapture" provisions in sections 1245 and
1250 require that a portion of the gain on some depreciable assets be treated as ordinary
gain. See id. §§ 1245, 1250. Under section 1.245 any amount of gain up to the sum of all
past depreciation allowances will be ordinary income. See id. § 1245(a)(1) and (2). The
rules under section 1250 shift gain to ordinary gain to the extent past depreciation deduc-
tions have exceeded the deductions that would have been allowed under the straight-line
method. Id. § 1250(a)(1) and (b)(l).
Although the Tax Reform Act of 1986 equalized capital gains and ordinary income rates,
those rates have gradually diverged since that time, at least for high-income individuals
subject to the highest statutory rates. At the present time, the highest federal statutory
rate on ordinary income of individuals is 39.6% while capital gains for high-income taxpay-
ers may be at rates as low as 20%. See id. §§ 1 (a)-(d) and (h).
It is worth noting that even in tax environments where capital gains rates equal ordinary
income rates, characterization as capital or ordinary is still important. Capital gains are
valuable because they tend to free taxpayers from the limitation on capital losses that al-
lows capital losses to be taken only to the extent there are offsetting capital gains. This
limitation hinders the ability to take losses early and therefore diminishes the potential
value of strategic loss-taking. That potential value is very high, about 10% of value for the
typical stock market asset. For a comprehensive discussion of the relation between strate-
gic loss-taking and the limitation on capital losses, see Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accre-
tion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817, 1870-72, 1879, 1882-84, 1885-
1889 (1990).
The rest of this Article will ignore the characterization of gain or loss upon disposition as
ordinary or capital. Under section 1231, losses from the disposition of depreciable assets
will tend to be ordinary losses. The limitation on capital losses does not come into play.
This fact means that not much is lost by ignoring the capital loss versus ordinary loss dis-
tinction when studying depreciable assets. Ignoring the distinction also simplifies the expo-
sition of the major points in the Article.
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fined precisely and contrasted with the major alternative, "group
accounting," in section B.8
To begin the first example, assume that the statutory tax depreciation
schedule is the smooth curve shown in Figure 1.9 Thus, in the first year
the taxpayer deducts $20 of the initial $100 value of the asset. The depre-
ciation period is 10 years. Suppose, however, that the asset breaks down
right after reaching age three and is discarded as worthless at that time.
The adjusted basis at the beginning of that year was $51, and the taxpayer
can take a loss in that amount upon discarding the asset. 10 The ex post
depreciation schedule is the one indicated in Figure 2. This schedule
tracks the statutory schedule for the first three years and then abruptly
drops off to zero in the third year.
Figure 1
Double Declining Balance with Switch to Straight Line
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One variety of strategic trading is "strategic loss-taking." Like asset
retirements, strategic loss-taking results in an ex post adjustment of the
pattern of deductions specified ex ante by the statutory depreciation
8. See infra text accompanying notes 17-19.
9. This curve corresponds to MACRS depreciation for a ten-year recovery period
under the Code except that the half-year convention is ignored. See I.R.C. § 168(d)(1)
(requiring half-year convention). Thus, depreciation is at a declining balance rate of 20%
per year and then switches to straight-line after five years have elapsed.
10. To take a loss in the year the asset is abandoned, the taxpayer must show abandon-
ment. I assume throughout the Article that this showing is not an obstacle. For most
depreciable assets, this assumption is innocuous because the assets are tangible. The real
problems in showing abandonment or worthlessness have been associated with intangible
assets such as securities or legal claims. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, supra note 1, at 414-15.
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schedule. Suppose that the statutory schedule is in annual increments
representing the same annual decrements in value as the statutory sched-
Figure 2
Ex Post Depreciation Schedule
100
90
80
cz 70
N 60
. 50
40
" 30
20
10
0 I I I I II I I I i I I I I
0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time (Years)
ule in the Figure 1. This annualized schedule is represented by the step
function in Figure 3. First year depreciation is $20 and initial cost was
$100 so that the depreciation schedule is at $80 during the first year. 1 In
the same figure, the market value of the asset appears as an irregular
curve.
Suppose that the taxpayer can costlessly sell the asset for its market
value and replace it with a similar used asset of the same value. 12 If the
11. The reason for using this particular step function is that asset value as a function of
time is plotted on the same graph. Strategic loss-taking possibilities arise if asset value
during any given year falls below the adjusted basis after depreciation is deducted at the
end of the year. It is easier to see on a graph whether asset value during a year falls below
adjusted basis as of the end of the year if the depreciation schedule is represented during
each year as equal to the adjusted basis at the end of the year.
Figures 3 and 4 take this approach. Thus, for the first year in Figure 3, the depreciation
schedule is represented by a constant $80 value. This $80 value is the adjusted basis at the
end of the first year after the depreciation deduction of $20 for that year is taken into
account.
12. The wash sale rules of section 1091 deny a loss deduction when sale is accompa-
nied by purchase of a "substantially identical" asset within 30 days preceding or following
the sale. I.R.C. § 1091(a). But section 1091 applies only to "shares of stock or securities"
and thus does not apply to depreciable assets. Id. Sale and repurchase of the same asset
might be treated as a sham transaction so that the loss on sale would be denied. See
Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (holding a court can invoke sham transaction
doctrine to ignore the form of a transaction with "no economic substance" and treat it as
something else for tax purposes). However, many depreciable assets such as cars and com-
puters are quite distinct but functionally fungible, and the taxpayer could probably avoid
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taxpayer faces a constant marginal tax rate during the entire ten-year life
of the asset, then the taxpayer will want to "accelerate" depreciation by
selling the asset during year three. Depreciation along the statutory
schedule would have brought the adjusted basis of the asset down to $51
at the end of that year. By selling at the low of $28 during the third
year,t 3 the taxpayer can take an additional loss of ($51 - $28) = $23 for
that year. Assuming that the replacement asset is depreciated at the
same rate as the original one but over the shorter life appropriate for a
used asset,14 the effective depreciation schedule will be the step function
in Figure 4. This schedule is the same as the one in Figure 3 except that it
shifts down to a lower level in year three. In effect, the taxpayer has
accelerated statutory depreciation by strategic loss-taking.
Figure 3
Asset Market Value Versus Depreciation Schedule
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the sham transaction doctrine by buying a replacement asset that is similar but not identi-
cal to the asset that was sold. As a result, it would probably be difficult to design effective
wash sale rules for depreciable assets.
13. The ability to trade costlessly means that it is possible to sell an asset when it
reaches its lowest market value during some period. The trader need only sell and repur-
chase whenever the asset drops an infinitesimal amount. The last sale and repurchase will
take place at the lowest market value during the period. This strategy involves a large
number of trades, but each trade costs nothing.
14. In fact, used assets are treated the same as new assets under MACRS: IRC § 168
does not apply a different schedule or a shorter life to used assets. Although the replace-
ment asset in the text example would have a ten-year life rather than a shorter life reflect-
ing that it is used and not new, initially it would be depreciated at the same double
declining balance (20% per year) rate as the original asset.
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Figure 4
Asset Market Value Versus Depreciation Schedule
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Two important characteristics of strategic loss-taking are worthy of
mention. First, profitable strategic loss-taking is only possible for a par-
ticular asset if, at some point in time, the market value of the asset falls
below the adjusted basis dictated by the depreciation schedule. 15 Second,
the viability of strategic loss-taking depends on transaction costs. If trad-
ing is costly enough, the benefits of "accelerating" depreciation will be
less than the after-tax trading costs required to secure those benefits.
Strategic loss-taking is not the only form of strategic trading that is
important for depreciation policy..16 But, because strategic loss-taking al-
lows the taxpayer to alter the depreciation schedule set by the govern-
ment, it must be considered carefully in the design of depreciation policy.
As a result, strategic loss-taking looms large in the discussions that follow,
and especially so in Part III.
15. If statutory depreciation is accelerated, the scope for strategic loss-taking is less-
ened. For example, if depreciation for the asset depicted in Figures 3 and 4 were acceler-
ated so that adjusted basis were at or below $28 by the end of year three, then there would
be no reason to trade in year three. The extreme instance of accelerated depreciation
occurs under a cash flow income tax where the entire cost of an asset is deducted at the
time of purchase. In that case, assuming the asset cannot fall below zero in value, there is
no scope for strategic loss-taking at all. An example of this treatment in current law is
I.R.C. § 179, which allows the immediate deduction of up to $19,000 in 1999 of equipment
used in a trade or business and placed into service in that year. For subsequent years, the
$19,000 limit gradually goes up to $25,000.
16. See infra note 128 (discussing taking long-term capital gains in a wash sale to en-
hance depreciable basis), infra text accompanying notes 173-174 (discussing "churning").
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B. CURRENT LAW AND POLICY
1. Individual Item Accounting and Group Accounting
Under current law, the taxpayer has a choice for each asset or group of
assets between two general approaches to depreciation accounting: indi-
vidual item accounting and group accounting. The approaches differ in
two significant ways. First, as the name suggests, group accounting typi-
cally involves the combination of several assets into a single account. At
the election of a taxpayer, a group of assets is depreciated as if it were a
single asset. Second, the tax treatment of asset dispositions under group
accounting typically differs from the treatment under individual item
accounting.
As mentioned above, under individual item accounting, a disposition
results in a gain or loss equal to the amount realized less the adjusted
basis.17 Under group accounting, the rules for dispositions are more com-
plicated, and a detailed discussion of these rules is deferred until Part IV
to accompany the main policy discussion of group accounting. It is im-
portant to note that divergent treatment of dispositions under individual
item and group accounting is not inevitable. Indeed, later portions of this
Article consider several group accounting disposition rules as policy op-
tions for individual item accounting.18
The next subsection of this Part discusses the depreciation schedules
that are applied under current law. These schedules are the same regard-
less of whether the taxpayer uses individual item accounting or group
accounting. 19
2. Depreciation Schedules
There are two separate major schedules for tax depreciation in the In-
ternal Revenue Code: the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System
(MACRS) and the Alternative Depreciation System (ADS).20 These two
17. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
18. See infra text accompanying note 156.
19. For example, Treas. Reg. § 1.168(i)-I (as amended in 1994), paragraph (d)(1)
states that "[d]epreciation allowances are determined for each general asset account by
using the applicable depreciation method, recovery period, and convention for the assets in
the account." "General asset accounts" are the group accounts for the Modified Acceler-
ated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) applicable to tangible property placed into service
after 1986. Similar provisions applied to previous regimes. For instance, "mass asset ac-
counts" are the group accounts for the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) appli-
cable to tangible property placed into service from 1981-86, and the Proposed Regulations
applicable to these accounts simply state that "a taxpayer may elect to account for mass
assets ... in the same mass asset account, as though such assets were a single mass asset."
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168-2(h)(1), 49 Fed. Reg. 5940 (1984). See also infra text accompany-
ing notes 243-247 (suggesting use of special depreciation schedules for some group ac-
counts and expressing doubt that Treasury can create and impose those schedules in
Regulations without explicit Congressional authorization).
20. In addition to these two major systems, there is a plethora of special rules in the
Code. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 169 (five year amortization of pollution control facilities); I.R.C.
§ 174(b) (five-year amortization of certain research and development expenditures); 1.R.C.
§ 194 (seven-year amortization of certain qualified reforestation expenditures); I.R.C.
§§ 59(e) and 263(c) (five-year amortization for certain intangible drilling expenditures).
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schedules differ in their relationship to economic depreciation, the theo-
retical ideal of matching the actual pattern of decline in asset value ex-
actly by depreciation deductions.2' Generally speaking, the ADS system
is meant to mimic economic depreciation while the MACRS system is
designed to allow depreciation at a faster rate than economic deprecia-
tion in order to stimulate investment. Thus, the Code requires the ADS
to be used whenever the goal is to measure income22 or to depreciate
assets under a non-accelerated schedule.23 In addition, the Department
of the Treasury, operating under Congressional mandate to study the
class lives to be used as a basis for MACRS and ADS,24 explicitly as-
sumes that ADS is meant to serve as a surrogate for economic
21. See supra text accompanying note 1.
22. For example, when a corporation distributes money to its shareholders, it is neces-
sary to decide whether the money represents a nontaxable return of capital to the share-
holders or is taxable as a distribution of corporate profits to the shareholders. The key
question that must be answered to address this question is whether the corporation has
profits to distribute. If it does, the distributions will be considered to be profits since the
capital contributed by the shareholders is still intact and at work in the corporation after
the distribution.
To determine whether a distribution is from profits, the Code sets up an "earnings and
profits" account consisting of the net undistributed earnings of the corporation. To com-
pute net earnings, an accurate measure of depreciation must be subtracted from gross
earnings. The Code requires that the ADS be used for this depreciation computation. See
I.R.C. § 312(k)(3) (1994).
23. For example, taxpayers must use ADS rather than MACRS to depreciate equip-
ment used outside of the United States, equipment leased to tax exempt entities and equip-
ment financed by tax exempt bonds. See I.R.C. § 168(g)(1)(A)-(C).
In each of these three cases, Congress did not want depreciation to be accelerated at all.
Acceleration under MACRS was meant to stimulate investment in the domestic economy.
Section 168 ensures that MACRS will not be allowed for investments used outside of the
United States. Tax exempt entities already receive a total exemption from taxation. Sec-
tion 168 ensures that they will not be able to receive tax benefits from accelerated depreci-
ation through leases. Tax exempt financing results in lower interest charges than normal
financing. See GRAETZ, supra note 1, at 261. Section 168 prevents the double benefit that
would arise from combining tax exempt financing with accelerated depreciation.
24. In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress directed the Treasury Department to
study the actual depreciation pattern of "all depreciable assets," and granted the Depart-
ment authority both to change class lives for assets with existing class lives and to prescribe
class lives for assets that do not have any. See I.R.C. § 168(i)(1)(B) (1986). In the Techni-
cal and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Treasury's authority to alter the class lives of
existing assets or to create class lives for assets without any was eliminated, but the direc-
tive to study the depreciation pattern of all depreciable assets was maintained. See I.R.C.§ 168(i)(1) (1988); Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 6253, 102 Stat. 3342 (1988). The Senate first passed an amendment barring Treasury
from lengthening class lives. This amendment was extended in Conference to cover all
Treasury authority to alter class lives, including the authority to establish class lives for
assets that currently have none. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-1104 § 6253 (1988).
The Department of the Treasury released six reports under the Congressional mandate
to study the depreciation pattern of "all depreciable assets." See Department of the Treas-
ury, Report to Congress on the Depreciation of Clothing Held for Rental (1989) [hereinaf-
ter "Treasury Rental Clothing Study"]; Department of the Treasury, Report to the
Congress on the Depreciation of Scientific Instruments (1990) [hereinafter "Treasury Sci-
entific Instruments Study"]; Department of the Treasury, Report to the Congress on the
Depreciation of Fruit and Nut Trees (1990) [hereinafter "Treasury Fruit Tree Study"]; De-
partment of the Treasury, Report to the Congress on the Depreciation of Horses (1990)
[hereinafter "Treasury Horse Study"]; Department of the Treasury, Report to the Congress
on the Depreciation of Business-Use Passenger Cars (1991) [hereinafter "Treasury Passen-
[Vol. 52
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depreciation. 25
In setting up MACRS in 1986, Congress wanted to allow depreciation
that is "accelerated" in comparison to economic depreciation but in-
tended that the degree of acceleration for each asset class be such that no
class of assets would be tax-favored over any other class.26 MACRS op-
erates by assigning assets to one of ten classes based on the "recovery
period" to be used to depreciate the asset.27 For some classes of assets,
MACRS allows front-loaded depreciation, that is, a pattern of deprecia-
tion with larger deductions in the earlier years of life.2 8
In contrast, for most assets, ADS consists of straight-line depreciation
over the "class life" of the asset.29 The government attempts to set the
class lives of assets so that the ADS system approximates economic de-
ger Cars Study"]; Department of the Treasury, Report to the Congress on the Depreciation
of Business-Use Light Trucks (1991) [hereinafter "Treasury Light Trucks Study"].
25. In the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, class lives are tied to
economic depreciation:
Class lives ... would be determined such that the present value of straight-
line depreciation deductions over the class life, discounted at an appropriate
real rate of interest, is equal to the present value of what the estimated de-
cline in value of the asset would be in the absence of inflation.
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Acr OF 1986,
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-841 (1986) [hereinafter "Tax Reform Act of 1986 Blue Book"].
In its first opportunity to study class lives under this directive, the Treasury Department
examined the issue of the proper class life for tuxedos. See Treasury Rental Clothing
Study, supra note 24. The Treasury Department interpreted the Congressional intent un-
derlying the directive to be that treatment under the ADS should approximate economic
depreciation as closely as possible. See id. at 1-2, 51. As a result, Treasury resolved ambi-
guities in the phrase "the present value of straight-line depreciation" by calculating present
value as if the taxpayer were subject to the actual ADS system. Thus, in the case of tuxe-
dos, the mid-year convention for the time property is placed in service was assumed to
apply, see infra note 29, and the tax benefits of the deductions were assumed to be realized
by the taxpayer on August 9 of each year. The August 9 date is the average date the
benefits would be realized by a taxpayer with positive taxable income through the impact
of the deductions on estimated tax payments. See Treasury Rental Clothing Study, supra
note 24, at 51.
26. See Tax Reform Act of 1986 Blue Book, supra note 25, at 98; SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, S. REP. No. 313 (1986); HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1985, H.R. No. 426 (1985).
27. The recovery periods are 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 25, 27.5, 39 and 50 years. See I.R.C.
§ 168(c)(1).
28. In particular, the pattern for assets with applicable recovery periods of 3, 5, 7 or 10
years is the pattern created by applying the 200 percent declining balance method and
switching to the straight-line method at the point in time when that method yields larger
deductions. The pattern for assets with applicable recovery periods of 15 and 20 years is
the same except that the 150 percent declining balance method is used instead of the 200
percent declining balance method. Assets with an applicable recovery period larger than
20 years do not receive any front loading of tax depreciation. These assets are depreciated
using the straight-line method. See I.R.C. § 168(b).
29. See I.R.C. § 168(g). The recovery period under ADS generally is the class life of
the asset. See I.R.C. § 168(g)(2)(C). There are only three exceptions. First, personal prop-
erty with no class life is assigned a recovery period of 12 years. Second, nonresidential real
property and residential rental property are assigned a recovery period of 40 years. Fi-
nally, railroad grading and tunnel bores are assigned a recovery period of 50 years. See id.
Under the ADS approach, the conventions in section 168(d) about when the property
has been placed in service must be followed. I.R.C. § 168(g)(2)(B). With some exceptions
this means that the "half-year convention" must be followed. All property placed in ser-
vice during the year will be treated as placed in service at the mid-point of that year. The
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preciation. 311 Generally speaking, the class life of an asset is significantly
longer than its "recovery period" under MACRS. 31
The class life concept plays an important role in MACRS in addition to
its central role under ADS. MACRS has ten asset categories and three
depreciation patterns.32 The Code explicitly assigns some asset types to
MACRS categories. 33 If an asset has a class life but is not explicitly as-
signed by the Code to a MACRS category, it is assigned to one of six
MACRS categories depending on its class life. 34 If an asset has no class
life and is not explicitly assigned by the Code to a MACRS category, then
the Code classifies it as 7-year property for MACRS purposes.35
II. OPTIMAL DEPRECIATION WHEN THE AGE-PRICE
PROFILE IS KNOWN IN ADVANCE
Part I detailed some basic features of depreciation systems and set out
some features of current law. With this background in hand, this Part
examines the theory and practice of setting depreciation schedules and
assigning recovery periods in a depreciation system. Sections A, B, and C
study the situation where the goal is to match tax depreciation with eco-
nomic depreciation. Section D examines the case of accelerated
depreciation.
More specifically, Section A discusses a restrictive assumption, that the
age-price profile of surviving assets is known in advance, and sets up an
example used throughout the rest of this Part. Section B shows that given
the restrictive assumption, there is a way to replicate economic deprecia-
tion. Section C shows that the required approach is quite different from
the leading academic approach devised by Hulten and Wykoff and that
some aspects of the current government approach also deviate from the
most significant exceptions are nonresidential real property and residential rental property.
These assets are subject to a "mid-month convention." See I.R.C. § 168(d).
30. This is clear both from the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and
from administrative practice. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 34.
32. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
33. This includes automobiles, light trucks, railroad grading and tunnel bores, residen-
tial rental property, nonresidential real property, railroad track, and a few other asset
types. See I.R.C. §§ 168(e)(3), 168(c)(1).
34. See I.R.C. § 168(e)(1). The classification scheme is as follows:
Class Life (in years) MACRS Category
4 or less 3-year property
more than 4 but less than 10 5-year property
10 or more but less than 16 7-year property
16 or more but less than 20 10-year property
20 or more but less than 25 15-year property
25 or more 20-year property
The MACRS categories indicate the period over which tax depreciation is taken under that
system while the class lives are the period under ADS. It is clear from the table set out
above that the MACRS period for depreciation of an asset is generally much shorter than
the class life of the asset.
35. See I.R.C. § 168(e)(3)(C)(iii).
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required approach. Finally, Section D considers the issue of accelerating
depreciation in a neutral manner starting from the baseline of economic
depreciation.
In Part III, the restrictive assumption applied in this part is relaxed.
The assumption is valuable because it leads to a particularly simple rule
for replicating economic depreciation and situates the more complex con-
siderations taken up in the latter Part. Given this rule, it is easy to pro-
vide a very direct critique in this Part of the Hulten and Wykoff approach
and of the current government approach.
This Part focuses only on individual item accounting. A coherent dis-
cussion of group accounting methods requires the more complex setting
developed in Part II.
A. AN AssuMPTION AND AN EXAMPLE
1. The Assumption
As depreciable assets age and wear out, they generally decline in value.
This decline reflects the fact that the asset's revenue earning life is be-
coming shorter and shorter. The decline can be described by an "age-
price profile," a specification of the value of the asset at each point in its
life. This Part studies optimal depreciation under the assumption that the
age-price profile for surviving units is known in advance. That is, when
the asset is purchased and put into service, the buyer (and the govern-
ment) know exactly how much surviving units will be worth at each fu-
ture time.
This assumption is restrictive. It is equivalent to assuming that after
the asset is put into service, no new information concerning its durability
or revenue earning potential will be discoverable at low cost. To make
this point clear, consider racehorses, an example of a depreciable asset
that will be used extensively later in the Article. It is clear that race-
horses are subject to "revenue risk," that is, the revenues that a particular
horse will earn are uncertain at the time the horse is born. 36 Racehorses
are also subject to "retirement risk," that is, it is uncertain how long a
particular horse will be able to race or breed effectively. 37
36. See, e.g., Treasury Horse Study, supra note 24, at 15-16 (unpredictable and dra-
matic earnings and value differences between thoroughbred stallions used in breeding).
37. Retirement risk is clearly a major factor to address when considering the impact of
risk on tax depreciation policy. Both government policymakers and leading academics are
careful to adjust their estimates of economic depreciation to take into account this type of
risk. See infra text accompanying notes 51-53. In addition, Treasury Department studies
on depreciation patterns find that asset life is highly uncertain for many very different
kinds of assets. See Treasury Rental Clothing Study, supra note 24, at 19 (tuxedos); Treas-
ury Scientific Instruments Study, supra note 24, at 15-16 (eight types of scientific instru-
ments); Treasury Fruit Tree Study, supra note 24, at 14 (peach trees); Treasury Horse
Study, supra note 24, at 7-9 (thoroughbred geldings, thoroughbred stallions, thoroughbred
mares); Treasury Light Trucks Study, supra note 24, at 16-17 (light trucks). These studies
suggest that retirement risk is not only theoretically important, but also empirically
significant.
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The resolution of these risks over a horse's life will cause the value of
the horse to differ from the value expected at birth. Thus, a horse's initial
races at two years old will reveal a great deal about the horse's future
revenue potential. Horses that appear to be Kentucky Derby material
will shoot up in value and horses that appear to be losers will plummet in
value. Also, after a few years of life some horses may be identifiably less
durable or healthy than others. These horses will be expected to have
shorter productive lives and will be less valuable than other horses. The
result of risk resolution will be that the age-price profile of individual
horses will deviate from the age-price profile anticipated when the horse
is put into service.
Although the assumption that the age-price profile is known in ad-
vance is unrealistic for many assets, the assumption allows the analysis in
this Part to be clear and simple. Part III then explores the implications
for depreciation policy of relaxing the assumption.
2. The Example
This Part uses an example set up in this section to demonstrate many
points. The example employs particular assumptions about the net reve-
nue stream and retirement risk of the asset under study. Nevertheless,
the basic conceptual results that underlie the entire Part will be shown to
be independent of the particular example chosen. These conceptual re-
sults will hold so long as the asset's age-price profile is known in advance.
The example combines a statistical distribution of asset lives and a
curve representing net revenues at each point in time to yield asset value
at each point in time. The net revenues at each future time for an asset
that is still operating are assumed to be fixed and known in advance. We
also assume that no new statistical information will be discovered about
an asset's durability beyond the originally given statistical distribution of
lives. Thus, the asset's prospects for additional life at any given later age
can be specified at the time the asset is put into service.
Under these assumptions, it is easy to construct in advance an "age-
price profile" representing the value of surviving assets at any given time.
For each asset age, one simply computes the present value of future reve-
nues taking into account the likelihood that the asset will survive to any
particular later year.
We will assume that the statistical distribution of asset lives is "expo-
nential." This means that the rate of death per unit time is constant. At
any given asset age, the same proportion of the assets still functioning will
fail within the following year. 38 For the net revenue stream, we will make
38. Consider a cohort of assets purchased at the same time. With an exponential life
distribution, the proportion of assets in the cohort surviving to any particular age will de-
cline in the same way that adjusted basis declines under a declining balance method of
depreciation. See infra note 55. Each year the same proportion of the surviving assets fail,just as adjusted basis falls by the same proportion each year under the declining balance
method.
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a similar assumption: net revenues decline exponentially. For conven-
ience, in this example, as in the rest of the Article, we also will assume
that there is no inflation and that assets have no salvage value.39 When
an asset fails, its value falls to zero.
With exponentially declining revenues and an exponential distribution
of asset lives, the age-price profile for surviving assets will also be expo-
nential. 40 That is, the value of the asset will decline at a constant rate
with age. With a real interest rate of 4%, an expected asset life of 10
years, and revenues that decline at a rate of 20% per year, the age-price
profile is as shown in Figure 5.41 If the asset fails at some point during its
life, the age-price curve will follow the curve in Figure 5 up until the time
of failure and then will drop off instantaneously to zero.42
For convenience, we leave the example in terms of "continuous time."
That is, we follow asset value changes as they occur from moment to mo-
ment. An alternative approach would be to annualize the changes in
value. The curve in Figure 5 would then look like the "step function" in
Figures 3 and 4.
This approach would not change the results but would make the analy-
sis and the graphs awkward.
B. REPLICATING ECONOMIC DEPRECIATION
When the age-price profile for surviving assets is known in advance,
there is a simple rule that replicates economic depreciation. This rule
calls for using a depreciation schedule based on that age-price profile
combined with allowing a loss deduction when an asset fails.
For our example, the age-price profile for surviving assets is the curve
shown in Figure 5. Basing the depreciation schedule on this curve means
An exponential distribution is a special case of a more general distribution called the
Weibull distribution. See PAUL A. TOBIAS & DAVID TRINDALE, APPLIED RELIABILITY 66
(1986). The exponential distribution has the property that the expected additional life of
an asset is independent of its age. For many assets this property does not seem intuitive,
but, instead, one would expect that older assets would have a shorter expected additional
life. For example, the expected additional lifespan for a very old racehorse will be less than
the life expectancy of a racehorse at birth. This property can be modeled by choosing a
different case of the Weibull distribution. For a discussion of the use of different lifespan
distributions and their impact on depreciation policy, see infra Appendix C.
39. See supra note 6 (salvage value); infra note 65 (inflation). Adding salvage value
into the example or discussing adjustments for inflation would not affect any of the results
but would make the example more complicated.
40. This is demonstrated mathematically in Appendix A infra.
41. Note that the real interest rate is treated as being constant over the life of the asset
and known in advance. If interest rates fluctuated, it would not be possible to set out a
single age-price profile for the asset in advance. The path of asset value over time would
depend on interest rates. Higher interest rates would depress value because future reve-
nues would be discounted more heavily. Part III studies the tax policy ramifications of not
knowing in advance the exact age-price profile that an asset will experience. See infra text
accompanying notes 119-198.
The 4% discount rate used in the example here is the same rate used by the Treasury
Department in its depreciation studies. For citations and a discussion of the appropriate-
ness of this rate, see infra note 70.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11 (Figures 1 and 2).
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Figure 5
Age-Price Profile-Exponential Life Distribution and
Revenue Decline Rate
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Time
that the taxpayer should receive a dollar of depreciation deductions
whenever the curve declines by a dollar.43 Under this rule, the curve rep-
resents the adjusted basis of surviving assets as well as their market value.
So long as the asset survives, a tax depreciation schedule based on the
curve will exactly match the decline in market value of the asset.
When an asset fails, the asset's value falls from the market value for
surviving assets indicated by the curve to zero instantaneously. Economic
depreciation requires an instantaneous deduction reflecting exactly that
decline in value. But the rule we have specified calls for exactly this
treatment. The taxpayer is allowed to deduct the remaining adjusted ba-
sis of the asset at the time of failure. This remaining adjusted basis is
equal to market value right before failure.
In summary, basing the statutory depreciation schedule on the age-
price profile for surviving assets and allowing a loss deduction when an
asset fails results in a system that replicates economic depreciation per-
fectly. So long as an asset survives, tax depreciation is equal to economic
43. The continuous time nature of this example means that the taxpayer continuously
receives depreciation deductions and the ensuing tax benefits. The accounting period is
effectively zero since any decrease in market value results in an instantaneous deduction.
A strong case can be made that this accounting period of zero is the appropriate one to use
for an accretion tax. See Stmad, supra note 7, at 1821-22, 1832-47, 1853-63.
In a context such as the text example where interest rates and the decline in asset value
are known with certainty, it is possible to collect taxes periodically (e.g., annually) but
replicate the result that would occur under continuous taxation. Tax liabilities and benefits
that arise before the end of the year can be paid or credited with interest at the end of the
year. The result will be financially equivalent to continuous taxation. See id. at 1828-29.
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depreciation because the tax depreciation schedule is exactly the schedule
of the decline in market value of the asset. If the asset fails and is dis-
carded, the statutory schedule no longer represents economic deprecia-
tion. However, deduction of the loss at the time of failure exactly
corrects the schedule to correspond to economic depreciation.
Note that under this set of rules, there is no scope for profitable strate-
gic loss-taking. Strategic loss-taking is potentially profitable only if mar-
ket value falls below adjusted basis under the statutory depreciation
schedule.44 In the tax scheme just presented, that situation occurs only
when the asset fails and is discarded. But upon failure and disposition of
the asset, the taxpayer receives a deduction equal to the loss suffered.
There is no need to trade the asset to receive the loss. 45 Furthermore, far
from being improper, this deduction is required in order to replicate eco-
nomic depreciation.
C. GOVERNMENT AND ACADEMIC APPROACHES
The rule set forth in the previous section is a rule that results in a tax
system based exactly on economic depreciation. Furthermore, this rule is
impervious to strategic loss-taking. Using this rule as a benchmark, this
section studies the Hulten and Wykoff approach and the government ap-
proach designed to achieve that same result. Because of improper treat-
ment of retirement risk, the Hulten and Wykoff approach generally
results in depreciation that is greatly accelerated compared to economic
depreciation. The government's approach is conceptually sound, but one
of the two major variants it uses to implement its approach results in
significant errors. In addition, even if the correct variant is employed, the
government's approach will fail if strategic loss-taking is viable. Subsec-
tion 1 discusses the Hulten and Wykoff approach while subsections 2, 3, 4
and 5 examine the government approach.
1. The Hulten and Wykoff Approach
The leading academic work on the measurement of economic deprecia-
tion is a 1981 article by Charles Hulten and Frank Wykoff.4 6 Hulten and
44. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
45. The taxpayer need only show that the asset has been discarded or abandoned. For
depreciable assets that are discarded, it normally should be easy to show abandonment.
See supra note 10.
46. See Charles Hulten and Frank Wykoff, supra note 3.
This work is held in very high esteem by the academic community. See, e.g., John B.
Shoven, Commentary on Investment Incentives in Theory and Practice, HUIrEN & WYKOFF
in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 342
(1988). Treasury depreciation studies also cite Hulten and Wykoff favorably and rely on
Hulten and Wykoff for guidance. See, e.g., Treasury Rental Clothing Study, supra note 24,
at 20; Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, supra note 24, at 19.
Hulten and Wykoff's work has had significant impact on the actual depreciation rules in
the Internal Revenue Code. A 1984 Treasury tax reform study, generally referred to as
"Treasury I," proposed the Real Cost Recovery System (RCRS), a set of depreciation rules
meant to replicate economic depreciation. These rules were based directly on Hulten and
Wykoff's results. A later administration proposal (Treasury 11) used the recovery periods
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Wykoff's central claim is that economic depreciation can be measured
precisely enough so that a tax system based on economic depreciation is a
practical option.47 They establish this claim by showing that it is possible
to calculate plausible economic depreciation rates for a wide range of
assets using existing data.48 It is not clear whether Hulten and Wykoff
intended that the government use the derived rates directly as the appli-
cable statutory rates for tax depreciation, 49 but the government has done
just that in some important settings.511 We therefore use the term "Hulten
and Wykoff approach" even though Hulten and Wykoff may have been
well aware of the problems inherent in using their derived rates directly
as a tax depreciation schedule.
To compute a curve representing economic depreciation, Hulten and
Wykoff begin with market price data. This data gives them an age-price
profile, that is, a curve that specifies the market value of surviving assets
at each age. Hulten and Wykoff note that this profile "miss[es] an essen-
tial point" because it represents "only the value of assets which have sur-
vived long enough to be eligible for sampling." 51
In response, they adjust the price at each age by multiplying by the
probability of survival to that age. The resulting product is an average
price where the average is over both surviving assets and assets that have
failed earlier and are now worthless.52 In their own words, this average
and depreciation patterns set out in RCRS as the baseline for proposing a system of accel-
erated depreciation. With some slight modifications these periods and patterns became
MACRS, the accelerated depreciation system currently in effect. See U.S. TREASURY
DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, volume 2, at
160 (1984); Brazell et al., A History of Federal Tax Depreciation Policy, OTA Paper 64, at
22-23 (1989).
47. See Hulten & Wykoff, supra note 3, at 82-83, 112.
48. See id. at 94-96.
49. They discuss proposals for statutory tax depreciation schedules, propose their own
depreciation rates, and then conclude that their derivation of rates shows that it is not
necessary for tax depreciation schedules to be "politically determined." See id. at 81-82,
94-96, 112. Because the central focus of their article is the ability to derive tax depreciation
schedules, it is easy to interpret their article as suggesting that their depreciation rates are
meant to be tax depreciation schedule rates.
As discussed below, the problem with directly applying Hulten and Wykoff's rates as a
tax depreciation schedule is that the adjustments that Hulten and Wykoff make for retire-
ments should not be incorporated in the schedule. Having to adjust for retirements makes
Hulten and Wykoff's argument that it is possible to derive tax schedules based on empirical
rather than political considerations more difficult. It is not clear why they would include
that adjustment if they did not believe the adjustment was appropriate for computing tax
rate schedules for actual application.
50. See supra note 46.
51. Hulten & Wykoff, supra note 3, at 91. Hulten and Wykoff note that this type of
problem is called "censored sample bias" in econometrics. Id. The sample of prices at
each age has been "censored" by removal of the assets that have not survived to be that
old.
52. Suppose, for example, that at age 10, surviving units are worth $100 but that only
one half of all units survive to this age. Under the Hulten and Wykoff approach, the price
at age 10 of $100 is multiplied by the probability of survival which is .50. The result is $50.
But this is the average value of all units (both surviving and retired) at age 10. Half of the
units are retired and have value $0 and half are functioning and have value $100.
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price "takes into account both survivors and nonsurvivors. '' 53
Hulten and Wykoff also find that, on average, age-price profiles are
nearly exponential in form.54 That is, assets tend to decline in value at a
constant rate per time interval. 55 Hulten and Wykoff declare this result
"the most significant finding" of their research. 56 However, they also
note that the exponential form for the age-price profiles only holds ap-
proximately as an average over many types of assets. In a rigorous statis-
tical test for the shape of these profiles, the exponential form, along with
its chief rivals, fails to be statistically acceptable. 57
Hulten and Wykoff propose approximating economic depreciation by
assuming an exponential decline in value and by using age-price profiles
corrected to include nonsurviving assets in computing the depreciation
rate for each asset.58 The adjustment for retirement risk under the
Hulten and Wykoff approach results in a new age-price profile that is
lower than the old profile that applies only to surviving assets. At each
age, the price in the new profile is the probability of survival up to that
age multiplied by the price for that age in the old profile.
The effect of the Hulten and Wykoff approach can be illustrated using
the example developed in the earlier sections. Consider Figure 6. The
upper exponential curve is the age-price profile for surviving assets. The
lower exponential curve is the age-price profile adjusted in the way that
Hulten and Wykoff advocate.
Using the lower exponential curve instead of the upper curve will result
in depreciation that is much faster than economic depreciation. A surviv-
ing asset moves along the upper curve but is depreciated as if the price
falls off more sharply along the lower curve. When an asset fails, there is
a loss deduction equal to the height of the lower curve. This amount is
less than the actual loss, which is the height of the upper curve. The dif-
53. Id. at 91.
54. See id. at 93.
Hulten and Wykoff use the term "geometric" instead of "exponential." See id. The
terms have the same meaning: curves that change at a constant instantaneous rate.
55. The correlate of constant exponential decline among depreciation methods in the
Code is the declining balance method. Under this method, a constant proportion of ad-
justed basis is deducted each year. For example, if the declining balance rate is 20% and
the asset is initially worth $100, then the pattern of deductions for the first four years will
be as follows:
Adjusted Basis at
Year Beginning of Year Deduction
1 $100.00 $20.00 = .20 x $100
2 $80.00 $16.00 = .20 x $80
3 $64.00 $12.80 = .20 x $64
4 $51.20 $10.24 = .20 x $51.20
If the asset actually declines at a constant 20% rate per year, then this declining balance
method will correspond to economic depreciation.
56. Id. at 93.
57. This means that there must have been many age-price profiles in their study that
deviate significantly from the exponential form.
58. See id. at 94-96.
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Figure 6
The Effect of the Hulten & Wykoff Adjustment
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ference in heights between the curves represents an amount of loss at
failure that the taxpayer has been permitted to deduct prematurely, that
is, before failure actually occurred.
It is possible to express the acceleration effect under the Hulten and
Wykoff approach in terms of class lives using a Treasury Department
method described in subsection 2.59 Figure 6 includes the straight-line
schedules that are equivalent in present value to the age-price profiles in
the figure. These schedules translate the upper and lower age-price
profiles into class lives of 8.40 and 5.87 respectively. Using the Hulten
and Wykoff approach has reduced class life by about 30%.611
59. See infra text accompanying notes 62-85. Treasury's approach involves adjusting
both the age-price profile and the approximating straight-line schedule for retirement loss
deductions. It turns out that the proper adjustment for the age-price profile for surviving
assets transforms it into the Hulten and Wykoff age-price profile. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 89-91. If one starts out with the Hulten and Wykoff schedule, correcting it for
retirement losses (as called for in the government approach) is redundant since that correc-
tion is built into the schedule to begin with. This "double correction" results in class lives
being much too short.
60. To the extent that this particular example is atypical, it may underestimate the ac-
celeration effect of using the Hulten and Wykoff approach. In the example, net revenues
per unit of time for surviving assets fall off at the sharp rate of 20% per year while the asset
survival rate is 90% per year. The steep rate of decline in revenues causes the value of
surviving assets to fall sharply with age. Combined with the high asset survival rate, this
sharp decline means that losses at retirement will not figure as prominently as they would
normally. Put another way, the revenue drop causes the curve to drop so sharply that the
additional drop due to multiplying by the probability of survival is relatively small. This
additional drop is the adjustment required by the Hulten and Wykoff approach.
To illustrate these points with a concrete example, suppose that we change the example
so that net revenues per unit of time fall off at only a 10% rate and the asset survival rate is
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Hulten and Wykoff's estimates and methods have strongly influenced
statutory and administrative recovery periods. 61 These recovery periods
may be much too short.
2. Description of the Government Approach
The current tax depreciation treatment of assets depends heavily on
their class lives. These class lives determine ADS treatment in almost all
cases62 and determine MACRS treatment for all assets except for the as-
sets specifically assigned to a MACRS category by the Code.63
Not surprisingly, the Treasury Department's ultimate goal in studying
depreciation for each asset is to determine an appropriate class life for
the asset. In particular, Congress has mandated that the Treasury De-
partment study the actual depreciation history of assets so that Treasury
might propose revisions to existing class lives and might propose class
lives for assets that currently have none.64 The legislative history con-
cerning this mandate includes the following directive to Treasury about
how class lives are to be calculated: "Class lives . . .[should] be deter-
mined such that the present value of straight-line depreciation deductions
over the class life, discounted at an appropriate real rate of interest, is
equal to the present value of what the estimated decline in value of the
asset would be in the absence of inflation."' 65 Treasury has termed the
class life that emerges from this type of calculation the "equivalent eco-
nomic life" of the asset.66
In the six reports issued to date under its study mandate, 67 Treasury
reveals its approach to establishing depreciation schedules that replicate
economic depreciation. Some of the reports are a bit vague on the details
of the approach, but one of them, the study of the depreciation of scien-
tific instruments, is very explicit. 68 That study uses two slightly different
only 80% per year. In this case, the class life corresponding to the age-price profile for
surviving assets is 13.64 years. Using the Hulten and Wykoff approach lowers the class life
to 5.50, a reduction of almost 60%. This reduction is about twice as large in percentage
terms as the reduction in the text example.
61. See supra note 46.
62. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
64. See supra note 24.
65. Tax Reform Act of 1986 Blue Book, supra note 25, at 103.
Throughout this Article, the effects of inflation on the tax depreciation system are ig-
nored. Adding inflation into the examples and analysis would complicate them and no real
conceptual gain would result.
It seems clear that indexing adjusted basis for inflation would be a good solution to the
problems inflation presents to the depreciation system. Other solutions, such as providing
accelerated depreciation to offset the taxation of inflationary gains, have the weakness that
they are a precise cure only when inflation is at a particular rate. If the actual inflation rate
differs from that rate, these solutions simply distort investment incentives. See GRAETrZ,
supra note 1, at 398-400.
66. See, e.g., Treasury Rental Clothing Study, supra note 24, at 1; Treasury Scientific
Instruments Study, supra note 24, at 1.
67. See supra note 24.
68. A mathematical appendix in that study sets out one variant of Treasury's ap-
proach. See Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, supra note 24, at 49-52 (Appendix C).
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approaches, and the approaches taken in the other five studies either are,
or appear to be, similar to these two approaches.
The goal of the government approach is to produce a straight-line
schedule that will result in the same present value of depreciation as eco-
nomic depreciation. The derived straight-line schedule then indicates the
class life that should be assigned to the asset for the ADS, the deprecia-
tion system in the tax code that is meant to approximate economic
depreciation.69
The government approach includes two stages. First, a retirement ad-
justed age-price profile is generated. Second, the straight-line schedule
that would result in the same present value of depreciation taking into
account retirements is computed. 711 The total life spanned by the straight-
line schedule is the class life for the asset.
a. Stage One: Computing a Retirement-Adjusted Age-Price Profile
The first stage begins with the observation or estimation of the decline
in value of the assets over time. This stage results in an age-price profile
69. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
70. The Treasury Department uses a 4% discount rate to compute present values in its
depreciation studies. See Treasury Rental Clothing Study, supra note 24, at 24; Treasury
Scientific Instruments Study, supra note 24, at 22; Treasury Fruit Tree Study, supra note 24,
at 23; Treasury Horse Study, supra note 24, at 13; Treasury Passenger Cars Study, supra
note 24, at 10; Treasury Light Trucks Study, supra note 24, at 13.
Where the approximating straight-line schedule has a very different shape from the orig-
inal age-price profile, it is possible that the class life results will be sensitive to the choice of
discount rate. It is unclear how solid Treasury's 4% assumption is. Over the past 60 years,
U.S. Treasury bills (short-term notes) have averaged only a 0.4% real return. For a discus-
sion of the tax policy implications of this low historical average rate, see Joseph Bankman
& Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate
About Risk? Does It Matter, 47 TAX L. REV. 377 (1992).
There is a great deal of variance in the ex post real rate of return. During the 1940s and
1970s, Treasury bills had a significant negative ex post real rate of return. During the 1926-
1934 period and during the 1980s, bills had a large positive ex post real rate of return. The
4% figure would not have been a bad estimate of the ex post real rate during the late 1970s
and 1980s, the period immediately preceding the Treasury depreciation studies. See RICH-
ARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE at 126
(table), 546 (chart) (3d ed. 1988).
However, it is not the ex post real rate that is critical but the real rate that is expected ex
ante. Investors will base their economic decisions on that rate. Ex post rates may end up
being particularly high if investors overestimate inflation.
Another issue makes matters even more complicated. It is unclear whether the ex ante
real riskless rate is stable. Some researchers claim that it displays a unit root which implies
that the time series of ex ante real riskless rate is nonstationary. See, e.g., Andrew K. Rose,
Is the Real Interest Rate Stable?, 43 J. FIN. 1095 (1988). This result is controversial. See Lai,
Is the Real Interest Rate Unstable? Some New Evidence, 29 APPLIED ECON. 359 (1997).
If the ex ante real interest rate is unstable, it will not tend to return to any particular
average value but will wander around more or less at random. Thus, long runs of negative
or positive real rates are to be expected if the past is prologue. Qualitatively, these runs
seem to characterize real ex post returns on U.S. Treasury bills. Furthermore, there is no
reason for the average real rate over a long time period to be any particular value. Picking
an appropriate real riskless rate to use in tax policy studies is no easy matter!
Finally, the 4% figure is not adjusted for taxes. However, the failure to make such an
adjustment may be acceptable if estimating economic depreciation for system-wide appli-
cation is the goal. See infra note 253.
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relating the market value of each asset to its age.7 1
After deriving an age-price profile, the government approach adjusts
this profile to take retirements into account and computes the present
value of depreciation under the adjusted schedule. It is here that two
variants appear, and both are present and clearly described in the scien-
tific instruments study. One variant is equivalent to the Hulten and Wyk-
off approach. The age-price profile for surviving assets is adjusted by
multiplying the value of surviving units at each age by the probability of
survival.72 Since this adjusted profile gives average value as a function of
age, it is possible to derive from the profile an "age-depreciation profile"
describing the rate of decline in value for the average asset at each age.
73
The discounted present value of the decline in average value suffered at
each age is the present value of economic depreciation that will be used
to compute an equivalent straight-line depreciation schedule.
The other variant is more complex and consists of four steps.74 The
first step is to compute age-price profiles for units with different known
lives. 75 As a second step, the prices in each age-price profile for a unit of
known life are divided by the initial price of a unit with that life. This
normalization results in a normalized initial price of one for all units, re-
gardless of life.76 The third step is to compute the present value of depre-
ciation as a function of the known asset life.77 For each particular life,
this present value of depreciation is simply the present value of the de-
clines in value described by the normalized age-price profile for an asset
with that life. Finally, since asset lives are unknown, a weighted average
of the present values of depreciation for each asset life is constructed
where the weights are the probabilities that the asset will have any given
71. Treasury has employed two different methods to construct age-price profiles: the
market data method and the productivity method. See Treasury Rental Clothing Study,
supra note 24, at 20-22 (productivity method); Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, supra
note 24, at 19, 21 (mixture of market data method and productivity method); Treasury
Fruit Tree Study, supra note 24, at 22-23, 40-41 (productivity method); Treasury Horse
Study, supra note 24, at 11, 14, 19-21 (market data method); Treasury Passenger Cars
Study, supra note 24, at 10-11 (market data method); Treasury Light Trucks Study, supra
note 24, at 12 (market data method).
The market data method consists of using data on market price versus age to estimate
the age-price profile. The productivity method is used when market data does not suffice
for providing an accurate estimate. See infra text accompanying notes 250-253 (description
of productivity method in Appendix A).
72. See Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, supra note 24, at 21-22.
73. See, e.g., Treasury Rental Clothing Study, supra note 24, at 24; Treasury Fruit Tree
Study, supra note 24, at 23-25.
74. These steps are clearly described in Appendix C of the scientific instruments study.
See Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, supra note 24 App. C, at 49-52.
75. See Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, supra note 24, at 49 (equations 1 and 6);
Treasury Fruit Tree Study, supra note 24, at 29 (Figure 5 and accompanying text); Treasury
Horse Study, supra note 24, at 12 (Figure 4 and accompanying text).
76. See Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, supra note 24, at 49 (equations 2 and 7);
Treasury Fruit Tree Study, supra note 24, at 29 (Figure 5 and accompanying text). See also
Treasury Horse Study, supra note 24, at 12 (Figure 4 and accompanying text; horse prices
for different lives are normalized to be the same at the start).
77. See Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, supra note 24, at 50-51 (equations 3, 4, 8
and 9).
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life. 78 This second variant takes retirement risk into account by averaging
together the present value of depreciation for assets with different lives.
b. Stage Two: Computing an Equivalent Straight-line Schedule
The result emerging from either variant of the first stage in the govern-
ment approach is a present value for economic depreciation that is ad-
justed to include retirement deductions. In the second stage, the
government computes an adjusted straight-line depreciation schedule
that results in the same present value of depreciation as the present value
of depreciation computed in step one. 79 This straight-line schedule is
"adjusted" in the sense that loss deductions due to asset retirements are
included in the present value computation. The adjustment process takes
the retirement loss at each time, multiplies it by the probability that re-
tirement will occur at that time, and discounts the product back to "time
0," the time the asset is placed in service.
Thus, the government approach adds the present value of retirement
losses to the present value of decline in value along each straight-line
schedule before picking one with the same present value as the retire-
ment adjusted age-price profile.11 Retirement losses accelerate deprecia-
tion relative to the schedule, and, as a result, adjusting straight-line
depreciation for retirement risk in this way increases the present value of
deductions for each straight-line schedule.81 Thus, a straight-line sched-
ule with a longer life will be required to match any given present value
derived from the retirement-adjusted age-price profile.82
78. See id. (equation 5 and text following equation 9).
79. See id., at 19-20, 22; Treasury Horse Study, supra note 24, at 13-14.
80. In two of the six studies the government also considered asset sales. In the Treas-
ury Passenger Cars Study, supra note 24, sales replaced retirements in the computations.
The reason for this approach is that business use passenger cars typically are sold before
the end of their useful life for household (non-business) use. See id. at 2, 24. The govern-
ment assumed that dispositions in the future would match the pattern observed in the
study sample from the mid and late 1980s and that this pattern was exogenous to the actual
tax treatment applied. See id. at 32. The only new element that arises from using sales
instead of retirements is that sales may result in gains as well as losses. The case would be
the same if we considered salvage value upon retirement since that value may exceed the
adjusted basis of the asset. Taking the disposition patterns to be exogenous means that no
explicit allowance for strategic loss-taking is implicit in the approach.
The second study that considers asset sales is the Treasury Light Trucks Study. See supra
note 24. This study takes both retirements and dispositions into account. See id. at 2. But
as in the Treasury Passenger Cars Study, the disposition pattern is exogenous and assumed
to be the same as the pattern that emerges from the data collected for the study. Thus,
there is no explicit consideration of strategic loss-taking. In fact, the numerical results
presume that gains rather than losses will predominate in asset sales under the equivalent
straight-line schedule. See id. at 36 (Table A-4, column 4).
81. When retirement occurs, the remaining adjusted basis is deducted immediately in-
stead of gradually as indicated by the rest of the schedule. Considering retirement risk
therefore increases the present value over the level that would follow from the schedule
alone.
82. When the present value of depreciation as a percentage of initial value is lower,
the straight-line schedule that produces the same present value of depreciation must be
less steeply sloped. Since the class life corresponds to the point where the straight-line
schedule crosses $0 value, the class life will be longer.
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Figure 7
Adjusting the Straight-line Schedule for Retirements
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As an illustration of the government's approach, consider Figure 7,
which is based on the example developed previously.83 The exponentially
declining line is the retirement adjusted age-price profile for the asset
based on the Hulten and Wykoff approach. The present value of depreci-
ation for this schedule is 88.44% of initial value. The lower straight-line
schedule results in the same present value of depreciation if deductions
for retirements are not included in the computation. Since this line cuts
the horizontal axis at 6.40, 6.40 years is the "appropriate" class life for the
asset.84 The higher straight line results in the same present value of de-
Adjusting a straight-line schedule for retirement risk requires knowing the distribution
of lives for the asset under study. In general, the present value of retirement loss deduc-
tions will be higher when depreciation is slower. The reason for this result is that when an
asset fails and becomes worthless, the ensuing retirement loss is equal to adjusted basis.
Adjusted basis is higher at any given time during the recovery period when depreciation is
slower.
Thus, for example, allowing for retirement risk would tend to reduce the gap in present
value between five-year and ten-year straight-line depreciation. Even though the present
value of depreciation under the five-year schedule is higher, the present value of retire-
ment loss deductions is higher for the ten-year schedule.
This reduction cannot entirely eliminate the gap. Suppose that an asset fails and is re-
tired at time t and that the retirement loss under the ten-year schedule at this time is $X(t)
higher than under the five-year schedule. Under the five-year schedule this amount $X(t)
has been deducted earlier than under the ten-year schedule. For this asset, the present
value of depreciation plus retirement losses must be greater under the five-year schedule.
But this argument does not depend on the particular retirement time that was chosen. As
a result, the argument holds for all assets, independent of retirement time.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
84. Strictly speaking this class life should be adjusted to reflect the peculiar features of
ADS depreciation. Thus, the appropriate convention for the starting time of service, typi-
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preciation as the exponential curve if retirement deductions are taken
into account. Since taking into account retirement deductions increases
the present value of deductions, this straight line is more gradual and
represents slower depreciation for surviving assets than the first straight
line. The second, more gradual straight line cuts the horizontal axis at
8.40, and thus requires that class life be set at 8.40 years, a considerably
longer class life than the 6.40 years dictated by the first straight line. The
impact of the adjustment for retirement is quite dramatic: Class life in-
creases by about 24%.
3. Critique of the Government Approach
At first glance the government approach looks quite different from the
approach that we identified as optimal, that is, basing the depreciation
schedule on the age-price profile unadjusted for retirements. The govern-
ment approach adjusts the age-price profile for retirements but then
makes an offsetting adjustment for retirements in computing an
equivalent straight-line schedule.8 5
These adjustments raise three questions. First, is the government's ap-
proach appropriate even though it appears to differ from the approach
that we argued was optimal above? Second, are the offsetting adjust-
ments for retirements in the government approach necessary? Given that
the government has to derive a straight-line schedule that is equivalent to
economic depreciation, 86 an alternative and apparently simpler approach
would be to convert the "optimal" depreciation schedule derived from
the age-price profile for surviving units directly into a straight-line sched-
ule. Third, if the adjustments are appropriate, are both of the govern-
ment's variants for adjusting the age-price profile correct?
To address these questions, this subsection argues that if we assume
away the possibility of strategic loss-taking, the government's approach
using the Hulten and Wykoff variant for adjusting the age-price profile is
correct. The other variant, however, results in depreciation that is too
fast. The next subsection shows that the offsetting retirement adjust-
ments are necessary. Simply converting the age-price profile for surviv-
ing assets to a straight-line schedule with equal present value will not
work. The final subsection shows that the government's approach fails
when strategic loss-taking is possible.
cally the mid-year convention, should be used to compute the equivalent straight-line
schedule, and the exact timing of the receipt of the tax benefits from depreciation deduc-
tions should be taken into account. See supra note 25. I ignore these ADS adjustments
here for simplicity.
85. The two adjustments are offsetting because the age-price profile is "accelerated"
while the surrogate straight-line schedule is "decelerated" by taking retirement deductions
into account. Compare supra text accompanying notes 71-73 (acceleration due to adjusting
age-price profile for retirement deductions) with supra text accompanying note 82 (decel-
eration of equivalent straight-line schedule to allow for benefits from retirement
deductions).
86. See supra note 25 and text accompanying notes 64-65.
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If we ignore strategic loss-taking, the argument for the government ap-
proach is that the present value of depreciation adjusted to include the
loss deductions that arise from retirements is the total present value of all
the tax benefits that come from economic depreciation of the asset. A
retirement loss is simply part of the asset's price path, and it should be
accounted for as a tax loss at the time of retirement by the tax system.8 7
The present value of the tax adjustments for economic depreciation
should include the present value that arises from retirements. 88
If the goal is to give the taxpayer a straight-line schedule that is
equivalent to depreciation using the age-price profile for surviving assets,
it is necessary to ensure that the present value of the sum of depreciation
deductions and retirement loss deductions is the same under the two
schedules. Only then will a taxpayer face the same expected present
value of total tax benefits for cost recovery under both schedules.
In the remainder of this subsection, we explore the two variants that
the government has used to adjust for retirements. The first variant sim-
ply uses the same adjustment that appears in the Hulten and Wykoff ap-
proach: the age-price profile for surviving assets is adjusted downward by
multiplying the price at each age by the probability of survival to that
age.89 The resulting curve consists of the average value of both surviving
and retired assets.90 The present value of depreciation based on this
curve is the retirement-adjusted present value that emerges from the first
variant.
Using this first variant results in the correct outcome. The decline
along the derived curve will be precisely the average decline in value ex-
perienced by assets with different lives. The present value of depreciation
that follows from the curve will be the present value that is expected on
average when the asset is purchased. 91 This present value is exactly the
goal of the calculations.
The second variant does not perform as well. In the example we have
been using in this Part,92 the present value of depreciation calculated by
87. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
88. The Treasury Department makes exactly this argument in several of its deprecia-
tion studies. See, e.g., Treasury Horse Study, supra note 24, at 14; Treasury Scientific In-
struments Study, supra note 24, at 23.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
90. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
91. To make this point in a more mathematical way, note that there are three steps in
the computation under the Hulten and Wykoff approach:
(1) A curve representing the average value of all units (retired and surviv-
ing) is derived;
(2) The derivative of this curve gives the instantaneous rate of decline in
value at each point;
(3) The instantaneous decline in value at each point is integrated after being
discounted to present value.
Taking the average and taking the derivative commute. That is, the derivative of the
average value curve is equal to the average derivative of the individual value curves. Thus,
the overall result will be the expected present value of depreciation independent of the
order of steps (1) and (2).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
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using the first variant is 88.44% of initial value compared to 90.51% of
initial value when calculated using the second variant.93 These present
values translate into class lives of 8.40 and 6.36 years respectively for the
two variants. 94 The second variant results in a class life that is about 24%
too short.
The divergence becomes even more extreme if we alter the example to
allow a slower rate of decline in revenues. The rate in the example was
20% per year. If we use a rate of 10% per year, the present values of
depreciation for the first and second variants are 83.60% and 87.66% of
initial value respectively. The corresponding class lives are 15.08 under
the first variant and 9.26 years under the second variant. The second vari-
ant results in a class life that is almost 40% too short. This discrepancy is
much larger than the discrepancy when revenue declined more quickly.
The intuitive reason for the deviation between the two variants and the
increase in that deviation for a lower rate of decline in revenues is that
the second variant gives too low a weight to assets with long lives. The
second variant begins by computing the age-price path and the present
value of depreciation for individual cases where the life of the asset is
known. Assets with longer lives will be more valuable initially because
these assets will continue producing revenues after assets with a shorter
life have been retired. Since they start at a higher initial value, longer-
lived assets will contribute more total depreciation than shorter-lived as-
sets. In addition, the depreciation for longer-lived assets will be concen-
trated in the later years compared to shorter-lived assets. The shorter-
lived assets will reach zero value and stop depreciating at some point. At
this point the longer-lived assets still have value and are still depreciating.
If assets of different lives are averaged together (as in the age-price
profiles we have been considering), the longer-lived assets will be a larger
component of value, will contribute more total depreciation, and will
cause average depreciation to be shifted toward later years. However,
the second variant normalizes the initial price of assets of different lives
to be one. This normalization artificially diminishes the contribution of
longer-lived assets to the average and causes average depreciation to ap-
pear to be faster than it really is. 95
It is not surprising then, that the second variant results in much shorter
class lives than the first variant. It is also not surprising that the discrep-
ancy is more severe when revenues decline more slowly. A slower de-
cline in revenues means that the later years of an asset's life are relatively
93. The mathematical derivation of these results is set out in Appendix A. See infra
Appendix A.
94. The class lives are calculated using the Treasury Department's method for translat-
ing the present value of depreciation for an asset into a class life for the asset. See supra
text accompanying note 78-84.
95. Appendix A discusses this point more comprehensively and proves that the pres-
ent value of depreciation is higher under the second variant in general and not just for the
parameters that govern the text example. See infra Appendix A and text accompanying
notes 260-264.
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more important. The second variant artificially downplays these later
years.
It is now possible to come to some conclusions about the government
approach. First, in the absence of strategic loss-taking, the government
approach is conceptually correct. In particular, adjusting both the initial
age-price profile and the surrogate straight-line schedule for retirements
is theoretically sound. Second, implementing the government approach
by the first, "Hulten and Wykoff" variant for adjusting the age-price pro-
file for retirements results in the correct values for class lives. However,
using the second variant results in class lives that are much too short. Use
of this variant should be abandoned in favor of the first variant.
Unfortunately, these positive conclusions will not hold up when strate-
gic loss-taking is viable. The impact of strategic loss-taking on the gov-
ernment's approach is discussed in subsection 5 below. The next
subsection shows that the government approach cannot be simplified to
eliminate the retirement adjustments without introducing substantial
errors.
4. The Need to Adjust for Retirements
The government's approach rests on the Treasury Department's inter-
pretation of language in the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 concerning how class lives should be calculated. 96 This language
could be interpreted differently to mean that class lives should be deter-
mined without making any adjustments for retirement risk.97 Thus, the
government could simply translate the age-price profile for surviving as-
sets into the straight-line schedule that results in equal present value of
depreciation. This approach would eliminate the laborious corrections
for retirement risk both for the age-price profile for surviving assets and
for the equivalent straight-line schedule.
Unfortunately, this simplified approach can result in significant errors.
These errors arise because a depreciation schedule based on the age-price
profile for surviving assets will be equivalent to the corresponding
straight-line schedule only for the assets that survive for the duration of
both schedules. For assets that perish before both schedules reach zero,
96. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
97. This interpretation would not strain the language in the legislative history. On the
contrary, perhaps the most natural interpretation of the language is that the age-price pro-
file should be translated into the straight-line method that is equivalent in present value
without adjusting for retirement risk. The relevant language in context is as follows:
If resale price data is used to prescribe class lives, such resale price data
should be adjusted downward to remove the effects of historical inflation.
This adjustment provides a larger measure of depreciation than in the ab-
sence of such an adjustment. Class lives using this data would be determined
such that the present value of straight-line depreciation deductions over the
class life, discounted at an appropriate real rate of interest, is equal to the
present value of what the estimated decline in value of the asset would be in
the absence of inflation.
Tax Reform Act of 1986 Blue Book, supra note 25, at 103.
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retirement deductions generally will differ under the two schedules. As a
result, when retirement risk is taken into account, the expected present
value of deductions is not the same for the approximating schedule and
the schedule based on the age-price profile for surviving assets. The di-
rection of the errors depends on whether the approximations allow faster
or slower depreciation than the actual decline in value of surviving assets
in the early years of asset life.
Consider the case where the approximation results in slower deprecia-
tion in the early years compared to actual depreciation. For the example
that we have been considering in this Part, Figure 8 sets out the age-price
profile for surviving assets and the straight-line schedule that results in
the same present value of depreciation deductions. It is apparent from
the figure that in the early years of the asset's life the straight-line sched-
ule results in depreciation that is slower than the actual decline in value
of the asset. In later years the straight-line schedule results in deprecia-
tion at a faster rate than the actual rate of decline in asset value.
Figure 8
Age-Price Profile and Equivalent Straight-line Schedule
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The straight-line schedule in the figure extends over 9.42 years. If the
taxpayer holds the asset for the full 9.42 years, then the taxpayer will
experience depreciation that is too slow in the early years but will "catch
up" in the later years when depreciation under the straight-line schedule
is too fast.
There is a problem, however, that has been identified by Roger Pies
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and David Fischer. 98 Many assets will fail and be discarded before the
taxpayer can catch up under the straight-line schedule. In the example
that generates the diagram, 99 over 50% of assets will fail before the two
curves cross in the diagram at approximately 7.1 years. These assets are
depreciated at too slow a rate along the straight-line schedule during their
entire life. They never have a chance to catch up in the later years when
depreciation is faster along that schedule than the actual rate of decline in
value.
This phenomenon results in the Pies-Fischer effect: When retirements
are taken into account, the straight-line schedule results in a lower pres-
ent value of deductions than the schedule based on actual depreciation.
In the example represented by Figure 8, the present value of all deduc-
tions will fall from 88.44% of initial value for depreciation based on the
actual age-price profile to 87.52% of initial value for depreciation using
the straight-line approximation to that profile. 00
Our example represents only one of two possible cases. Straight-line
approximations may involve depreciation that is faster than actual decline
in value in the early years followed by depreciation in the later years that
is slower than actual decline in value. In this second case, retirement risk
can cause an "inverse" Pies-Fischer effect to occur. A larger proportion
of assets experience the early part of the approximate schedule than the
later part. Since the early part is accelerated relative to the actual decline
in value while the later part is decelerated, the expected present value of
all deductions will be higher under the approximated schedule than under
the schedule that reflects actual decline in value.
In conclusion, it is not possible to eliminate the adjustments for retire-
ments in the government approach without creating significant errors.
However painful, those adjustments are necessary. 10 1
98. See Roger A. Pies & David J. Fischer, How Dispositions Affect Determination of
Depreciation Class Life, 47 TAX NOTES 85, 85-86 (1990).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
100. As Pies and Fischer point out, present value effects that appear small, such as the
one percentage point effect here, may actually represent significant distortions in terms of
the degree of adjustment in the law required to correct them. See Pies & Fischer supra
note 98, at 89 (class life for use in straight-line depreciation must be shifted from 5.039
years to 3.619 years to overcome 1.64 percentage point gap in present value).
The exact class lives that Pies and Fischer advocate may be much too short. To construct
a depreciation schedule for surviving assets, they use the depreciation rates derived by
Hulten and Wykoff. See id. at 90. But these rates already have been accelerated to take
into account retirement losses. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61. Nonetheless,
Pies and Fischer proceed to adjust the schedule based on these rates for retirement losses.
In effect, this approach results in a double adjustment for retirement losses. The resulting
class lives will be much too short. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
101. The use of a straight-line approximation does raise some problems even under the
government's approach. Although the present value of deductions is the same under the
straight-line approximation as under the retirement adjusted age-price profile, there is a
residual "ex post" equity problem that arises from using an approximation.
Suppose that the approximating straight-line schedule initially is slower than economic
depreciation represented by the age-price profile for surviving assets but that an asset will
be fully depreciated under the straight-line schedule before the age-price profile reaches
zero. Then, taxpayer one who holds an asset that fails early will receive depreciation that is
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5. The Impact of Strategic Loss-taking
In subsection 3, we argued that the government approach was concep-
tually correct so long as the proper variant is used to adjust the age-price
profile for retirement risk. Unfortunately, this conclusion does not hold
up if strategic loss-taking is feasible.
To see the basic intuition behind this conclusion, let us return to the
theoretically ideal treatment consisting of using a depreciation schedule
based on the age-price profile for surviving assets. As we have noted," 2
under this schedule there can be no strategic loss-taking. At any point in
time, the asset has been depreciated for tax purposes down to exactly its
market value. Adjusted basis is equal to market value. The taxpayer can-
not obtain a tax loss by selling the asset.
This result disappears, however, if the depreciation schedule is ever
above the age-price profile for surviving assets. At such a point in time,
the market value of the asset is less than the adjusted basis of the asset,
and the taxpayer can trade to obtain a tax loss.
This phenomenon is independent of whether there is any retirement
risk. Consider an asset that will produce constant revenues of $1000 per
year and will last exactly 10 years."' 3 Figure 9 plots the ensuing age-price
too slow compared to economic depreciation. In contrast, taxpayer two who holds an asset
that fails right after the approximating straight-line schedule reaches zero will receive de-
preciation that is too fast compared to economic depreciation.
This ex post problem cannot be fixed short of abandoning approximation techniques
altogether and using the actual age-price profile of surviving assets as the basis for the
depreciation deductions allowed. As long as the approximate schedule deviates in differ-
ent directions from economic depreciation during different asset age periods, differential
treatment based on the holding period for the asset will occur. See also infra text accompa-
nying notes 177-180 (discussing impact of diversified holdings of depreciable assets on eq-
uity problem).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
103. Since the exact life is known in advance, there is no retirement risk.
This example is almost identical to the example used by Professor Chirelstein to illus-
trate what he calls the "sinking-fund depreciation method." See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 137-39 (5th ed. 1988). The sinking-fund method is equivalent
to the productivity method described above: The age-price profile that serves as a basis for
economic depreciation is equal at each moment in time to the present value of future
revenues. See infra text accompanying notes 248-251.
Unfortunately, Professor Chirelstein linked the sinking-fund method to the outcome that
economic depreciation will be decelerated compared to straight-line depreciation. See id.
at 139. But that deceleration result is not the necessary or natural outcome of the sinking-
fund method. Instead the result is an artifact of the particular example Professor Chirel-
stein examines. The asset in the example has constant revenues, no revenue risk, and no
retirement risk.
All of the age-price profiles depicted in figures in this paper have been derived by the
same method, the productivity method, that Professor Chirelstein used. The profiles in
these figures are based on different assumptions about revenue risk and retirement risk.
Yet most of them are accelerated rather than decelerated relative to the straight-line
method. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 42-43 (Figure 5, exponential life distribu-
tion and exponentially declining revenues) and infra text accompanying notes 127-128 (Fig-
ure 11, Weibull life distribution with shape parameter 2.125, constant revenues).
Whether deceleration or acceleration relative to the corresponding straight-line curve is
"typical" is an empirical question. The evidence unearthed by Hulten and Wykoff suggests
that acceleration is typical. They term the situation studied by Chirelstein, where revenues
are constant and the asset simply collapses at some known future time, the "one-horse-
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profile and the straight-line schedule with the same present value of de-
ductions as the schedule based on that profile.
Figure 9
Age-Price Profile and Equivalent Straight-line Schedule
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The two schedules cross when the asset is 6.77 years old. Up to this
point the taxpayer is better off under the straight-line schedule, but after-
wards, the taxpayer should trade frequently so as to secure deductions
that track the actual decline in value of the asset.' 04 The total present
value of deductions under this strategy are 61.23% of initial value com-
shay" case. See Hulten & Wykoff, supra note 3, at 89. This case results in an age-price
profile that declines more swiftly at older ages, as in Figure 9 and the Chirelstein example.
But this case is not typical as is indicated by two of Hulten and Wykoff's empirical findings.
First, Hulten and Wykoff found that the one-horse-shay pattern is not statistically accepta-
ble as a model for the large set of depreciable assets that they studied. Second, the average
age-price profile for these assets is convex, that is, the rate of decline is more rapid in the
early years of the asset's life. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
104. At about three years of age, the rate of the actual decline in value becomes greater
than the rate of depreciation along the straight-line schedule. At this point in time, the
slope of the age-price profile in the figure is equal to the slope of the straight line. But it is
not optimal for the taxpayer to switch to the actual schedule at this "equal rates" time,
even though the actual decline in value will be at a faster rate for all future times. Switch-
ing by trading at the "equal rates" time entails paying taxes on the gain equal to the verti-
cal gap between the schedules at that time. This gain will be offset by accelerated
deductions along the age-price profile representing actual decline in value. When the point
at which the curves cross is reached, the entire amount of this gain will be offset by addi-
tional deductions. However, these offsetting deductions are later in time than the gain
experienced from selling at the equal rates time. In present value terms, the taxpayer is
worse off.
This same argument applies to potential trades at all points in time before the time at
which the curves cross. After that time, there is no penalty in the form of taxable gain for
shifting to the faster schedule based on the actual decline in asset value.
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pared to 59.80% of initial value for the stream of deductions under either
the straight-line schedule or the schedule based on actual decline in
value.1(15
Congress has required the government to convert schedules represent-
ing economic depreciation into straight-line schedules with the same pres-
ent value of depreciation.10 6 This requirement is not senseless because it
allows ADS, the part of the Code that approximates economic deprecia-
tion, to be very simple: Each asset is depreciated under the straight-line
method over its class life. But the existence of the requirement makes
strategic loss-taking problems inevitable.
This inevitability results from the fact that a schedule that approxi-
mates econonic depreciation must result in adjusted basis sometimes be-
ing higher and sometimes lower than actual market value. If adjusted
basis were always higher than market value, depreciation under the ap-
proximating schedule would be too slow. 107 If adjusted basis were always
lower than market value, the approximating schedule would be too fast.
Since adjusted basis must sometimes be above market value under any
approximation, strategic loss-taking is a potential problem. 108
Because Congress requires the government to use approximations, it is
important to consider policy responses to the strategic loss-taking prob-
lem. It turns out, however, that strategic loss-taking is a much more per-
vasive problem. The true scope of the problem has been hidden by our
assumption that the age-price profile for surviving assets is known in ad-
vance. A schedule based on this profile precludes strategic loss-taking
since adjusted basis is always equal to market value.
But, in general, the age-price profile for surviving assets is not known
105. The taxpayer will be even better off if used assets are depreciated under the same
type of straight-line approximation employed for new assets. Then, after selling at the
point where the curves cross, the taxpayer will receive a new straight-line schedule that will
decline faster than the actual decline in value for some period of time. The taxpayer
should stick to that schedule until it crosses the age-price profile. Then the taxpayer should
trade again, receiving a third straight-line schedule. Pursuing this strategy dominates sim-
ply trading to deduct along the age-price profile after the first straight-line schedule crosses
the curve representing that profile.
106. See supra note 25 and text accompanying notes 64-65.
107. This assertion is true even if we take retirements into account. Under the slower
schedule with consistently higher adjusted basis, retirement loss deductions are more valu-
able since loss is equal to adjusted basis at the time of retirement. However, the increased
losses exactly correspond to earlier depreciation deductions given up by the taxpayer on
the slow schedule. Thus, the slower schedule will result in a lower present value of depreci-
ation even after adjustment for retirement losses. For a more extensive explanation of this
point, see supra note 82.
108. In the context of our example, consider the following figure. The curved line is
the age-price profile for surviving assets. This curve represents the market value of surviv-
ing assets at any given time. The straight-line is the approximating schedule under the
correct, Hulten and Wykoff, variant of the government's approach. See supra text accom-
panying notes 62-84.
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in advance.' 0 9 As a result, there is the danger that market prices will end
up being lower than adjusted basis under whatever schedule is specified
ex ante. Part III takes up the potential policy responses to strategic loss-
taking in this more general setting."10 The solutions discussed there apply
equally to the strategic loss-taking problems raised by the need for the
government to use approximations.
D. RETIREMENT RISK CONSIDERATIONS IN THE NEUTRAL DESIGN OF
ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION SYSTEMS
Section B establishes that retirement risk can be ignored in computing
a depreciation schedule that results in economic depreciation. However,
if the goal is to accelerate depreciation in a neutral way across assets from
a benchmark of economic depreciation, then retirement risk must be
taken into account. The basic reasoning behind this assertion is straight-
forward. Two assets with the same age-price profile for surviving units
will have the same statutory schedule if economic depreciation is the
goal."' Suppose, however, that asset number one has a much higher sur-
Figure
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It is clear from the figure that the approximating straight-line schedule results in an
adjusted basis above market value for the first six years and an adjusted basis below mar-
ket value thereafter. Thus, adjusted basis under the approximating schedule is sometimes
below and sometimes above market value. During the first six years, the period when
adjusted basis is above market value, strategic loss-taking is possible. The taxpayer will
want to "trade down" to the market value and thus effectively accelerate depreciation
deductions.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 119-198.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
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vival rate than asset number two. The statutory schedule covers only sur-
viving units. Asset number one is more likely to survive and therefore is
more likely to be depreciated along any given portion of the statutory
schedule. Accelerating the statutory schedule will benefit asset one more
than asset two.
This result can be illustrated using the example developed in earlier
sections.' 12 Consider Figure 10. The upper curve is the same age-price
profile that we have seen in the example all along. Since this curve is the
age-price profile for surviving assets, it is the statutory schedule that
should be used if economic depreciation is the goal. The lower curve is
an accelerated depreciation schedule. The rate of depreciation on the
lower schedule is exactly twice the rate on the upper schedule. The dif-
ference in the heights of the two curves represents the cumulative amount
of "early" tax depreciation that an asset depreciated on the lower curve
will receive compared to economic depreciation.
Figure 10
Age-Price Profile Versus Accelerated Depreciation Schedule
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Now consider two assets. Asset one has a survival rate of 9/10 annually
while asset two survives only at a rate of 2/3 annually. The following
table indicates the probability of survival to various ages for the two
assets:
112. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
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TABLE I: SURVIVAL HISTORY FOR TWO ASSETS
age percentage surviving to age for
asset one asset two
0 100.0% 100.0%
1 90.0% 66.7%
2 81.0% 44.4%
3 72.9% 29.6%
4 65.6% 19.6%
5 59.0% 13.2%
6 53.1% 8.8%
7 47.8% 5.9%
8 43.0% 3.9%
9 38.7% 2.6%
10 34.9% 1.7%
From the table it is clear that at any given age past a few months, it is
much more likely that asset one will be subject to the statutory deprecia-
tion schedule. Asset two is much more likely to fail early. As a result,
accelerating statutory depreciation should be much more of a benefit for
asset one than for asset two.
This intuition turns out to be true and can be quantified. The total set
of tax benefits consists of statutory depreciation deductions and retire-
ment loss deductions. For the two assets, the present value of these de-
ductions per dollar of asset cost before and after acceleration of
depreciation are as follows:
TABLE II: EFFECT ON PRESENT VALUE
OF ACCELERATION
asset present value of tax benefits under:
economic depreciation accelerated depreciation
one .677 .759
two .820 .848
For asset one, the increase in the present value of deductions is
0.081644 per dollar of investment while the increase for asset two per
dollar of investment is only 0.02868, about a third as much. The accelera-
tion of depreciation has clearly favored asset one over asset two. In order
for accelerated depreciation to be neutral, the statutory schedule for asset
one must be accelerated much less than the one for asset two.1 13 If the
113. There is much work by economists on the issue of how to accelerate depreciation
in a neutral manner. See ALAN AUERBACH, THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL INCOME 33
(1983) (citing sources). There is more than one test for neutrality. The two major tests are
the present value approach and the internal rate of return approach. See id. at 33-34.
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depreciation rate is doubled for asset two as in the example, neutrality
will be achieved if the depreciation rate for asset one is increased by a
factor of 1.29.114
It is clear that different amounts of acceleration may be required for
two assets that have the same statutory depreciation schedule under an
economic depreciation scheme if the assets differ in retirement risk char-
acteristics. This result has important implications for current law. Under
current law, ADS is meant to simulate economic depreciation, and
MACRS is meant to accelerate depreciation in a neutral manner from the
baseline of economic depreciation.' "5 But the Code simply translates the
class lives under ADS to recovery periods under MACRS.' 16 This ap-
proach may result in some serious misclassification if assets vary greatly
in retirement risk characteristics.' t 7 In fact, it appears that there is a great
The present value approach works by computing the present value of gross returns re-
quired per dollar of investment. If tax benefits are high enough, this present value will be
less than one dollar. This means that less than a dollar in present value of gross returns willjustify a one dollar investment. A "neutral" acceleration of depreciation will decrease the
required present value of gross returns for all assets the same amount.
The internal rate of return approach works by computing the gross internal rate of re-
turn required to justify a one dollar investment. Higher tax benefits mean that this internal
rate of return will be lower. The investment does not need to earn as much return if tax
benefits are more generous. A "neutral" acceleration of depreciation will decrease inter-
nal rates of return for all assets the same amount.
The argument in the text is equivalent to the present value approach. An increase in the
present value of deductions translates to a proportional decrease in the required present
value of gross returns. Appendix B infra demonstrates that the proportionality factor is T/
(1 - T) where T is the tax rate.
There are strong arguments in favor of using the internal rate of return approach instead
of the present value approach. See Auerbach, supra note 112. But using the internal rate of
return approach would not affect the qualitative argument in the text. Accelerating depre-
ciation would lower the required internal rate of return by .02411 times T/(I - T) for asset
one and by 0.015161 times T/(I - T) for asset two. Thus, under the internal rate of return
method, this acceleration of depreciation fails to be neutral in exactly the same way: The
acceleration strongly favors asset one.
The fact that the internal rate of return approach comports qualitatively with the present
value approach in this example is not surprising. The intuition that accelerating the statu-
tory schedule should have more impact on asset one because of its higher survival rate is
independent of which approach toward testing neutrality is taken.
For a mathematical discussion of the application of the present value and internal rate of
return approaches to the text example, see infra Appendix B.
114. There is no single accepted definition of neutrality. See supra note 113. The two
leading approaches are the present value approach and the internal rate of return ap-
proach. See id. Under these two approaches the required acceleration factors for asset
one are 1.29 and 1.56 respectively. The text uses the 1.29 figure because the example has
been cast in present value terms.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 20-26.
116. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
117. The misclassification arises because ADS is meant to replicate economic deprecia-
tion while MACRS is meant to allow accelerated depreciation that is neutral between as-
sets. The point in the text is that neutral acceleration can result in two assets with the same
economic depreciation schedule having very different accelerated schedules. Thus, the fact
that two assets are in the same ADS category does not mean that they should be in the
same MACRS category. Setting up MACRS categories strictly on the basis of class lives,
as in the current Code, is a mistake. See supra note 34.
Earlier parts of the Article point out that ADS depreciation may not accurately replicate
economic depreciation. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61 (use of the Hulten and
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deal of variation, even for assets that seem similar.""
III. OPTIMAL DEPRECIATION WHEN THE AGE-PRICE
PROFILE IS NOT KNOWN IN ADVANCE
Part II studies tax depreciation policy in a context where the age-price
profile is known in advance. For many depreciable assets, however, infor-
mation about revenues or the durability of the asset affect the value of
the asset as its life unfolds.' 19 For these assets, the age-price profile for
the asset is not known in advance. This condition qualifies some of the
conclusions of Part II and raises some new issues.
The most fundamental result in Part II is that the age-price profile for
surviving assets provides the unique statutory depreciation schedule that
leads to an exact replication of economic depreciation. Since a deprecia-
tion schedule is set in advance, this result depends on knowing the age-
price profile for surviving assets in advance. If that profile is not known
in advance, the government must use other approaches for setting the
depreciation schedule.
Section A explores the new considerations that arise from not being
certain about the future prices of surviving assets. Sections B and C dis-
cuss potential tax policy responses to that uncertainty. Section B focuses
on changes in the ex ante part of depreciation policy, that is, changes in
the statutory depreciation schedule that is fixed in advance. Section C
considers changes in the ex post features of depreciation law. Under indi-
vidual item accounting, those features currently consist primarily of "set-
tling up" by assessing a loss or a gain when an asset is sold or discarded.
The loss or gain is equal to the amount realized minus the adjusted basis.
Section C considers more elaborate ex post adjustments. Some of these
are alternative rules for the tax treatment of dispositions that are actually
used in group accounting methods. The discussion, however, continues to
presume individual item accounting. Part IV discusses group accounting.
Section D states some conclusions. No clear policy winner emerges
from the discussion. The stronger alternatives have strengths and weak-
Wykoff approach makes class lives too short under current law). But even if ADS did
accurately replicate economic depreciation, the claim that a scheme where ADS and
MACRS categories are the same involves some misclassification would still stand. Given
that assets have different retirement risk characteristics, either the ADS categories or the
MACRS categories or both must be flawed if the two sets of categories are the same.
Finally, note that since the MACRS categories cover broad sets of class lives, the current
MACRS classification system may not be very accurate anyway. For example, assets with
class lives of between 4 and 10 years all are treated as 5-year recovery property under
MACRS. See supra note 34. The failure to take into account retirement risk in going from
ADS to MACRS is theoretically significant, but the existing degree of misclassification
may be so large that it dwarfs effects stemming from that failure. Nonetheless, it does
appear plausible that some degree of misclassification in the current MACRS categories
stems from ignoring retirement risk.
118. See infra Appendix C. This Appendix discusses life distributions and shows that
apparently similar assets (in particular, different sexes of racehorses) may have very differ-
ent life distributions.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
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nesses and only more research can determine which of them is actually
the best policy.
A. THE BASIC IMPLICATIONS OF UNCERTAIN FUTURE ASSET PRICES
FOR TAX DEPRECIATION POLICY
To illustrate the dilemma created by not knowing the age-price profile
of surviving assets in advance, consider an example that roughly approxi-
mates the situation for racehorses. At birth it is unclear how successful a
racehorse will be. The horses end up in three general categories. t20
About 40% never become "starters," that is, horses that race regularly.121
A minority of the 60% that become starters enjoy spectacular success.
Suppose that this class comprises one-sixth of the starters or 10% of all
racehorses.122 Spectacularly successful horses are the ones in the big na-
tional and international races such as the Kentucky Derby. The other
starters race consistently but probably only in local events. We are as-
suming that these other starters comprise 50% of all racehorses. They are
clearly "successful" but never earn the huge revenues that spectacularly
successful horses earn.
Suppose that there is no information about which type a racehorse is
until the horse actually begins to race at age two, but that shortly after the
horse is two, the horse's type is discovered with certainty.' 2 3 The result
will be that all racehorses will have a common age-price profile up until
age 2: During the first two years of life the owner must assume a 40%
chance that the horse will not be a starter, a 10% chance that the horse
will be a spectacularly successful starter, and a 50% chance that the horse
will start but will not enjoy spectacular success. When racing begins at
age two, the common age-price profile splits into three parts. The price
of spectacularly successful horses shoots up at that time while the price of
nonstarters falls.
Assume that spectacularly successful horses earn $5000 per year, non-
starters earn $500 per year, and starters that are not spectacularly success-
ful earn $2000 per year. In addition, suppose that all three types of
horses have the same distribution of useful lives once they are put into
service at two years old.12 4 Finally, suppose that before being tested in
120. Finer gradations are undoubtedly possible. But these three categories do emerge
from the Treasury Department's study on the depreciation of horses if both racing and
later breeding uses are considered. See Treasury Horse Study, supra note 24, at 5, 14-18.
121. The data indicate that between 30% and 40% never start. See id. at 5.
122. Unlike the 40% figure, this figure is simply used to generate the example. It is not
clear exactly what proportion of racehorses are, in fact, "spectacularly successful." Some
evidence indicates that the figure may be much less than 10% of all racehorses, including
nonstarters. See id. at 18 (about 7% of all starting colts become spectacularly successful
breeding stallions).
123. Information undoubtedly arrives at a more gradual rate than this. In addition,
some horses may be more likely to be successful based on their genetic heritage. These
horses presumably would have a higher value at birth. The goal here is not to model
racehorses precisely, but merely to construct a simple but illustrative example.
124. Instead of choosing an exponential distribution of lives, we use a Weibull distribu-
tion with shape parameter 2.125 and life parameter 0.153. This distribution is estimated
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their first races, two-year olds are sold to the owners who will race
them. 25 Since each horse's type is unknown until after the first few
races, all of these sales will occur at the same price.
Figure 11 illustrates the age-price profiles for the three types of horses
that follow from these assumptions. Until two years of age all three types
have the same age-price profile, then, at two years old, the age-price
profiles for the three types diverge. The spectacularly successful starters
are identified and their price shoots up. 126 Their age-price profile is the
top one in the figure. The second highest curve is the age price profile for
horses that become starters but that do not enjoy spectacular success.
The lowest curve is the age-price profile for horses that are nonstarters.
These horses experience a large drop in price when they are identified as
nonstarters at two years old. Finally, the third highest curve is a weighted
average of the other three curves. The weights are the proportions of
horses that fall into each of the three categories. This "average curve"
Figure 11
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from data on the useful lives of thoroughbred geldings. For a discussion of the Weibull
distribution and the reasons for using it, see infra Appendix C.
125. This assumption permits use of the common market value just before two years old
as the original basis of the horses. The Treasury Department in its study of horses in effect
makes a similar assumption since they take the value of horses before two years old to be
constant and use this value as the original basis. See Treasury Horse Study, supra note 24,
at 2, 11. Taking the value at birth as the basis instead would complicate the analysis but
would not affect any of the major conclusions.
126. The treatment of appreciation during portions of the lives of depreciable assets
raises interesting tax policy issues. For a discussion of these issues, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 141-145.
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therefore represents the an average age-price profile for all horses.127
It is clear from Figure 11 that it is no longer possible to replicate eco-
nomic depreciation perfectly by using a single statutory schedule. 128 Even
if the schedule is based on the average curve in the figure, many horses
will experience actual depreciation that deviates sharply from the sched-
ule. In particular, if the schedule is based on the average curve, deprecia-
tion will be much too fast for the spectacularly successful starters and
much too slow for nonstarters. 129
In addition, unless the statutory schedule is generated from a curve
that lies entirely below the lowest age-price profile, profitable strategic
loss-taking will be possible if trading costs are low enough. For example,
suppose in Figure 11 that the statutory schedule is the average curve.
When a horse is identified as a nonstarter just after two years of age, the
owner will want to sell the horse to speed up tax depreciation. By selling,
the owner takes the large loss of $6062.85 that occurs at two years but
127. If an individual owned many racehorses, price performance for the aggregate
group of horses would tend to be close to this average curve.
128. One might wonder why the authorities would not delay until right after the begin-
ning of year three to set the schedule for that year and future years. Then the tax authori-
ties would know which outcome occurs and could set the depreciation schedule on the
basis of the "correct" age-price profile.
This approach would work in the example. However, a peculiar feature of the example
is that all risk is resolved at one point in time. In the real world, risk tends to be resolved
gradually. The tax authorities would have to wait until a machine was retired to know the
exact age-price profile that occurred. Then, the depreciation system would be entirely ex
post in nature.
The device of having all risk resolved at one time in the example is used to make the
analysis simple. Analyzing the value of strategic loss-taking in an environment where risk
is resolved continuously is mathematically very difficult. See, e.g., George M. Constanti-
nides, Capital Market Equilibrium with Personal Tax, 51 ECONOMETRICA 611, 611 (1983);
Michael J.P. Magill & George M. Constantinides, Portfolio Selection with Transactions
Costs, 13 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1976). For a cogent study of the value of strategic loss-
taking for depreciable assets in that kind of environment, see Joseph T. Williams, Trading
and Valuing Depreciable Assets, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 283 (1985).
Professor Williams' study includes an aspect of strategic trading for depreciable assets
not discussed here: the possibility of selling depreciable assets for a gain in a wash sale in
order to increase the adjusted basis of the assets. The added basis is equal to the gain.
Since recovery of the added basis through deductions will be delayed compared to the
gain, this strategy only will be profitable if the tax rate on the gain is significantly lower
than the ordinary income rates at which the deductions will reduce future taxes. At some
points in history, the tax code has imposed rates on long-term capital gains (on assets
owned longer than some "holding period") that are lower than the rates on ordinary in-
come or short term capital gains. At present, a rate gap of as much as 21.6 percentage
points exists. As recently as the late 1980s, however, there was no such gap. See supra
note 7.
A complete analysis of strategic trading under current law would include consideration
of the possibility of taking long-term capital gains in a wash sale to enhance basis. I ignore
this possibility in the text, preferring to focus on aspects of strategic trading that would
exist in the absence of any favorable rate treatment for long-term capital gains.
129. A schedule based on the average curve will give each taxpayer at each point in
time a deduction equal to the average decline in value across the assets in the category(here racehorses). There are mathematical reasons for choosing the average decline in
value as an estimate of the true decline in value. See infra note 146 and text accompanying
notes 146-147.
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that is not reflected in the average curve. 13°1 The owner can then replace
the horse sold with another nonstarter and depreciate this horse roughly
along its age-price profile for the remainder of its life.1
3 1
This strategy increases the present value of deductions by $1765.30 as
of year two, since that is the difference in present value between depreci-
ating along the average curve and taking the $6062.85 loss right after the
beginning of year two combined with depreciating along the age-price
profile for nonstarters for the rest of the asset's life. 132 The strategy will
be attractive if this increase in present value exceeds the present value of
the trading costs of engaging in the strategy.
133
If strategic loss-taking is viable, the taxpayer can subvert a depreciation
schedule based on the average age-price profile. The taxpayer will depre-
ciate along that schedule if the actual age-price profile ends up being
above the average one. But if the actual age-price profile turns out to be
below the average curve, the taxpayer will jump down to the schedule
based on that lower age-price profile. So the overall result will be that at
worst the taxpayer will be subject to the schedule based on the average
curve. Under some outcomes, the taxpayer will be able to depreciate
based on a more favorable schedule. The actual average schedule exper-
130. The $6062.85 loss is the difference between $8589.04, the value right before year
two, and $2526.19, the value of a horse that is identified as a nonstarter right after the
beginning of year two. The example assumes that the owner first purchased the horse at
$8589.04, right before the beginning of year two.
131. Presumably, the average curve that generates the statutory schedule would dictate
the shape of the schedule. This shape can be described by the percentage of original cost
allowable as a deduction for each time period. But the age-price profile for nonstarters has
the same shape as the average curve. That age-price profile simply starts at a lower point.
Thus, the replacement horse would be depreciated along its actual age-price profile for the
remainder of its life.
132. The present value of depreciation along the average curve adjusted for retirements
is $6088.19. The present value of depreciation along the nonstarters' curve adjusted for
retirements is $1790.64. The $6062.85 loss deduction has present value of $6062.85 since
the loss occurs immediately.
By taking the loss and shifting to the lower nonstarters' curve, total present value for all
deductions increases by $6062.85 + $1790.64 - $6088.19 = $1765.30. The adjustment for
retirements used to compute the $6088.19 and $1790.64 figures consists of weighting depre-
ciation along the curve by the probability of survival and adding the present value of retire-
ment loss deductions where retirement at each particular time is weighted by its
probability. These figures therefore represent the total present value of all deductions that
will result from depreciating according to the schedule as long as the asset lives and then
taking a loss deduction at retirement.
133. This statement is strictly true only under certain patterns of tax rates over time. In
particular, the statement is true if the taxpayer is subject to the same marginal tax rates
during the investment's entire life. In that case, all of the depreciation deductions and the
deduction for trading costs will translate into after tax benefits at that common marginal
rate. The taxpayer need only compare the increase in present value for the depreciation
deductions to the present value of the trading cost deductions to decide whether to engage
in trading.
Note that trading costs are not necessarily entirely deductible at the time trades are
made. Trading costs typically will be added to the basis of the asset and, in effect, will be
deducted at the time of sale or disposition of the asset. See Woodward v. Commissioner,
397 U.S. 572 (1972). Although the transaction costs of selling the original horse would
result in an immediate tax benefit, the transaction costs of buying the replacement horse
might not result in a tax benefit for many years.
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ienced by the taxpayer will result in faster depreciation than the schedule
based on the average age-price profile.
Anticipating this phenomenon in advance can cause assets subject to
significant future price risk to be favored by the depreciation rules over
otherwise similar assets. Going back to the example, let us compare the
asset in the example to an asset with an age-price profile that is known in
advance and that is the same as the average age-price profile in the exam-
ple. For both assets, suppose that the statutory depreciation schedule is
based on that average age-price profile. Then the individual who buys
the asset in the example will anticipate the fact that there will be a special
tax benefit if the horse ends up being a nonstarter: The taxpayer in effect
will be able to accelerate depreciation if this outcome occurs. As men-
tioned above, this acceleration increases the present value of depreciation
and loss deductions by $1765.30 in that case.
Since there is a 40% chance of any given horse being a nonstarter, the
present value of depreciation deductions at the time of purchase right
before year two will increase by (.40 x $1765.30) = $706.12. As a result,
the total present value of all depreciation and loss deductions at time of
purchase will increase from $6088.19 to $6794.31. This increase of about
12% represents the tax advantage of the asset subject to an uncertain
future price path in the example over an otherwise identical asset that is
not subject to such uncertainty. It is clear, then, that substantial invest-
ment distortions may follow if the degree of future price path uncertainty
is not taken into account in setting up tax depreciation rules.134
134. The example in this section centered on the fact that different assets of the same
type may have different future revenue streams. Thus, racehorses perform differently and
experience different degrees of success over their careers. See supra note 36. It is worth
noting, however, that revenue risk may affect all members of a class uniformly. Suppose,
counterfactually, that all racehorses will earn the same revenues but that the general popu-
larity and profitability of horseracing is uncertain. This situation still fits easily into the
conceptual framework of this section. In particular, the three age-price profiles can be
reinterpreted as the outcome under high, moderate and low profitability for horseracing.
At the time the horses are two years old, the information about which of the three catego-
ries applies is revealed instantaneously. But the tax authorities have set the depreciation
schedule in advance not knowing which of the three outcomes will occur.
More generally, revenue risk may be divided into a portion that can be diversified away
costlessly and a portion that is endemic to the entire economic system. This second type of
risk cannot be diversified away costlessly. Some economists believe that the presence of
systematic revenue risk, that is, revenue risk that cannot be costlessly diversified away,
warrants special depreciation subsidies. The author disagrees with this claim. For a discus-
sion, see infra Appendix D.
One type of revenue risk that is interesting from a tax policy standpoint is on the "cost
side" of net revenues. Assets that have the same useful life may differ substantially in the
amount and pattern of repair and maintenance costs. Net revenues will reflect these differ-
ences since the costs of repair and maintenance are subtracted from gross revenues in the
netting process.
Repair and maintenance costs are interesting from a tax policy standpoint. There may
be a tendency to expense these costs even if they extend asset life by many years so that
there is a policy argument for amortization. Excess expensing of maintenance costs may
lead to a tax-induced bias in favor of used assets. Extending the life of used assets is
accompanied by a 100% up front deduction for the costs while the extended life of new
assets must be paid for with dollars that are deducted only over several future years. A
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B. Ex ANTE POLICY RESPONSES TO PRICE PATH UNCERTAINTY
The previous section indicates that price path uncertainty can lead to
both inefficiency and inequity. Inequity arises when some taxpayers re-
ceive treatment that is either more favorable or less favorable than eco-
nomic depreciation.1 35 Inefficiency arises if one type of asset is favored
over another by the tax system when there is no economic reason to do
so. In the previous section we saw that traditional depreciation rules will
favor assets with more uncertain age-price profiles.
One way to respond to the potential distortions and inequities that
arise from price path uncertainty is to adjust the depreciation schedule
that is set ex ante. This section explores this possibility while the next
section examines solutions that involve ex post adjustments to the results
under the schedule.
Regardless of whether ex ante or ex post adjustments are the focus, it is
useful to divide the analysis into three cases: zero trading costs, very high
trading costs, and all cases in between these two extremes. Trading costs
are central because they determine the viability of strategic loss-taking. If
trading costs are zero, then strategic trading has its fullest scope. If trad-
ing costs are very high, no strategic trade will be profitable.
If trading costs are zero, an attractive rule is to allow no depreciation
deductions at all. This rule will induce the taxpayer to trade whenever
value falls below adjusted basis in order to accelerate loss deductions to
the earliest possible moment. But the rule does not result in perfect rep-
lication of economic depreciation because it does not tax the owner when
depreciable assets appreciate.
To see this point consider the value path for "spectacularly successful"
racehorses purchased right before age two from Figure 11 in the previous
section.136 This path along with a horizontal line indicating original cost
are reproduced in Figure 12 below. Given that trading is costless and that
there are no depreciation deductions, the taxpayer will hold the asset un-
til it is about six and one-half years old. Then the taxpayer will trade
down the curve by continually selling and repurchasing an equivalent
substitute asset.
In this case, the taxpayer is treated properly during the period follow-
ing the six and one-half year point. As losses accumulate during that pe-
riod, the taxpayer receives a stream of deductions equal to the losses.
careful study of the significance and policy implications of this issue is left to future
research.
135. There are two senses in which "inequity" occurs as a result of deviations from
economic depreciation. First, some taxpayers may enjoy treatment that is more favorable
than economic depreciation while others are treated less favorably relative to the same
standard. Second, even if the deviations from economic depreciation are all of the same
degree and in the same direction, the idea that the tax system should take into account
wealth changes as they occur is a central tenet of accretion tax theory. See Strnad, supra
note 7, at 1820-22, 1903. This tenet originates from norms that are based on notions of
"equity." See id. at 1821 n.7, 1832-48.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 127-128.
1999]
592 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
Figure 12
Top Starter Age-Price Profile
30000
--- Value at Two Years
2500 - Top Stre Valae
20000
• 15000
10000
5000
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Age
However, immediately after purchase at year two, there is a very large
gain followed by four and one-half years of losses equal to that gain.
With a constant marginal tax rate, this pattern of appreciation followed
by an equal amount of depreciation normally would generate taxes with a
present value greater than zero. 137 Here, however, there is no tax effect
since the taxpayer does not realize the gain from the appreciation and
does not deduct the later offsetting depreciation. In total, the taxpayer
receives treatment that is more favorable than economic depreciation.
Bouts of appreciation followed by equal depreciation will happen fre-
quently during the lives of most risky depreciable assets. Good news
about future revenues may cause an asset to appreciate in value despite
the fact that its estimated remaining life is declining. 38 With costless
trading and no statutory depreciation deductions, the taxpayer will have
traded the adjusted basis down to the low point before the appreciation
started.' 39
The asset then will appreciate and fluctuate for a while before moving
back down to the level of the adjusted basis.14°) That period of apprecia-
137. The reason for a positive present value is that the gains are earlier than the losses.
If the same tax rate applies to both, then the tax benefits from the losses will be equal in
amount to the taxes on the gains since the total gain is equal to the sum of the losses. But
the tax benefits will be discounted more heavily since they are received later.
138. This phenomenon actually occurs for two of the three types of horses in the exam-
ple just presented. See Figure 11, supra text accompanying notes 127-128.
139. With costless trading and no depreciation deductions, taxpayers will trade continu-
ously when the asset declines. See supra note 13. As a result, the adjusted basis of the
asset at any point in time will be the minimum value of the asset over the period of owner-
ship up until that time.
140. The asset will eventually fail with probability one. Thus, with probability one, the
asset will decline below the level of its adjusted basis sometime in the future.
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tion and fluctuation will involve equal total amounts of gain and loss as in
the example just presented. During the life of an asset subject to substan-
tial price risk, there should be many such periods of appreciation and
fluctuation.
There are several ways to deal with the problem that depreciable assets
may appreciate over part of their lives. Under accretion tax theory, the
ideal approach would be to tax all gains and to allow deductions for all
losses as they occur. By the standards of this theory, allowing no depreci-
ation deductions at all when trading is costless is too lenient a rule. The
taxpayer should pay a net tax on each of the bouts of appreciation and
fluctuation but does not under the rule.
The potential solutions to this problem of unrealized appreciation for
depreciable assets are similar to the potential solutions for the more gen-
eral class of risky assets that are not necessarily depreciable.' 41 The most
prominent such solution is "frequent assessment," a solution that is ex
post in nature: The asset's actual value path is observed as closely as
possible, and the appropriate tax is levied.1 42
In two of its six recent studies, the Treasury Department faced the
problem of depreciable assets that appreciate during part of their lives.143
The Treasury Department's solution for the appreciation aspect of these
141. The category of "depreciable assets" used here has a similar meaning to the class
of assets subject to "a reasonable allowance for ... exhaustion, wear and tear (including a
reasonable allowance for obsolescence)" under section 167 of the Code. 1.R.C. § 167(a).
These assets have finite useful lives and therefore will wear out and become valueless in a
way that is at least roughly predictable. Thus, land is not included in the section 167 cate-
gory because it has "no ascertainable useful life." Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1999). The
same would be true of corporate equities and similar assets. Fixed maturity bonds have an
ascertainable life, but generally do not decline in value to zero over that lifetime. Neither
bonds nor corporate equities are depreciable assets under section 167.
142. For a discussion of this solution and its leading competitors, see Strnad, supra note
7, at 1891-1903. Perhaps the strongest general competitor for frequent assessment is ex
post approximation in linear or exponential form. This approach assumes that the asset
has followed a linear or exponential path between any two known values on the actual
path.
However, regardless of whether the exponential or linear variant is used, the approach
fails completely to address the problem presented here. That problem is that in between
sales at roughly the same price there is a period of appreciation followed by equal amounts
of depreciation. The linear and exponential approximations in this case are both the same:
Price remains flat during the entire period between sales. As a result, no tax is due. But
some tax should be paid to reflect the fact that appreciation is followed by an equal
amount of depreciation.
143. One of the studies focused on racehorses. Spectacularly successful racehorses dis-
play an age-price profile very similar to the profile that we have been studying. See Treas-
ury Horse Study, supra note 24, at 16. The other study examined fruit and nut trees. See
Treasury Fruit Tree Study, supra note 24. Fruit and nut trees are "put into service" for
purposes of tax depreciation when they start producing fruit and nuts. See id. at 1, 11, 23-
24. But at that point in time they are still growing. Fruit and nut output per tree increases
at a rapid rate and does not reach a peak until several years after the first season with
significant yield. See id. at 1, 23, 27, 33, 36, 39, 42. This effect is pronounced enough that
the trees increase in value during the early years in their lives. In these early years, the fact
that remaining life is shorter as time goes on is more than offset by the fact that peak
revenues associated with peak production are closer in time and therefore discounted less
heavily. In Treasury's fruit and nut tree study this result emerged even though Treasury
used a 4% real after-tax discount rate. See id. at 23.
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depreciable assets is to ignore the appreciation and the associated offset-
ting depreciation. 44 In terms of the example, this means that the appre-
ciation and matching depreciation from the two year point to the six and
one-half year point would be ignored. Depreciation would be allowed
only starting at the six and one-half year point when the asset first de-
clines below its original cost.
A possible theoretical rationale for this approach is that it would be
unfair and perhaps also inefficient to tax the unrealized gain from the
appreciation on these depreciable assets when the Code generally allows
unrealized gains to go untaxed. 145 Given that the appreciation is not
taxed, the offsetting depreciation should not be deductible either.
When trading is costless, the proposed rule of permitting no statutory
depreciation will perfectly implement the Treasury Department ap-
proach. The taxpayer will take loss deductions only when and to the ex-
tent that value declines below adjusted basis. An initial spurt of
appreciation above original cost followed by offsetting depreciation will
be totally ignored.
Now consider the opposite case from the case of zero trading costs. If
trading costs are very high, strategic trading will never be economically
viable. As a result, choosing and imposing a depreciation schedule based
on the expected decline in value for surviving assets is an attractive ap-
proach. This approach means that at each moment during the asset's life,
the taxpayer will receive a depreciation deduction that is the average of
the actual depreciation that would occur over all possible paths. Choos-
ing the average minimizes the variance, 146 a measure of how much actual
depreciation tends to deviate from the amount allowed. 47
144. See Treasury Horse Study, supra note 24, at 18-19; Treasury Fruit Tree Study, supra
note 24, at 1-2, 24-27.
145. The Treasury Department did not rely on this rationale. It arrived at its position
based on its belief that Congressional intent with respect to the treatment of depreciable
assets requires not taking periods of appreciation and matching depreciation into account.
See Treasury Fruit Tree Study, supra note 24, at 18; Treasury Horse Study, supra note 24, at
18.
146. This point is easy to demonstrate using a little calculus. Suppose that one wants to
know the true value of some random variable X. There are n possible values, each of
which is equally likely. Denote these values xi where i = 1, 2 ..., n. The variance of X
from some estimate b is simply
1 n
V(X) = n- Y (xi - b)2.
i=O
The second derivative of V with respect to b is 1, which is positive, and the first derivative
is zero when b = (11n) Y xi, the average value of X. This average value is the minimum
variance estimate of X.
147. The average value here is based on information available at the time the asset is
placed into service. Call that moment "time 0." In between time 0 and the time, "t," at
which depreciation is being approximated, there may be additional information that would
change the estimate of average depreciation. The estimate of the average based on time 0
information will not necessarily be a minimum variance estimate of time t depreciation
given information available at time t.
However, we are considering a scheme where the depreciation schedule is set ex ante, at
time 0. Thus, if this schedule is meant to minimize the variance of actual depreciation from
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Having considered the polar cases of zero trading costs and very high
trading costs, there remains the case where trading costs are "moderate."
In this case, strategic trading will only be viable when the tax timing ben-
efits outweigh the trading costs. This case is considerably more compli-
cated, and the optimal solution does not necessary lie "in between" the
attractive approaches in the other two cases. With very high trading
costs, setting the depreciation schedule on the basis of the average age-
price profile was appealing. In the case of zero trading costs, the ultimate
in "decelerated" depreciation, namely, no depreciation deductions at all,
appeared to be a good rule. But it is not necessarily true that a schedule
somewhere in between the one dictated by the average age-price profile
and one that allows no deductions at all is optimal in the case of moder-
ate trading costs.
To see this point, consider the three outcomes in Figure 11 where the
statutory schedule is the second curve from the bottom, the average age-
price profile. For convenience, that Figure is reproduced here as Figure
13.
Figure 13
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schedule depreciation, the average depreciation at time t based on time 0 information is
the best estimate.
It should be noted that the normative goals of tax policy may dictate estimation objec-
tives that are more complicated than simply minimizing variance. For example, if most
depreciable assets are held by wealthy taxpayers, then errors on the side of leniency (de-
preciation that is too fast) may be more serious than errors in the other direction. See
Strnad, supra note 7, at 1850 n. 89 (stating that equity/efficiency tradeoffs may mean that at
an optimum, additional transfers from high income to low income individuals are socially
desirable). As a result, an estimate might be made that weights errors on the side of leni-
ency more heavily. Such an estimate will not necessarily be a minimum variance estimate.
In statistical terminology, other central moments such as skewedness will also be socially
relevant.
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Taxpayers facing the top two outcomes will welcome this schedule
since it gives them faster depreciation than economic depreciation. On
the other hand, taxpayers facing the lowest outcome will want to engage
in strategic trading. This trading will result in depreciation deductions
that roughly replicate the actual age-price profile that they will experi-
ence. 148 On the other hand, the trading costs incurred by these taxpayers
are a social cost.
In terms of accretion tax theory, the taxpayers with the two high out-
comes are receiving an improper tax benefit while taxpayers facing the
low outcome are treated exactly right. If the depreciation schedule is de-
celerated by moving it up from the average age-price profile, the im-
proper benefits to the high and middle outcome taxpayers will be
reduced.
The central issue is how much deceleration is optimal. If the schedule
is based on a curve that is far enough above the middle outcome age-
price profile, then strategic trading will be viable for middle outcome tax-
payers. 49 At this point, the middle outcome taxpayer will experience tax
benefits that are roughly correct, and the additional deceleration in de-
preciation will reduce the improper benefits experienced by high out-
come taxpayers. However, these tax policy benefits are not free. The
middle outcome taxpayer now pays for trading, and these trading costs
are a social cost of the tax policy.' 50
It is possible that the induced trading costs from decelerating the
schedule exceed any gains in efficiency or equity from that decelera-
tion.151 And here is the rub: The same reasoning applies to the taxpayer
148. Thus, giving the figure its original racehorse interpretation, these taxpayers take
the loss that occurs right after the horse is two years old and then depreciate along the age-
price profile for nonstarters. See supra text accompanying notes 129-133.
149. If trading costs were zero, these taxpayers would engage in trading if any part of
the schedule-setting curve was even an infinitesimal amount above the actual age-price
profile. If trading costs are moderate, the schedule-setting curve must be high enough
above the actual age-price profile so that the increase in tax benefits from trading out-
weighs the trading costs.
150. In our example, there is a upper limit to how much deceleration is desirable. Once
the schedule-setting curve reaches the highest age-price profile, there is no reason to go
higher. All taxpayers will receive approximately the correct tax treatment. Further decel-
eration will only induce strategic trading by the high outcome taxpayer. This trading will
result in social costs, and there is no corresponding social benefit since the high outcome
taxpayer is already being treated correctly.
151. This possibility is enhanced because the efficiency and equity gains will tend to be
"second order," that is, small compared to the increased present value of the taxes col-
lected by the government. For example, it is well known that the efficiency costs of taxa-
tion tend to be proportional to the tax rate squared and thus are of lower order than the
taxes themselves, which are proportional to the tax rate. See, e.g., Fullerton et al., Replac-
ing the U.S. Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax: A Sequenced General Equi-
librium Approach, 20 J. PUB. ECON. 3, 17 (1983). However, the trading that is induced by a
slight deceleration in the schedule is likely to involve trading costs approximately equal to
the tax savings caused by the trades. In other words, at the margin, trading costs may be
"first order" in magnitude.
It is unclear whether this point would hold up for large decelerations of the schedule. In
that case, for some taxpayers trading costs will be small compared to the potential gains in
tax savings, while others will be at the margin as we have described. Unfortunately, it is
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facing the low age-price profile who trades strategically to take losses as
measured against the "normal" depreciation schedule based on the aver-
age age-price profile. In particular, it may be true that the trading costs
induced for that taxpayer are larger than the efficiency and equity costs
that would result from accelerating the schedule to eliminate that trading.
Thus, the optimal policy may be to provide accelerated depreciation to
eliminate the costs of trading induced by a schedule that simulates eco-
nomic depreciation on average. Indeed, one of the virtues of an acceler-
ated depreciation system such as MACRS is that it reduces strategic loss-
taking. Under an accelerated schedule adjusted basis is lower at any
given point in time. It is less likely that adjusted basis will ever exceed
market value by enough to make strategic loss-taking profitable net of
trading costs. 152
The overall picture under moderate trading costs now emerges. As de-
preciation is decelerated, the improper benefits that flow to high outcome
taxpayers are reduced. In addition, more low and moderate outcome tax-
payers trade strategically. This trading makes their tax treatment roughly
correct, but the sum of their costs of trading is a social cost. Tax equity, as
defined by tracking wealth changes as closely as possible,153 is enhanced
at the price of additional trading costs. 154 However, the same reasoning
applies to the low outcome taxpayer. It may be optimal to accelerate the
depreciation schedule because the reduction in trading costs for the low
outcome taxpayer may exceed the social costs in the form of reduced
equity.
In conclusion, clear guidelines for setting ex ante depreciation sched-
ules in the face of uncertain future price paths emerge only when trading
costs are very high or very low. With high trading costs, a good approach
is to base the depreciation schedule on the average age-price profile.
With zero trading costs, providing no depreciation deductions at all is an
attractive strategy. In the case of moderate trading costs, not much can
be said in general about optimal ex ante depreciation schedules.
difficult to develop models that specify optimal trading strategies and the ensuing total
trading costs for various taxpayers. See infra text accompanying notes 289-290.
152. It is also the case that failing to index adjusted basis for inflation reduces the scope
for strategic loss-taking. Market value is in nominal dollars and increases with general
price inflation. Opportunities for strategic loss-taking depend on adjusted basis exceeding
market value. Given that the rate of inflation has generally been positive, this condition
will be less likely to occur if adjusted basis is not indexed for inflation.
153. See supra note 135.
154. Efficiency may also be enhanced. Using a statutory schedule based on the average
age-price profile tends to improperly favor depreciable assets with high future price risk.
See supra text accompanying notes 133-134. There will be an amount of deceleration that
will exactly cancel out the present value improper benefits as of the time of purchase. The
trade-off between the efficiency gains of deceleration and the added induced trading costs
is similar to the trade-off between equity gains and the added trading costs.
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C. Ex POST POLICY RESPONSES TO PRICE PATH UNCERTAINTY
An alternative or additional way to respond to the complications that
arise from revenue risk is to alter the ex post adjustment aspects of the
depreciation rules. Under individual item accounting, these aspects con-
sist primarily of "settling up" at the time of disposition of an asset by
taxing the difference between amount realized and adjusted basis. 155
Unfortunately, unless the government actually observes the price path
of depreciable assets, it is difficult to design purely ex post adjustments
that improve on an optimally designed ex ante system. It may be that the
only additional information that is available ex post is the actual life or
holding period of the asset. Subsection 1 shows that this information can-
not be exploited in a way that is free from effective taxpayer
manipulation.
This pessimistic conclusion is not the end of the story. It may be possi-
ble to combine ex post and ex ante rules in a way that effectively ad-
dresses the situation of uncertain price paths and the associated problem
of strategic loss-taking. One set of methods of this sort combines disposi-
tion rules that discourage strategic loss-taking with changes in the ex ante
depreciation schedule that adjust for the disposition rules.
Subsections 2, 3, and 4 consider three such combinations of disposition
rule and ex ante schedule: the depreciation bond approach, the proceeds
tax rule, and the account adjustment rule. Two of these rules are used
presently for certain types of group accounts. 56 Subsection 5 concludes
with a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of policies that combine
alternative disposition rules with ex ante schedule adjustments.
1. Ex Post Adjustment In General
One potential ex post approach is periodic valuation and assessment of
taxes. If the period used in this approach is very short, the approach will
come close to taxing all gains and losses as they occur. This result is ideal
under accretion tax theory. 57
The potential disadvantage of this approach is that frequent valuation
may be very expensive. Public markets may not exist for many deprecia-
ble assets, and market price series that do exist may not reflect the value
155. The current Code contains instances of ex post adjustment other than taxing gain
or losses at disposition. One such instance involves depreciation under the income forecast
method. Under this method, the depreciation deduction for a given year is equal to cost
minus salvage value for the asset multiplied by a fraction: current year net income divided
by total anticipated income from the asset See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-28 1978-1 CB 51; Rev.
Rul. 60-358 1960-2 CB 68 (describing the nature and availability of the income forecast
method in some specific instances). The Code requires that the depreciation deduction
computed under the original forecasted income stream be adjusted to allow for the actual
(ex post) stream for certain assets. The adjustment involves charging or paying the tax-
payer interest depending on the nature of the deviation of actual income from forecasted
income. See I.R.C. § 168(g).
156. See infra text accompanying note 207.
157. See Strnad, supra note 7, at 1821-22, 1832-47, 1853-63.
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of assets retained by owners.158 One important advantage of taking an ex
ante approach to depreciation by setting a schedule in advance is that this
approach avoids the need to value depreciable assets frequently.
If observing actual price series is ruled out, it is hard to come up with
ex post adjustments that improve a well-designed ex ante system. Con-
sider first the case of very high trading costs. In this case, sales are pro-
hibitively costly so that the only dispositions are retirements. It is hard to
see how to improve on the approach suggested in the previous section of
using the average expected age-price profile to design a statutory sched-
ule and then allowing losses to be taken upon retirement. Unless more
information is observed about actual asset paths, the average expected
path as of asset purchase will still be a good estimate of the path that the
asset took up until failure and retirement. 159
The only additional information that is available costlessly in this case
is the time of retirement. If the time of retirement correlates with the
path up to retirement, then additional ex post adjustment might be fruit-
ful. Consider the racehorse example once again. If high revenue horses
also tend to have longer lives, then a tax surcharge might be levied on
horses that are retired after long years of service. Unfortunately, there
are problems with this type of ex post rule. As a horse nears the end of
its life, value drops off sharply.160 If the surtax were high enough to cap-
ture the huge excess tax benefit inherent in the high outcome case, 161
158. Assets that are sold may have different characteristics than those that are retained.
A well-known theoretical example of this phenomenon is the so-called "market for lem-
ons." See George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons, 85 Q. J. ECoN. 488 (1970). If
quality is not observable at low cost, the only equilibrium price in a market may be a price
that would be paid for a low quality asset, a "lemon." If the market price were higher,
owners of lemons would unload them. Buyers then would assume that they will receive a
lemon and would refuse to pay the higher market price. Thus, assets that are held rather
than sold will be of higher quality.
If market prices reflect only the value of lemons, depreciation schedules based on those
prices will tend to be accelerated relative to the age-value profile of the average asset.
Academic commentators and the Treasury Department are very aware of this phenome-
non and have tried to adjust for it in their analyses. See, e.g., Hulten & Wykoff, supra note
3, at 96-99; Treasury Horse Study, supra note 24, at 27.
In the context of this Article, a market subject to the lemons phenomenon is a "high
trading cost" market. To sell an asset that is not a lemon requires expending significant
costs to convince buyers of that fact. If these costs were small, there would be no "lemons"
problem.
159. "Good estimate" here means minimum variance estimate. See supra note 146 and
text accompanying notes 146-147. The conclusion that enriching the ex post adjustment
rules is not very fruitful would not change if "good estimate" meant an estimate that aimed
at goals other than minimizing variance. See supra note 147. All that might change is that
the best ex ante estimate would not be the average age-value profile.
160. This drop off occurs for horses in all revenue-earning categories. See Figure 11
supra text accompanying notes 127-128.
161. In the high outcome case, the present value of depreciation deductions adjusted
for retirements based on the decline in value of the average horse is $6088.19. But the
present value of depreciation adjusted for retirements for the high outcome horse using its
actual age price profile is only $1233.59. This $1233.59 figure is much lower than $6088.19
because the high outcome horses experience a huge spurt of appreciation at age two. See
supra text accompanying notes 142. The excess tax benefit for these horses is ($6088.19 -
$ 1233.59) = $4854.60 multiplied by the marginal tax rate.
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owners would simply send horses to the glue factory early. 62
Suppose, on the other hand, that highly successful horses tend to have
shorter useful lives and that a surtax is imposed on early retirements.
Owners might then respond by keeping horses around after their racing
days are over and claiming that they are still in service. This strategy
would be even easier for non-living assets such as machines. Owners of
such assets do not have to contend with physical death as a fact that re-
buts the claim of continued service.
If trading costs are zero, then the goal is simply a rule that induces the
owner to trade frequently. Frequent trades establish a flow of taxes ap-
propriate to the actual value path of the asset. By trading, the taxpayer
does the government's work for it. The previous section discussed ex
ante rules designed to induce trading. To the extent these rules are unsat-
isfactory, it seems that actual observation of the asset path is the best
palliative. 63
In the case of "moderate" trading costs, the favored ex ante approach
results in the tax treatment of some assets being established by trading as
in the zero trading cost case and the tax treatment of the remaining assets
being in accord with an ex ante schedule as in the case of very high trad-
ing costs. The same reasons for being skeptical of improving matters by
embellishing the ex post rules in the case of zero and very high trading
costs apply equally to the moderate trading cost case. The tax treatment
of the traded assets is probably already close to being correct. For the
non-traded assets not much improvement is possible short of gathering
information on the actual value path over time.
This point is strengthened by considering an ex post solution to strate-
gic loss-taking devised by Alan Auerbach.164 Auerbach constrains the in-
formation available to be the amount realized on disposition, the holding
period, the interest rates applicable during the holding period, and the
investor's tax rate. He shows that there is one and only one tax approach
that will not affect the investor's decision of whether to hold or sell any
asset.165
162. For the same reasons, early retirement would be the rule for less talented horses.
These horses have a lower revenue base so that the surtax would loom even larger. As of
1990, the salvage value of a horse was about $450. See Treasury Horse Study, supra note
24, at 11.
163. In particular, both of the most prominent practical ex post approximation tech-
niques fail to improve on the proposed ex ante rule at all. See supra note 171.
164. See Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV.
167 (1991).
165. More formally, Auerbach requires that the realization-based tax system satisfy a
condition he calls "holding period neutrality." This condition requires that the before tax
certainty equivalent return on any asset be independent of the length of the holding period
or the asset's past pattern of returns. See id. at 169. When such a condition holds, strategic
loss-taking will not play any role. Holding period neutrality will ensure that investors will
view assets held for a period of time as equivalent to assets just purchased. The basis of the
assets, their price history, and their holding period will not have any impact on the decision
to sell or continue holding an asset.
Auerbach shows rigorously that there is only one tax approach that will meet this condi-
tion given that the available information at sale or disposition is limited to the amount
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To make this approach clear, suppose that the taxpayer holds an asset
for two years during which the applicable interest rate was 10% and then
sells it for $121. Assuming that the asset did not produce any cash flows,
the required approach is to apply an ideal accretion tax under the as-
sumption that the asset appreciated at the applicable interest rate during
the holding period.166 In particular, we would presume that the investor
purchased the asset for $100 so that it grew at a 10% compound annual
rate to $121 after two years. If the investor were in the 40% bracket and
the accretion tax was annualized, $4 would be due at the end of one year
on the $10 gain during that year and $4.40 at the end of the second year
on the $11 gain during that year. Since all the tax is paid at the end of the
second year, the investor would pay interest at the investor's after-tax
rate of 6% per year on the $4 due at the end of the first year.
As Auerbach points out, this approach produces ex ante results that are
equivalent to a perfect accretion tax but deviates from the ex post results
that would follow from such a tax. 167 Ex ante equivalence means that an
investor's decision to buy, hold, or sell assets will be the same as if a
perfect accretion tax applied. The difference in ex post treatments is easy
to see in the case of the asset sold for $121. The tax due is independent of
the amount that the investor paid for the asset. If the asset cost $10,000,
the investor has a huge loss but is required to pay a tax upon disposition.
Similarly, if the asset cost only $1, the investor earned $120 but pays less
than $9 in tax despite being subject to a 40% rate.
Applying the Auerbach approach to depreciable assets requires exam-
ining how the approach applies to an asset that produces cash flows as
well as proceeds upon disposition. 168 In this case, the Auerbach scheme
is equivalent to taxing each cash flow as if it were an asset disposition. 169
In other words, a cash flow of $X that occurs time T after a project begins
is taxed under an accretion tax approach as if the taxpayer had purchased
an asset at time 0 that grew at the prevailing riskless interest rate to $X at
time T. For depreciable assets, one would tax all the cash flows that re-
sult from the asset, including any realization at disposition or retirement
in this manner. This approach would succeed in eliminating strategic
loss-taking problems but at the cost of discarding important ex post as-
pects of an accretion tax.1 70
realized, the holding period, interest rates during the holding period, and the applicable tax
rate. See id. at 172 (Proposition 3).
166. See id. at 172.
167. See id. at 169, 176.
168. 1 use the term "Auerbach approach" and similar language for convenience and to
attribute proper credit for what is a very clever and interesting idea. In his original work
concerning the approach, Auerbach notes and addresses weaknesses in the approach in
addition to discussing its advantages.
169. See id. at 175.
170. The same elements are present as in the example of the asset that was sold for
$121. The Auerbach approach entails ignoring the depreciable asset's cost so that tax out-
comes are disconnected from the accretion tax ideal of taxing all wealth changes as they
occur. See supra notes 43 and 135. Auerbach states this point and responds to it by argu-
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In the ensuing subsections, we will consider approaches that have less
severe effects on the ex post properties that characterize an accretion tax.
It is important to keep in mind Auerbach's uniqueness result: Absent
moving to his approach, there is no way to tinker with the accretion tax
system in a way that will preserve the ex ante properties of that system
and also eliminate incentives to trade or hold assets based only on tax
considerations. Once we give up on observing the past price path of as-
sets, we are in a world of trade-offs. Auerbach's approach trades off the
ex post properties of accretion taxation to eradicate strategic trading. All
of the approaches in the next subsections will involve some sacrifice of
accretion tax norms in order to achieve some diminution in strategic trad-
ing opportunities.
2. The Depreciation Bond Approach
Allowing for coordinated changes in the ex post and ex ante portions
of the tax depreciation rules makes a whole additional set of alternative
policies available. In particular, the disposition rules can be altered to
penalize strategic loss-taking and the ex ante schedule can be adjusted to
take into account the new disposition rules.
One simple policy of this type is the depreciation bond approach. This
approach consists of three basic elements. First, the original owner of an
asset receives all the depreciation benefits from the asset regardless of
how long the original owner retains the asset. Depreciation is therefore
similar to a nontransferable bond. Original ownership of the asset enti-
tles the owner to a fixed stream of deductions, just as a bond entitles the
owner to a fixed stream of payments.' 7' Second, dispositions of all kinds
are not taxable events. There is no loss deduction upon retirement, and
sale does not result in taxable gain or in a deduction for loss. Third, the
depreciation schedule would be set using the Hulten and Wykoff ap-
proach. Instead of simply basing the schedule on the age-price profile for
surviving assets, that profile would be first adjusted by multiplying the
price at each age by the probability of survival to that age.172
ing that his approach is fair and that its disadvantages are similar to those inherent in other
actual or proposed tax systems. See Auerbach, supra note 164, at 176-77.
171. Given that future deductions are set in advance, a variant of this step would be to
give the taxpayer a single deduction equal to the present value of depreciation at the time
the asset is purchased. Such an approach would be identical to the "first-year capital re-
covery system" proposed by Professors Alan Auerbach and Dale Jorgenson in 1980. See
Alan J. Auerbach & Dale W. Jorgenson, Inflation-proof Depreciation of Assets, HARV.
Bus. REV. Scpt.-Oct. 1980 at 113. This approach has the advantage that the effect of infla-
tion is removed from the depreciation rules. The present value of depreciation and the
ensuing tax savings is in current dollars. Thus, there is no need to correct for inflation by
indexing adjusted basis or by using other similar adjustments.
Auerbach and Jorgenson's approach, however, has a different disposition rule than the
depreciation bond approach. They propose that the seller take the present value of depre-
ciation for the used asset being sold into income at the time of sale. See id. at 114. This
disposition rule is similar to the "account adjustment rule" discussed infra in subsection 4.
See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
172. For a discussion of the Hulten and Wykoff approach, see supra text accompanying
notes 46-61.
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The depreciation bond approach cleanly eliminates the possibility of
strategic loss-taking. Since dispositions are not taxable events, trading
has no tax effect. Whatever ex ante depreciation schedule is set will
"stick" since taxpayers cannot alter the pattern of deductions under the
schedule by realizing losses.
Use of this disposition rule requires that a different depreciation sched-
ule be set ex ante. Given that dispositions are not taxed, a depreciation
schedule based on the age-price profile for surviving assets would be in-
appropriate. The argument for using that schedule in the face of retire-
ment risk is that loss deductions granted upon disposition automatically
adjust for asset retirements.' 73 To replicate economic depreciation under
the depreciation bond approach, retirement losses must be built into the
schedule as in the Hulten and Wykoff approach.
Although the depreciation bond approach eliminates strategic loss-tak-
ing, it makes another kind of strategic trading viable: the "churning" of
depreciable assets. If each new owner were entitled to a depreciation
bond based on the purchase price, a new asset could be traded back and
forth to generate deductions many times the original cost of the asset.
This churning cannot happen under current law because excess deprecia-
tion is recaptured as gain upon disposition. The original cost of each new
asset can only be deducted once.
A potential response to this problem would be to make used assets
nondepreciable. Under that rule, used assets would trade at a discount
reflecting the absence of depreciation deductions. For example, if a
brand new asset were traded right after it was first purchased and if every
taxpayer faced the same marginal tax rate, the discount would equal the
present value of the depreciation bond multiplied by that tax rate. This
result would ensue because the purchaser could buy a new asset instead
and obtain a depreciation bond at the same time.
This price environment would ensure that no individual's investment
decisions would be biased for or against used assets versus new assets.
Sale of used assets would be at a price reduced by the present value of the
tax benefits that would result from buying a new asset with the same ex-
pected life and productivity. Ignoring trading costs, an owner would be
indifferent between holding the old asset and replacing it with the new
asset. Similarly, a purchaser would be indifferent between purchasing a
new asset accompanied by a depreciation bond or a similar used asset
without a depreciation bond but at a discount reflecting the absence of
the bond. The purchase and sale of the depreciable assets would turn
strictly on business considerations and not on tax benefits or detriments.
Making used assets nondepreciable is not a perfect solution. This rule
puts tremendous pressure on the distinction between new and used as-
sets. An asset would sell for a higher price if it was a "new" asset. The
taxpayer therefore would have an incentive to "rebuild" or otherwise al-
173. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
1999]
SMU LAW REVIEW
ter the old asset and claim that it is a new asset. 174 A substantial and
complex set of rules might be required to maintain the distinction be-
tween old and new assets. 175
There are two other problems with the depreciation bond approach.
First, the approach fails to track wealth changes that happen as the value
of the asset fluctuates. 176 Thus, for example, if the asset fails early in its
life, deductions are not accelerated to reflect the early loss. Eliminating
the ex post corrections triggered by dispositions in the current system
weakens the accuracy of the system in tracking wealth changes.
There is a "diversification" argument that suggests this problem is not
pressing. Most of the depreciable assets in the United States are held by
large corporate taxpayers. 77 A typical large corporation undoubtedly
holds a large number of depreciable assets. In addition, individuals who
hold ownership positions in the corporations often will invest in many
different corporations. 78 In effect, these individuals hold a small owner-
ship interest in a very large number of very different depreciable assets.
Early retirement of some assets is likely to be offset by unexpectedly long
useful lives for other assets. Assets used in one industry that go up in
value because industry revenues will be higher than expected are likely to
be offset by assets used in another industry that are falling in value be-
cause industry revenues will be lower than expected. If depreciation
schedules are set in advance to mimic average expected economic depre-
ciation, diversification may bring most investors' actual experience close
to this average.
The problem with this argument is that revenue risk is correlated across
the aggregate of all depreciable assets. A significant portion of this risk
cannot be eliminated costlessly by holding a diversified portfolio.' 79
Thus, there is a substantial probability that actual asset values in aggre-
gate will deviate significantly from the performance that is expected on
average. The problem that eliminating ex post adjustments reduces the
ability of the tax system to track actual changes in wealth remains despite
the ability to hold a diversified portfolio. 80
174. A kind of tax arbitrage is possible by taking the following steps: buy a new asset,
alter it, and resell it as "new" for a price equal to the purchase price plus the cost of
alterations. This maneuver is tax arbitrage in the sense that the taxpayer receives deprecia-
tion tax benefits without having any ongoing investment.
175. For example, value added accounts might be set up for depreciable assets. When
an asset is purchased, only the "new value" added by refurbishing or altering the asset
would be depreciable. The potentially large administrative and taxpayer compliance costs
for operating this system are obvious.
176. Under accretion tax theory, tracking wealth changes as they occur is normatively
desirable. See supra note 135.
177. See Joseph Bankman, The Case Against Passive hivestments: A Critical Appraisal
of the Passive Loss Restrictions, 42 STAN. L. REV. 15, 29-30 n.79 (1989).
178. Portfolio diversification, dividing one's wealth into many different investments, is a
superior strategy for most investors. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 70, at 131-34.
179. See id. at 132.
180. There is also an efficiency problem when dispositions are not taxable events: risk-
ier assets are favored by the depreciation rules. The causes of this phenomenon are com-
plicated. For a discussion, see infra Appendix D.
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An additional potential problem with the depreciation bond approach
arises if not all taxpayers are subject to the same marginal tax rate. In
that case, the approach permits depreciation tax benefits to be sold by
low bracket taxpayers to high bracket taxpayers. Instead of purchasing
new depreciable assets directly, the low bracket taxpayer can arrange for
a high bracket taxpayer to buy the assets and immediately resell them to
the low bracket taxpayer. The high bracket taxpayer retains the depreci-
ation benefits in the form of the depreciation bond and can pass most of
the after-tax value of the benefits on to the low bracket taxpayer in the
form of a reduced price.
This maneuver is reminiscent of safe harbor leasing where a high
bracket taxpayer leases an asset to a low bracket taxpayer. In this case,
the high bracket taxpayer formally retains ownership of the asset and
therefore is entitled to the stream of depreciation deductions generated
by the asset. The depreciation bond, however, is much simpler since the
high bracket taxpayer does not have to retain ownership of the asset to
enjoy the tax benefits that flow from depreciating the asset.181
The potential problem with this result is that it may be undesirable to
allow low bracket taxpayers to benefit from depreciation deductions to
the same degree as high bracket taxpayers. In a scheme that attempts to
simulate economic depreciation, these larger benefits compensate for a
higher tax rate on revenues so that all taxpayers, independent of marginal
rate, perceive the same market value for all investments.18 2 This neutral
outcome will be violated if low bracket taxpayers pay tax on revenues at
their low rate but then receive benefits from depreciation deductions
based on a higher rate. In that case, low bracket taxpayers will be willing
to pay more in pre-tax dollars for investment assets than high bracket
taxpayers who are equally efficient users of the assets.183
181. Soon after the addition of safe harbor leasing to the tax code in 1981, Professors
Warren and Auerbach in fact suggested direct transferability of tax benefits as an alterna-
tive method for achieving the same goals. Direct transferability eliminates tax and other
legal problems associated with the requirement that the high bracket taxpayer retain own-
ership while the low bracket taxpayer uses the asset. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr. & Alan J.
Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1774-78 (1982).
182. See infra note 253.
183. If the tax code does not adhere to economic depreciation, then the transferability
of tax benefits may be desirable from a neutrality perspective. In fact, the existence of
accelerated depreciation provided a series of rationales for the transfer of tax benefits in-
herent in safe harbor leasing. For a good discussion, see Warren & Auerbach, supra note
181, at 1753-62, 1768-72; Alvin C. Warren & Alan J. Auerbach, Tax Policy and Equipment
Leasing After TEFRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1579, 1583-85 (1983).
We have assumed in the text example that most of the benefits of purchase of deprecia-
ble assets by high bracket taxpayers for resale to low bracket taxpayers are passed on to
the low bracket taxpayers. Thus, high bracket taxpayers will not reap very much of a re-
duction in taxes from the deals. If the incidence is different and high bracket taxpayers
receive much of the benefit, then these taxpayers will receive transfers from the govern-
ment in their role as intermediary between the asset manufacturer and asset user. In the
absence of arguments of the sort that Warren and Auerbach put forward, this intermediary
role has no economic purpose and neither do the transfers.
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3. The Proceeds Tax Rule
The proceeds tax rule is an approach used for some group accounts.1 84
The rule addresses two of the weaknesses of the depreciation bond ap-
proach: The proceeds tax rule stops churning dead in its tracks and
makes tax deals between taxpayers in different brackets unprofitable.
Using the proceeds tax rule does have a disadvantage. The rule interferes
with trading of depreciable assets that is motivated by business rather
than tax goals.
The proceeds tax rule is so named because it requires the entire pro-
ceeds of an asset sale to be taken immediately into income. There is no
deduction for the adjusted basis of the asset. The remaining adjusted ba-
sis is deducted as if the asset had been retained. 8 5 Thus, the proceeds tax
approach is similar to the depreciation bond approach in that deprecia-
tion, once set at the start, continues unadjusted until exhaustion even if
the taxpayer sells or retires the asset before it is fully depreciated. The
difference between the two approaches is that the depreciation bond ap-
proach ignores dispositions while the proceeds tax rule taxes the gross
proceeds from the disposition.
The proceeds tax rule clearly blocks strategic loss-taking. There is no
tax benefit from selling an asset that has a "loss" on it. Recovery of the
cost of the asset will proceed on the original schedule even in the face of a
sale or other disposition. In fact, sale results in additional tax in a present
value sense for the "loss" asset. In effect, the remaining value is taxed
(even though it is below adjusted basis for a "loss" asset) and then recov-
ered as future deductions along the original depreciation deduction
schedule. For both "gain" and "loss" assets, there is therefore a penalty
for trading because adjusted basis is ignored at the time of disposition.
The proceeds tax rule also makes churning a losing strategy. Purchase
of the asset followed by immediate resale results in income equal to the
value of the asset plus a series of future depreciation deductions that sum
to that value. In effect, the taxpayer receives income and an equal deduc-
tion, but the deduction is delayed. For a taxpayer facing constant margi-
nal tax rates and positive interest rates, this combination has negative net
present value. Because of the time value of money, the reduction in fu-
ture taxes from the delayed deductions is worth less than the immediate
tax on the income.
The fact that the proceeds tax rule punishes asset sales by ignoring ad-
justed basis means that it is effective in controlling both strategic loss-
taking and churning. However, this feature of the rule also leads to its
major disadvantage. The rule will penalize sales that are motivated by
business rather than tax considerations. For instance, the taxpayer who
184. See supra text accompanying notes 318-319.
185. For a more complete description of the proceeds tax rule in the context of group
accounts, see infra text accompanying note 318.
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wants to sell some depreciable assets in order to finance a new produc-
tion technology will have to pay a tax penalty to do so.
Another problem with the proceeds tax rule is that it may be difficult
to compute the appropriate ex ante depreciation schedule. Moving from
a schedule based on the age-price profile for surviving assets to a Hulten
and Wykoff schedule is appropriate when asset dispositions are untaxed
as in the depreciation bond approach. But this degree of adjustment is
inadequate when dispositions are subject to a punitive tax. It is difficult
to specify how much additional adjustment is warranted. The appropriate
amount depends on the frequency of "legitimate" business sales of assets
that are not fully depreciated. 186 That frequency would be difficult to
forecast with any accuracy.
Finally, the inherent penalty on asset sales generated by ignoring ad-
justed basis results in the same equity problem as under the depreciation
bond approach. In particular, the system fails to track and tax wealth
changes as they occur.
4. The Account Adjustment Rule
The account adjustment rule is used for some types of group accounts,
and the strict definition of the rule is embedded in a group accounting
framework.1 87 Group accounts treat a group of assets as if they were a
single asset for purposes of depreciation. The account adjustment rule
halts the tax depreciation of assets that are sold or retired from group
accounts and requires that the gain or loss on the disposition be com-
puted. In contrast to individual item accounting, this gain or loss is not
recognized immediately. Instead, gain is subtracted from the "adjusted
basis" of the group account while loss is added to that "adjusted basis." 188
In effect, the tax on the gain or the reduction in tax on the loss is delayed
since gain reduces and loss increases future depreciation deductions.
Translating this rule to the framework of individual item accounting, it
is as if gain or loss is taxed or credited under the schedule used to depre-
186. We have not had to take this special category of sales into account under the previ-
ous depreciation methods that we have studied. If the depreciation schedule is based on
the age-price profile for surviving assets and that profile is correct, the market value of an
asset will be equal to its adjusted basis. There are no tax consequences of sale. See supra
text accompanying notes 43-45. The depreciation bond approach exhibits this trait even
more strongly. Under any depreciation schedule that is set in advance, sale has no tax
consequences. That is, the failure of sale to have tax consequences does not depend on the
depreciation schedule being "correct."
The Treasury Department did take asset sales into account in two of its studies, but its
approach was to assume that past patterns of sale would persist into the future. See supra
note 80. This approach treats the sales as exogenous to the tax system, and, to the extent
sales are not tax motivated, assumes that the business conditions that dictated sale during
the sample period will be the same in the future.
187. For a more complete description of the rule in the context of group accounting, see
infra text accompanying note 317.
188. Adjusted basis is placed in quotation marks because group accounting does not
formally assign an adjusted basis to the group account. However, the results of the account
adjustment rule are accurately described using the concept of the group account having an
"adjusted basis." See infra text accompanying note 313.
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ciate the asset before it was sold.189 Suppose, for example, that the asset
was being depreciated under a ten year, straight-line schedule. If the as-
set is sold for a $100 gain at the end of five years, the account adjustment
rule calls for $20 of income for each of years six through ten inclusive. 9 )
The account adjustment rule blocks churning as an effective strategy
but allows strategic loss-taking. Churning will not work because the tax-
payer who buys an asset and then immediately resells it for the same
price will not be allowed to depreciate the asset. The account adjustment
rule cuts off future depreciation deductions at the time of sale or disposi-
tion. On the other hand, strategic loss-taking is still a viable strategy.
Loss is recognized, although somewhat delayed compared to the individ-
ual item method. This allows the taxpayer to accelerate depreciation
when it turns out to be too slow ex post. Concurrently, the taxpayer can
retain depreciable assets with gains on them and thus need not decelerate
depreciation at all when it turns out to be too fast ex post.
It is true that strategic loss-taking is not as profitable a strategy under
the account adjustment rule as under the individual item method. Losses
have delayed effect under the account adjustment rule, while they reduce
taxes "immediately," that is, in the year of disposition, under the individ-
ual item method.
The impact of the account adjustment rule on "normal" business sales
is similar to the impact of the individual item method. If the depreciation
schedule is based on the age-price profile for surviving assets and that
profile is correct, the market value of an asset will be equal to its adjusted
basis. There are no tax consequences of sale, and the taxpayer decides
whether or not to sell based strictly on business considerations. This
happy outcome is consistently attainable only if the correct age-price pro-
file is known in advance. In the more general context adopted in this
Part, there is price path uncertainty. An ex ante depreciation schedule
based on the expected price path may prove to be too fast for some as-
sets. In this case, assets will have gains on them and there will be a lock-
in effect: The taxpayer may forgo sales that make business sense in order
to avoid recognizing the gains. 19'
The account adjustment rule does require an accompanying adjustment
to the ex ante depreciation schedule. The schedule based on the age-
price profile for surviving assets is appropriate for individual item ac-
189. This translation to individual item accounting will be exact if the group account
consists entirely of assets placed into the service at the same time and depreciated under
the same schedule. There are currently two different group accounting schemes applicable
to two different classes of assets. Only one of these schemes restricts group accounts to
aggregations of such a uniform set of assets. See infra text accompanying notes 306-311.
190. An alternative method would be to take the present value of the entire stream of
gains into income at the time of sale. If it is true that the purchaser of the used asset would
depreciate under a five year, straight-line schedule, then this present value treatment
would be identical to the disposition rule proposed by Professors Auerbach and Jorgenson
under their "first-year capital cost recovery system." See supra note 171.
191. The depreciation bond approach avoids this lock-in effect. See supra note 186.
The proceeds tax rule exacerbates it. See supra text accompanying notes 185-186.
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counting because that schedule presumes that retirement loss deductions
will have immediate effect. When assets are retired, treatment in accord
with "economic depreciation" is assured because the loss deduction is ex-
actly equal to the loss in value when the asset is retired. 92 Where the
loss deduction is delayed, the associated reduction in taxes is delayed and
the taxpayer receives too small a benefit under the standard of economic
depreciation. Thus, if the account adjustment rule applies to dispositions,
the ex ante depreciation schedule will have to be accelerated compared to
the schedule appropriate for individual item accounting.
5. A Comparison of the Alternative Disposition Rules
We are now in a position to summarize the strengths and weaknesses of
various disposition rules. 193 These strengths and weaknesses lie along
five dimensions:
(1) the strategic loss-taking problem;
(2) the churning problem;
(3) the impact on "normal" business sales of depreciable assets;
(4) the need to know adjusted basis in order to compute tax treatment
on sale;
(5) the difficulty in adjusting the ex ante depreciation schedule.
The following table summarizes the performance of the various disposi-
tion rules along these dimensions. 94 In the table, the "individual item
192. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45. This argument is strictly true only in the
case where the age-price profile for surviving assets is known in advance. If that is not the
case, the adjusted basis of the asset may differ from market value at the time of retirement.
Deducting the adjusted basis will not be equivalent to deducting the amount of economic
loss since the economic loss is equal to the market value right before the asset "dies" and
becomes worthless. See supra text accompanying notes 120-129.
193. I do not include the Auerbach approach in the summary. The strengths and weak-
nesses of that approach are very clear: Although the approach eliminates all strategic trad-
ing problems, does not require any depreciation schedule, and does not require knowledge
of an assets adjusted basis, the approach largely abandons the accretion tax goal of taxing
wealth changes as they occur. See supra text accompanying notes 164-170. In contrast, the
approaches summarized here give considerable weight to that goal.
194. Another potential dimension involves the sharing of "systematic" risk with the
government through the tax system. When asset dispositions are taxed, the government
shares in the upside and downside by taxing gains and allowing deductions of losses. To
the extent that this risk is "systematic," that is, cannot be costlessly diversified away, this
risk sharing has value to the taxpayer.
Some of the asset disposition rules eliminate or reduce this risk-sharing feature. Under
the depreciation bond approach, there are no tax consequences of disposition and there-
fore no risk sharing. The proceeds tax rule discourages dispositions and thereby reduces
the scope for risk sharing. When assets are sold under that rule, however, there is risk
sharing since the tax on the proceeds will be higher for the better outcome of a higher sales
price. Finally, the account adjustment rule reduces the impact of taxes on disposition by
delaying the accompanying gains and losses. This delay should reduce the degree of risk
sharing inherent in the rules.
Some economists believe that when risk sharing is reduced, the depreciation schedule
should be accelerated in compensation. This reduction may well occur for some of the
disposition rules discussed here. For a more complete discussion, see infra Appendix D.
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method" refers to the policy of taxing gains and losses on dispositions
immediately.195
TABLE III: PROS AND CONS OF DISPOSITION RULES
disposition remaining remaining impact on need to difficulty of
treatment strategic churning normal sales know adjusting
trading problem adjusted depreciation
problem basis'? schedule
individual severe none moderate yes none
item
accounting
depreciation none severe none no moderate
bond
approach
proceeds tax none none severe no high
rule
account moderate none moderate yes moderate
adjustment
rule
Clearly none of the four treatments is dominant. Choosing between
them involves trading off one problem against another. Perhaps the most
appealing treatment in the group is the depreciation bond approach, but
this approach will be viable only if the churning problem can be ad-
dressed in a way that does not involve administrative or taxpayer compli-
ance costs that are too large. It is unclear whether the approach
suggested earlier of making used assets nondepreciable will meet this
goal. 96
D. SOME CONCLUSIONS
Assuming that basing depreciation on annual changes in asset value is
infeasible, two general alternatives have emerged for dealing with strate-
gic loss-taking and the fact that the future price path for most depreciable
assets is uncertain. One is ex ante adjustment in the depreciation sched-
ule. The problem with this approach is that the desired degree of adjust-
ment depends heavily on the traits of individual assets. In particular, one
would need to know whether trading is costly for each asset and also the
degree of uncertainty in future prices. The need to classify assets by du-
rability has proven to be difficult enough. 197 Factoring in trading costs
and price uncertainty would greatly complicate an already arduous
task.198
195. The name is derived from the fact that this method is used for individual item
accounting under current law. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 174-175.
197. One need only read any of the six Treasury studies of particular assets to be con-
vinced of this fact. See supra note 24 (citing the six studies).
198. Analytic complexity is not the only problem that would come about from a more
extensive methodology. Depreciation policy is subject to considerable political pressure
from concerned groups. For example, in 1988, Congress withdrew the power to set useful
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An alternative approach is to change the disposition rules. These
changes would require an accompanying adjustment of ex ante deprecia-
tion schedules, but the required adjustments are analytically clear for
many of the disposition rules. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be
a clear winner among the disposition rules since each rule has some draw-
backs. Nonetheless, some of these rules have potential and are worthy of
further study.
IV. GROUP ACCOUNTING
Group accounting methods allow a group of assets to be depreciated in
a unified account as if they were a single asset. This approach makes tax
accounting much easier and less expensive in situations where a taxpayer
holds large numbers of identical, low-value assets and where keeping
track of these assets on an item by item basis is difficult. This administra-
tive cost saving is undoubtedly the major reason for permitting group
accounting.' 99
This Part shows that tax policy toward group accounts turns heavily on
the fact that strategic loss-taking is a particularly serious problem for cer-
tain types of group accounts. As a result, a powerful analysis of group
accounting policy is possible based on the theory developed in the previ-
ous Part.
This policy analysis is not merely of theoretical interest. In the face of
potentially large administrative cost savings, group accounting is an im-
portant aspect of depreciation policy. Controlling strategic loss-taking
should not be accomplished at the cost of heavily penalizing taxpayers
who choose group accounting.
Section A describes current law governing group accounting. Section
B discusses the form that rules addressing group accounting should take.
lives that it had delegated to Treasury in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See supra note 24.
The original proposal restricting Treasury's power merely barred Treasury from lengthen-
ing lives. This fact suggests that the withdrawal of power was prompted by industries who
feared that Treasury studies of their depreciable assets would result in decelerated
depreciation.
As is the case with durability, there is a significant degree of uncertainty about both
trading costs and future price volatility for various assets. But the more uncertain the
determination of depreciation treatment becomes, the more scope there is for politics.
When the political process is factored in, adding more uncertain factors to be considered
may make depreciation policy less effective.
Along these lines, it is worth noting the motivation for Hulten and Wykoff's seminal
study of economic depreciation. See Hulten & Wykoff, supra note 3, at 82. Their goal was
to counter the claim that depreciation policy must be "politically determined" since a theo-
retically correct depreciation policy cannot be implemented. They intended to accomplish
this goal by showing that there is a clear way to estimate economic depreciation. See id.
199. For tangible assets put into service during 1981-1986, group accounting was permit-
ted only for assets where such a rationale was likely to apply. This limitation was moti-
vated by a technical concern about the recapture of the investment tax credit from assets
sold out of group accounts. As a result, an attempt was made to narrow the category of
assets for which group accounting was allowed as much as possible. See infra text accom-
panying notes 301-305.
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Finally, Section C considers the problem of designing optimal rules under
certain constraints set by Congress.
A. CURRENT LAW
Group accounting is quite complex. Four major group accounting sys-
tems have been in force since 1971. Two remain in force today.
This section provides a qualitative overview of group accounting. Par-
ticular attention is devoted to the group accounting rules for the tax treat-
ment of asset dispositions since the disposition rules determine the scope
for strategic loss-taking. Appendix E provides a more extensive discus-
sion of group accounting rules under all four post-1971 regimes and pro-
vides primary and secondary references for the assertions about current
law made in this subsection.
The two group accounting systems that apply to assets put into service
currently, that is, in 1999, are a system of "multiple asset accounts" estab-
lished under the Regulations for section 167, and a system of "general
asset accounts" established by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and deline-
ated in Regulations that apply to assets placed in service in taxable years
ending on or after October 11, 1994.2110 The general asset account rules
apply to "recovery property," property subject to depreciation under
MACRS. Recovery property includes most real and personal tangible
property. The multiple asset account rules apply to property that is de-
preciable but that is not recovery property. This category includes intan-
gible assets such as patents and copyrights.
Both general asset accounts and multiple asset accounts are elective
and quite flexible. A taxpayer can set up any number of these accounts
and can place any number of assets, including one, in any of the ac-
counts. 20 ' Use of group accounts for any given asset does not preclude
treating other similar assets put into service in the same year or a later
year under individual accounting. There is one important difference in
the scope of general asset accounts and multiple asset accounts. A single
general asset account may contain only assets that were placed into ser-
vice the same taxable year and that are subject to the same depreciation
method, the same convention, and the same recovery period.20 2 In con-
trast, the only limitation on multiple asset accounts is that the same de-
preciation method (e.g., straight-line or declining balance at a particular
200. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(i)-1. The effective date provision of the Regulations, Treas.
Reg. § 1.168(i)-1 (I), allows "any reasonable method that is consistently applied to the tax-
payer's general asset accounts" for assets placed in service after December 31, 1986, in
taxable years ending before October 11, 1994.
201. Placing one asset in a group account is essentially an election to apply the group
accounting disposition rules to the asset instead of the disposition rule that applies under
individual accounting. This fact emphasizes the point that group accounting methods are
distinguishable from individual item accounting because of different substantive tax treat-
ments (upon disposition of assets) and not simply because group accounts treat several
assets as a single asset.
202. See Treas. Reg. §1.168(i)-1(c)(2)(i) and (ii).
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rate) apply to each account during its entire life. 2°3
The central feature of group accounting is that each group account will
be treated as if it is a single asset for accounting purposes. But different
types of group accounts are subject to different tax rules upon disposition
of assets. In addition, there is a traditional distinction between different
types of dispositions. The multiple asset account rules divide dispositions
into two categories: "normal" retirements and "abnormal" retirements.
The difference between these two categories is somewhat fuzzy,2 04 but
some particular cases are clear. For instance, if a few assets are sold from
a group account long before they are obsolete, the sales will be treated as
abnormal retirements. On the other hand, discarding an asset that wears
out in an ordinary way from use will be treated as a normal retirement.
The general asset account rules do not use the normal and abnormal
retirement categories but instead define certain dispositions as "qualify-
ing dispositions. ' 20 5 The qualifying disposition category overlaps with
"abnormal retirements" in the multiple asset account scheme but is nar-
rower and more precise. 206
There are three general methods for treating dispositions under multi-
ple asset accounts and general asset accounts: the individual item
method, the account adjustment method, and the proceeds tax method.
Part III defines and discusses two of these methods, 2°7 and Appendix E
contains a more detailed description of all three methods for the inter-
ested reader.20 8 For multiple asset accounts, the account adjustment
method applies to normal retirements while the individual item method is
used for abnormal retirements. For general asset accounts, the individual
item method applies on an elective basis to the special category of "quali-
fying distributions," while the proceeds tax rule applies to all other
dispositions.
203. See Dooher et al., 412 T.M., Depreciation Methods-Item and Group Accounts
(Bureau of National Affairs, 1989), at A-I to A-2.
204. For multiple asset accounts, the definitions of normal and abnormal retirements
are set out in Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)(8). An abnormal retirement is one "due to a cause not
contemplated in setting the applicable depreciation rate." Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)(8). As an
example, the Regulation cites an asset destroyed by a casualty or one that "has lost its
usefulness suddenly as the result of extraordinary obsolescence." Id. Generally speaking,
all the "facts and circumstances" must be considered to determine whether a retirement is
normal or abnormal. Id.
205. See Treas. Reg. § 1.168(i)-1(e)(3)(iii)(B) (defining "qualifying dispositions").
206. In particular, the "qualifying dispositions" category includes casualty related re-
tirements, Treas. Reg. § 1.168(i)-l(e)(3)(iii)(B)(1), but the category does not incorporate
the "extraordinary obsolescence" concept or the idea of "a cause [for retirement] not con-
templated in setting the applicable depreciation rate" that defines "abnormal retirements"
for purposes of multiple asset accounts. Instead, "qualifying dispositions" explicitly in-
clude the narrower cases of charitable contributions of property from general asset ac-
counts and dispositions due to termination of a business. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(i)-
1(e)(3)(iii)(B)(2) and (3). The exact distinction between abnormal retirements in the mul-
tiple asset account scheme and qualifying dispositions in the general asset account system
does not bear on the discussion in this Article and is not explicated further.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 184-192.
208. See infra text accompanying notes 312-318.
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B. OPTIMAL GROUP ACCOUNTING RULES
In discussing the rules that should be used for group accounting, an
important threshold question is why group accounting requires rules that
are different from the rules for individual asset accounting. Given that
the goal of group accounting is to allow aggregate treatment of assets that
are costly to account for individually,20 9 we need to focus on whether
aggregation of several assets into one "group account" asset raises any
special problems. 21" Special problems related to strategic loss-taking ex-
ist, but only for certain types of aggregation. In particular, problems exist
when assets subject to different depreciation schedules or assets put into
service at different times are aggregated in the same account. We demon-
strate this point in subsection 1 and then discuss possible solutions in sub-
section 2.
1. Problems Posed By Group Accounting
Some terminology is useful. 21' Accounts that include assets put into
service in different years are called "open" accounts while accounts lim-
ited to assets put into service in a single year are "closed" accounts. The
term "open" captures the idea that the taxpayer may continue to add
assets to the account after it has been started in some particular year.
Furthermore, accounts that contain assets subject to different deprecia-
tion schedules are called "heterogeneous" accounts while accounts that
contain only assets subject to a single schedule are "homogeneous"
accounts.
Consider first the case of homogeneous, closed accounts, that is, group
accounts containing only assets placed into service in the same year and
subject to the same depreciation schedule. In this case, there is no real
need for separate rules for group accounting. Each asset can be treated
as if it were an individual asset.
There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, because all assets in
the group would be subject to the same depreciation schedule if ac-
counted for individually, the group can be assigned that same schedule.
There is no scope for changing the depreciation schedule for any given
209. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
210. Group accounting rules raise issues that result from aggregation of depreciable
assets. There is also a body of rules that deal with issues that arise from the "disaggrega-
tion" of depreciable assets. These are the "repair" rules. Certain components of a depre-
ciable asset may wear out and require replacement before other components. An
important issue is how repairs or replacement of components should be treated. See supra
note 134.
There is some fascinating history associated with this issue. For example, prior to 1981,
the Code allowed taxpayers to "disaggregate" buildings and depreciate the components
based on their separate and distinct useful lives. This method was called "component de-
preciation." It was abolished in 1981.
Despite the fact that the "repair" rules are intellectually interesting and practically sig-
nificant, we leave an examination of the rules for another day.
211. This terminology is derived from Dooher et al., supra note 203, at A-2, A-33 to A-
39.
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asset by aggregating it with other assets in a group account. Second, the
adjusted basis of any particular asset in the group is readily determinable
even though it might be impossible to distinguish one asset in the group
from another. This adjusted basis is simply the adjusted basis for the
group multiplied by the proportion of initial group value represented by
the asset in question.212 Thus, the disposition of an asset from the group
account can be treated in exactly the same manner as disposition of that
asset would have been treated under individual asset accounting. Be-
cause neither depreciation of surviving assets nor disposition of assets
need be treated differently, the same depreciation policy considerations
apply as under individual asset accounting.
This happy result falls apart if the law allows heterogeneous or open
accounts. Heterogeneous accounts contain assets subject to different de-
preciation schedules. When such assets are placed into the same group
account, the group account is depreciated under a composite schedule
that is a weighted average of the schedules that would have applied to the
individual assets placed into the account.2 13 Applying the individual item
approach to dispositions will create opportunities for strategic loss-taking
whether the heterogeneous account is open or closed.
The weighted average approach involves computing an initial deprecia-
tion rate based on the assets initially in the accounts and then redeter-
mining the rate "whenever additions, retirements, or replacements
substantially alter the relative proportions of types of assets in the ac-
counts. ' '2 14 This redetermination rule applies to both closed and open
heterogenous accounts. Typically, such accounts will display some change
in asset mix as assets age and are retired. Nonetheless, leading commen-
tators have noted that "[n]either taxpayers nor the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice personnel have been inclined to go through the involved and
laborious process of recomputing rates very often," especially for open
heterogeneous accounts, since the "substantial alteration" of asset types
in such an account need be only temporary.215 The taxpayer may add
212. All assets are placed into service at the same time and are subject to the same
depreciation schedule as they would be if accounted for individually. If the adjusted basis
for the group is X% of initial value, it will be true that the adjusted basis of an individual
asset would have been X% of initial value if this asset had been accounted for individually.
Thus, we can easily convert the adjusted basis of the group into an adjusted basis for an
asset in the group if we know the aggregate initial value of the group and the initial value
of the asset.
213. The text below details the major features of the weighted average approach. The
rules for this approach are most clearly set out for "open heterogeneous accounts." These
are group accounts with assets placed into service at different times as well as assets subject
to different depreciation schedules. This mixture is the most general case, and it is not
surprising that the rules are the most well-developed for this case. For a good description
of these rules for multiple asset accounts, see Dooher et al., supra note 203, at A-34 to A-
37. Accounts consisting of assets placed into service at the same time but subject to differ-
ent depreciation schedules are called "heterogeneous accounts closed at the end of the first
year." The rules for these accounts are not as clear or well developed. See id. at A-37 to
A-38.
214. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-7(d).
215. Dooher et al., supra note 203, at A-36.
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new assets to the account in the near future, thereby shifting the types of
asset in the account back toward the original mix.
Use of the weighted average schedule in group accounts allows the tax-
payer to create some lucrative strategic loss-taking opportunities, even if
the underlying accounts are subject to redetermination annually. These
opportunities differ from the opportunities that exist when individual as-
set accounting applies. Under individual asset accounting, strategic loss-
taking is a potentially serious problem when the future price path for
surviving assets is not known in advance: Market price may range below
adjusted basis under whatever depreciation schedule is set, and the tax-
payer can "accelerate" the schedule by selling the asset for a tax-loss and
combining that sale with purchase of a similar replacement asset. In the
group accounting context, strategic loss-taking is possible even when
there is no uncertainty about asset lives or future price paths. When
group accounts use a weighted average schedule rule, the taxpayer can
deliberately mix assets with very different depreciation schedules in a
group account to achieve more favorable results than the results that
would follow from depreciating each asset separately. 21 6
To see how this manipulation works, it is convenient to start by consid-
ering application of the weighted average approach in the absence of any
redeterminations. Consider two types of assets with known lives of one
year and six years, respectively. Suppose that it also is known in advance
that the value of both asset types will decline in a straight-line fashion
over their lives. If the Code provides the correct theoretical depreciation
schedule for these assets, that is, straight-line depreciation over their
lives, there will be no strategic loss-taking opportunities for the assets
under individual item accounting. Each asset's adjusted basis will at all
times be equal to its market value.
This result disappears if the taxpayer can aggregate the two different
asset types into a group account using a weighted average schedule. Sup-
pose, for example, that the taxpayer constructs a group account com-
posed of 40% (by value) of the one year asset and 60% of the six-year
asset. This account would be depreciated during the first year as if it were
one asset on a two-year straight-line schedule, and absent any redetermi-
nations, the two year straight-line schedule will apply in the second year
also. 217 But the taxpayer can retire the one-year assets at the end of the
first year and claim a loss equal to the remaining adjusted basis of these
assets. Assuming that the loss can be taken immediately, as is the case
216. This group accounting strategy does not always involve combining a sale for a loss
with repurchase of a replacement asset. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to refer to this strat-
egy by the term "strategic loss-taking" since the beneficial results stem from anticipated
retirements that accentuate losses. This point is explained in more detail below after de-
veloping an example that clarifies the operation of the weighted average method. See infra
note 218.
217. The weighted average rate of depreciation is the aggregate first year allowance for
the assets in the group under individual item accounting divided by the total value of the
assets placed into the account. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-1 (b), example (2); Dooher et al.,
supra note 203, at A-34 - A-35.
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under the individual item method, these assets will be depreciated cor-
rectly (following economic depreciation) since they have a one-year life.
However, the remaining assets with six-year lives will be depreciated for
two years on a straight-line basis, thus receiving accelerated treatment.
Thus, by mixing long-lived and short-lived assets in the same group ac-
count, the taxpayer can accelerate the depreciation of the long-lived as-
sets compared to their individual item treatment. 218
One aspect driving this result is the absence of redeterminations. At
the end of the first year, the account consists entirely of assets with five
years of life remaining. The multiple asset account regulations state that
"the average useful life and rate shall be redetermined whenever addi-
tions, retirements, or replacements substantially alter the relative propor-
tion of types of assets in the accounts." 2 19
The most rigorous enforcement of this Regulation would be to recom-
pute the average useful life and rate every year. In fact, even with annual
redeterminations, the taxpayer can play by the rules and get away with
murder. The taxpayer's leeway to do so is especially clear for open ac-
counts. For instance, in the example of the one-year asset and the six-
year asset, the taxpayer could annually add smaller and smaller amounts
of one-year assets to the account and yet maintain the rate of deprecia-
tion on the six-year assets at 50% per year or greater. 220 By maintaining
218. We have previously defined strategic loss-taking to mean the sale of an asset for a
tax loss combined with repurchase of a similar asset. See supra text accompanying notes
12-15. In the text example, the taxpayer combines assets in a group account anticipating
that some will be retired before they are fully depreciated. The one-year asset is retired for
a loss but no asset is sold for a tax loss and replaced with another asset.
We will nonetheless refer to the strategy of accelerating depreciation for long-lived as-
sets by mixing them in a group account with short-lived assets as "strategic loss-taking."
The taxpayer is intentionally mixing the assets together in such a way that long-lived assets
will receive favorable treatment, accelerated depreciation, while short-lived assets suffer no
detriment due to the ability of the taxpayer to form a new "schedule" for those assets by
loss-taking trades or retirements.
In fact, the absence of "pure" strategic loss-taking in the text example is largely an arti-
fact of that particular example. If we had mixed two-year assets with six-year assets, the
resulting schedule would be straight-line depreciation with a recovery period three and
one-third years. The taxpayer would deduct 30% of initial value in the first three years and
10% of initial value in the fourth year. In this case, pure strategic loss-taking is called for.
After the first year, the two-year assets have fallen 50% in value, but adjusted basis has
only been reduced by 30%. The taxpayer can trade these costs for a loss and then replace
them with equivalent assets with one-year of life remaining.
219. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-7(d).
220. Consider an example. Suppose that in the first year, there are $1200 worth of six-
year straight-line assets and $800 worth of one-year assets. The group account is depreci-
ated on a two-year straight-line schedule so that only $1000 in "adjusted basis" is left after
one year. In addition, the one-year assets are retired from the account at a $400 loss,
thereby reducing the account "adjusted basis" to $600. Thus, only five-year assets are in
the account and these have an aggregate adjusted basis of $600.
Suppose the Regulations are applied strictly so that the taxpayer must recompute the
depreciation rate for the account. By adding one-year assets with total value of $360 to the
account, the taxpayer would maintain two year straight-line treatment: The first year allow-
ance would be one-fifth of $600 plus $360 which is $480 or one-half of $960, the total value
of assets in the account.
The following table details the value in one-year assets that would need to be added each
year to maintain a group treatment on a two-year straight-line basis:
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the 50% rate, the taxpayer will have replaced six-year straight-line depre-
ciation with 300% declining balance depreciation. 22' This strategy does
not affect the depreciation of the one-year assets since the taxpayer re-
tires them at the end their one-year life, thereby allowing a first year de-
duction for the entire cost.
Finally, even if the account in question is closed and the Regulation is
strictly enforced, the taxpayer will still succeed in getting accelerated de-
preciation. In our example, the taxpayer still deducts one-half of the ba-
sis of the six-year assets in the first year. If the regulation is strictly
enforced, the taxpayer will have to deduct the remaining half of the basis
of these assets under a straight-line schedule over five years.222 But the
overall result is more favorable to the taxpayer than 200% declining bal-
ance depreciation. 223
We now turn to the case of open, homogeneous accounts. That is, we
focus on the consequences of allowing similar assets placed in service in
different years to be in the same account. Special problems arise in these
accounts when it is costly to distinguish assets. Consider railroad ties, an
asset type that is suggested as a prime candidate for these accounts by the
Regulations. 224
The railroad company will constantly be replacing ties that have rotted
or are damaged with new ones. A group account consisting of all of its
railroad ties in service will be a composite of ties placed in service initially
in many different years. Labeling each tie in some indelible way and
keeping track of it separately in the tax accounts undoubtedly would be
very costly.
The treatment of retirements from such a group account poses
Remaining Adjusted Basis New Value of One-Year
Year of Long-Lived Assets Assets that Must be Added
1 $1200.00 $800.00
2 $600.00 $360.00
3 $300.00 $225.00
4 $150.00 $100.00
5 $75.00 $0.00
6 $37.50 $0.00
In year six, the taxpayer can simply deduct the entire $37.50 of adjusted basis since the
asset now has only one year of useful life left. The net result is that the taxpayer switches
the depreciation of the six-year asset from six-year straight-line depreciation to six-year
300% declining balance depreciation.
221. The resulting degree of acceleration is more than the Code allows for accelerated
depreciation. MACRS permits at most 200% declining balance depreciation compared to
the straight-line treatment under ADS. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
222. All of the one-year assets have been retired from the account. All that remains is
the six-year assets that have five years of life remaining.
223. The present value of depreciation taken 50% at the end of year one followed by
10% in each of the following five years is 90.88% of initial value. The present value of
depreciation on a 200% declining balance schedule over six years (switching to straight-
line when it is optimal to do so) is 90.13% of initial value.
224. See supra note 199 and infra note 302.
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problems if the rule for dispositions depends on adjusted basis. 225 If ties
are not identified, the date a tie was placed in service and thus its ad-
justed basis at retirement are not known. Using the average adjusted ba-
sis for ties in the account would be inaccurate if older ties are more likely
to be the ones that are retired. In that case, the adjusted basis assigned to
retired assets will generally be too high since average adjusted basis will
tend to exceed the adjusted basis of the assets actually retired.
2. Some Solutions to the Problems
Subsection 1 shows that the problems specific to group accounting arise
when group accounts are allowed to be open or heterogeneous. One ob-
vious potential solution is to require that such accounts be closed and
homogeneous. 226 This restriction is in effect for general asset accounts
but does not apply to multiple asset accounts.227
Unfortunately, the restriction vitiates much of the legitimate scope of
group accounting. The purpose for allowing group accounts is to address
situations in which assets are numerous, indistinguishable, or of low unit
value. In these situations individual item accounting would be extremely
expensive compared to the value of the assets. This problem is clearest
for assets like railroad ties where not permitting open accounts would
result in potentially very high administrative and compliance costs. But
the same problem can exist if heterogeneous accounts are not permitted.
High cost savings may result if the taxpayer is permitted to treat a myriad
of small items put into service in the same year in a single account as a
single asset. The taxpayer's financial accounts may already be structured
in this way, perhaps lumping all the miscellaneous items for particular
projects or businesses into one category.
Given the need to allow group accounts that are open or heterogene-
ous, it would be valuable to establish separate rules for closed, homogene-
ous accounts. The nice feature of these accounts is that nothing is lost in
applying the same rules that apply under individual item accounting.228
The Code and the Regulations should permit taxpayers to operate closed,
homogeneous accounts under those rules.
The remaining issue is how to treat open, heterogeneous accounts. 229
225. The individual item method and the account adjustment method both require
knowledge of the adjusted basis of the asset being retired (or sold) from a group account.
See supra text accompanying note 7; infra text following note 317.
226. This requirement in fact applied to "vintage accounts" under the Asset Deprecia-
tion Range system in effect from 1971 to 1980. See infra text accompanying note 299.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 202-203.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 211-212. Ideal individual item accounting rules
may be different from the ones in operation today. In particular, they may adjust tax
schedules or use a disposition rule other than the individual item method in order to com-
bat strategic loss-taking. See supra text accompanying notes 134-196. But the essential
point is that there is no need to establish different rules for closed, homogeneous accounts.
229. I choose not to deal with open, homogeneous accounts and closed, heterogenous
accounts separately. The policy adjustments for "openness" and "heterogeneity" are suffi-
ciently similar that it is not worth discussing these two types of accounts separately. In-
stead the discussion focuses on the most general case: the open, heterogeneous account.
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The availability of these accounts raises the danger that they will be used
to enhance or create strategic loss-taking opportunities. It is important
that the rules that apply to open, heterogeneous accounts aim at control-
ling strategic loss-taking. At the same time, these rules should not be so
severe as to destroy the viability of using these accounts since they can
result in large savings of administrative and compliance resources. 23°
Ex ante schedule adjustments alone are unlikely to be a good policy for
open, heterogeneous accounts. The big problem with controlling strate-
gic loss-taking by ex ante schedule adjustments is that the required ad-
justments depend heavily on trading costs and asset volatility.2 31 This
problem is much worse for open heterogenous accounts since these ac-
counts mix different kinds of assets and since the asset mix may change
over time. Each open, heterogeneous account would require its own spe-
cial schedule, and setting the appropriate schedule might be very
difficult.232
Two of the disposition rules discussed in Part III, the depreciation bond
approach and the proceeds tax rule, are extremely attractive methods for
controlling the strategic loss-taking problems that accompany open, het-
erogeneous group accounts. Two features of these rules make them par-
ticularly suitable. First, under both rules, computing the tax treatment
upon disposition of assets from the account does not require knowing the
adjusted basis of the assets sold or retired from the account. 233 We have
seen that for open accounts, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, it
is difficult to determine the adjusted basis for such assets. Such a deter-
mination is possible for closed, heterogeneous accounts. Because these
accounts contain assets that are all put in service in the same year, ad-
justed basis can be computed from scratch knowing the type of asset be-
ing sold or retired. Nonetheless, this computation is exactly the kind of
asset-by-asset delineation that group accounts are designed to avoid. The
computation would be especially burdensome if a group of assets were
sold or retired as a block.2 3
4
230. See supra text accompanying notes 226-228 (special role for open and heterogene-
ous accounts).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 135-154.
232. One could not simply start with special schedules for each asset type and then have
a formula that mechanically combined those schedules into a single schedule when the
assets are mixed in a group account. There may be no danger of strategic loss-taking for
two asset types considered separately, but combining them may create a considerable dan-
ger. See supra text accompanying notes 217-223 (example). Thus, a special schedule for a
group account would have to be tailored to the particular mix of assets in that account. In
addition, if the account is open, that mix may change over time so that the schedule would
have to be changed along with the mix or would have to be set so as to anticipate changes
in mix.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 171, 183-185, and 195-196.
234. It is interesting to contrast the outcome of this sale or retirement of a block of
assets with the same transaction for closed, homogeneous accounts. For these accounts,
the adjusted basis of a single asset or a block of assets is simply the "adjusted basis" of the
account multiplied by the proportion of original account value represented by the asset or
block. See supra text accompanying note 212. Thus, it is fairly easy to compute adjusted
basis when assets are sold or retired from such an account. This ease of computation
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The second advantage of the depreciation bond approach and the pro-
ceeds tax rule is that they make strategic loss-taking totally ineffective. 235
Because strategic loss-taking is a particularly serious problem for open,
heterogeneous accounts, it makes sense to use a policy that strongly ad-
dresses that type of manipulation.
One drawback of using either the depreciation bond approach or the
proceeds tax rule is that the ex ante depreciation schedule will have to be
adjusted.2 36 Unless this schedule is considerably accelerated, the tax-
payer will pay a substantial price for shifting to group accounts under
these disposition rules.237 Failure to adjust would discourage use of open,
heterogeneous group accounts, and we have seen that using these ac-
counts promises substantial cost savings. 238
Establishing a separate set of schedules for assets in group accounts
that are open or heterogeneous is inelegant and adds to the complexity of
the depreciation rules.239 In addition, unless the government is prepared
to define the situations where administrative and compliance costs war-
rant the use of group accounts, group accounting treatment is destined to
be elective. If the special schedules set up for assets in group accounts
that are open or heterogeneous overcompensate for the disposition rules
applied to those accounts, taxpayers will elect group accounting simply to
obtain a more favorable depreciation schedule.
Finally, the problem of designing special schedules differs for the two
disposition rules. In the case of the depreciation bond approach, compu-
tation of the appropriate accelerated schedule is easy.240 In contrast,
under the proceeds tax rule that computation is difficult. 241 As a result,
under the proceeds tax rule the danger of making a schedule adjustment
makes it feasible to use disposition rules that hinge on the adjusted basis of the assets that
are sold or retired from closed, homogeneous accounts.
235. The other disposition rules are not complete cures. They leave some scope for
strategic loss-taking. See supra text accompanying notes 190-191.
236. Of course, adjustment would not be necessary if the depreciation bond approach
or the proceeds tax rule were applied generally, that is, to all assets regardless of whether
individual item accounting or some form of group accounting applies to the asset.
237. See supra note 60 and text accompanying notes 59-61, and 173-186 (large degree of
acceleration required for ex ante depreciation schedule under depreciation bond approach
and proceeds tax rule).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 226-228.
239. However, the schedule adjustment rules could operate mechanically. The rules
could specify a group of schedules paralleling MACRS and ADS. These schedules would
specify the treatment for each type of asset (e.g., by class life or MACRS category). The
schedule for a group account would be a weighted average (weighted by initial value) of
the schedules for the assets put into the account. If the account were "open," the schedule
would be readjusted when new assets were added.
In contrast, no such mechanical approach will work where the schedule adjustment itself
is used to combat strategic loss-taking. See supra note 232. A mechanical method is possi-
ble for the depreciation bond approach and the proceeds tax rule since under these ap-
proaches the schedule adjustment merely allows for the change in disposition rule. The
new disposition rule itself, and not the schedule adjustment, is what stops strategic loss-
taking.
240. The Hulten and Wykoff schedule will work. See supra text accompanying note
173.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 185-186.
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that overcompensates for the severity of the disposition rule is greater
and, in the face of computational difficulty, so is the danger of undercom-
pensating in an effort to avoid overcompensating.
Although the required schedule adjustment for the depreciation bond
approach and the proceeds tax rule are a disadvantage, using one or the
other of these two disposition rules seems like the best available ap-
proach for group accounts that are open or heterogeneous. Using other
disposition rules or relying solely on schedule adjustment for such ac-
counts is not practical.
C. SOME SUGGESTED REFORMS OF THE GROUP ACCOUNTING RULES
Three policy points emerge from the previous section. First, the same
disposition rules and other rules (such as the rules specifying the depreci-
ation schedule) that apply under individual item accounting should apply
to group accounting for closed, homogeneous accounts. Second, group
accounts that are open or heterogeneous require special treatment. The
best policy for these accounts appears to be use of either the depreciation
bond approach or the proceeds tax rule. Third, limiting group accounts
to those that are closed and homogeneous is undesirable. There are
many instances where use of heterogeneous or open accounts can achieve
considerable simplification and an ensuing drop in administrative and ac-
counting costs.
Current law does not reflect these three points. The general asset ac-
counts system which applies to the bulk of depreciable assets (all "recov-
ery property") permits only closed, homogeneous accounts and then
applies the proceeds tax rule to all dispositions except for the special class
of qualifying dispositions. The most important dispositions in that class
are retirements or sales associated with closing down a business or a busi-
ness subunit. Group accounting for the remainder of depreciable assets is
subject to the multiple asset account rules. These rules permit open or
heterogeneous accounts but impose disposition rules that rely on the ad-
justed basis of individual assets: The account adjustment rule applies to
"normal retirements," while individual item accounting applies to "ab-
normal retirements."
There is no apparent reason why the group accounting rules for "recov-
ery property" should differ from the rules for other property. Instead, as
demonstrated above, different rules should apply to group accounts that
are closed and homogeneous from the rules that apply to other accounts.
It would make sense to reform the group accounting rules by promulgat-
ing one set of rules that apply to all types of property but that differ de-
pending on whether the relevant account is closed and homogeneous. In
particular, a good approach would be to apply the same individual item
accounting rules that govern a particular type of asset to closed accounts
that contain only that asset type. In contrast, it is desirable to subject
open or heterogeneous accounts to special disposition rules and perhaps
also to an accelerated depreciation schedule.
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It is not clear that the Treasury Department could unilaterally mandate
this suggested system. There are certain legal roadblocks that stand in
the way of Treasury directly implementing these rules for "general asset
accounts" by regulation. In addition, adopting an accelerated deprecia-
tion schedule for open or heterogeneous accounts may be politically as
well as instrumentally difficult for both general asset accounts and multi-
ple asset accounts.
It appears that Treasury would not face any statutory difficulties in ex-
tending the general asset account regulations to apply to accounts that
are open and/or heterogeneous as well as to closed, homogeneous ac-
counts. In fact, after the passage of the authorizing statutory provisions
in 1986 but prior to promulgation of Proposed Regulations in 1992, it was
reasonable to expect that the regulations would permit open or heteroge-
neous accounts.242
A more difficult problem is that section 168(i)(4), the statutory provi-
sion permitting general asset accounts, requires the proceeds tax rule for
dispositions from these accounts, "except as provided in regulations. '243
Interpreting this requirement to establish a strong presumption in favor
of the proceeds tax approach as the "normal" rule would make it difficult
to mandate individual item accounting treatment by regulation for closed,
homogeneous accounts. But it is not clear that reading in such a pre-
sumption is appropriate. Prior to the promulgation of regulations, some
commentators believed that the proceeds tax rule would apply to "nor-
mal" or "ordinary" retirements,244 while others believed that the rule
properly should apply to "abnormal" or "extraordinary" retirements. 245
This lack of consensus about the constraints inherent in the proceeds tax
rule mandate of section 168(i)(4) suggests considerable regulatory flexi-
bility for Treasury. In particular, it seems that Treasury could extend gen-
eral asset account treatment to open and heterogeneous accounts,
applying the proceeds tax rule only to such accounts while specifying by
242. See Appendix E, infra note 306 and accompanying text.
243. I.R.C. § 168(i)(4).
244. In particular, one letter to Treasury concerning the Regulations to be promulgated
under section 168(i)(4) suggested that the proceeds tax rule be applied only to normal
retirements. The letter writer proposed that the individual income method would apply to
"substantial abnormal" retirements. This category would be defined to include retirements
of more than 20% of the assets (by unadjusted basis) in a general asset account that occur
"as a direct result of a cessation, termination, curtailment, or disposition of a business,
manufacturing, or other income producing process." See Public Comments on Proposed
Regulations, 88 TAX NOTES TODAY 160-36 (August 4, 1988). The proposed category of
"substantial abnormal" retirements would also include retirements due to factors other
than business exigencies. The actual Regulations incorporated the cessation of business
part of this proposal.
245. The argument relies on the fact that for mass asset accounts, language in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code required proceeds tax rule treatment for dispositions. However, Con-
gress changed the language when general asset accounts replaced mass asset accounts, and
this change can be construed to mean that normal retirements are not intended to be sub-
ject to the proceeds tax rule. For a discussion with the relevant citations, see Megaard and
Megaard, infra note 304, at A-115.
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regulation that individual item accounting applies to closed, homogene-
ous accounts.
However, there is another problem with specifying proceeds tax treat-
ment for disposition from multiple asset accounts that are open and/or
heterogeneous: Congress did not explicitly authorize use of an acceler-
ated schedule along with the proceeds tax rule in section 168(i)(4) or in
the enabling provisions for multiple asset accounts. Without such a
schedule, much of the potential usefulness of open or heterogeneous
group accounts may be vitiated. 246 But Treasury would have to rely on a
broad reading of Congressional intent to set up accelerated schedules on
its own in the Regulations. Congress has proven acutely sensitive to
Treasury-determined depreciation schedules in the past, even when
Treasury's authority to set the schedules was clear.247
Whether or not Treasury may accelerate depreciation for accounts sub-
ject to the proceeds tax rule, an important issue is whether Treasury can
take steps in its Regulations to mitigate the worst feature of that rule, the
tendency to interfere with sales that have a legitimate business pur-
pose.24  One way to accomplish this task would be to apply the proceeds
tax rule only to "abnormal" or "extraordinary" retirements and then de-
fine "normal" or "ordinary" retirements to include legitimate business
transactions in addition to assets that simply wear out. However, design-
ing rules that distinguish between sales motivated by strategic loss-taking
and those motivated by an independent business purpose may not be
easy.24
9
It is clear that some of the constraints placed by Congress on the rules
for general asset accounts and the lack of Congressional authorization for
Treasury to adjust depreciation schedules for group accounts may make it
246. See supra text accompanying notes 237-238.
247. For example, Treasury promulgated the entire Asset Depreciation Range system
by Regulation in 1971. The system generally gave taxpayers the opportunity for acceler-
ated depreciation compared to prior law. Although Treasury arguably had authority to
promulgate the Regulations, Congress carefully reviewed them and made some changes
before allowing them to go into effect. See Donald, Depreciation: ADR System for Post-
1970 Property, 255-3rd Tax Mgmt. - (BNA), at A-2 through A-3 (1988).
It is also instructive that Congress removed the power granted to Treasury in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 to set useful lives before that power was ever exercised. See supra
note 24. This revocation may have been prompted by pressure from industries afraid that
Treasury would mandate slower depreciation for their assets. See supra note 198.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 185-186.
249. It is important to note that by combining assets appropriately in group accounts, a
strategic loss-taking result can be achieved through simply retiring assets that wear out.
See supra text accompanying notes 217-221 (example). These are certainly "normal" re-
tirements. See supra text accompanying note 204. If the proceeds tax rule were not ap-
plied to them, some other disposition rule that is effective against strategic loss-taking
would have to be applied. The only other candidate we have seen is the depreciation bond
approach. But using that rule introduces the danger of churning transactions. See supra
text accompanying notes 173-175. Since transactions motivated by legitimate business pur-
poses would count as "normal" retirements, the rules would have to distinguish such trans-
actions from transactions designed to churn depreciable assets. Designing such rules
would not be easy. They would have to turn either on motivation tests or on mechanical
rules that might well be overinclusive or underinclusive or both.
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difficult for Treasury to provide sound rules for group accounts. It may be
desirable for Treasury to seek a broader and more flexible mandate from
Congress before revisiting these rules.
V. CONCLUSIONS
If the age-price profile for surviving units is known for a particular as-
set and the goal is to replicate economic depreciation, then the statutory
depreciation schedule should be the age-price profile for surviving assets.
Contrary to the leading academic approach devised by Hulten and Wyk-
off, this schedule should not be adjusted for retirement risk. The proper
adjustment for that risk occurs automatically if the law allows a loss de-
duction when assets fail and are discarded.
In contrast, when the future price path for surviving units is known and
the objective is to accelerate depreciation in a manner that is neutral
across assets, then depreciation schedules must take retirement risk into
account. Assets with the same age-price profile for surviving units may
require very different degrees of acceleration. The reason for this result
is that the assets may be subject to very different survival patterns. If
assets have a higher survival rate, then the statutory depreciation sched-
ule is more important because it is more likely to be applied to the assets.
Such assets do not need as much acceleration in the statutory schedule to
receive the same degree of benefit as assets with lower survival rates.
When the age-price profile for an asset is uncertain, approximating
economic depreciation is more complex. Strategic loss-taking becomes
an important consideration. Simple and clearly appropriate policies exist
only for assets with very high trading costs or zero trading costs. These
policies are basing the depreciation schedule on the expected price path
in the high trading cost case and allowing no depreciation deductions in
the zero trading cost case.
When trading costs are moderate, solutions that combine special dispo-
sition rules with ex ante schedule changes become attractive. None of
these solutions is dominant. For example, one promising solution, the
depreciation bond approach, eliminates strategic loss-taking but permits
the churning of depreciable assets. The proceeds tax rule, another possi-
ble solution, eliminates both strategic loss-taking and churning but re-
quires a difficult ex ante schedule adjustment and discourages
dispositions of depreciable assets for legitimate business reasons.
Finally, some types of group accounts raise special problems. Closed,
homogeneous accounts are not in this category. Whatever set of rules
turns out to be optimal under individual item accounting will be optimal
for these accounts. However, strategic loss-taking is potentially a very
severe problem for group accounts that are open or heterogeneous. For
these accounts, it may be best to apply rules, such as the depreciation
bond approach or the proceeds tax rule, that are particularly effective at
curbing strategic loss-taking even if these rules are not used under indi-
vidual item accounting.
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APPENDIX A
A Mathematical Description of the Productivity Method, the Treasury
Department Approach, and the Text Examples
This Appendix, along with Appendices B and C, provides mathemati-
cal derivations for the results in the text examples and figures. The deri-
vation of the basic example in Section II.A of the text that is used
throughout Part II is almost identical to the productivity method. This
method is one of the two ways that the Treasury Department uses to ar-
rive at age-price profiles for depreciable assets.
Section 1 of this Appendix provides a verbal description of the produc-
tivity method and then uses that method to construct the example used in
Section II.A of the text. Section 2 describes the mathematics of the
Treasury Department approach. Section 3 discusses the example from
Section II.C.4 of the text. Section 4 connects the results in the Appendix
with the various figures, tables and numerical examples in Part II of the
text.
1. The Productivity Method and the Text Example from Part H1
The Treasury Department uses the productivity method to construct an
age-price profile when market data does not suffice to estimate the pro-
file directly.25 The method begins with two empirical inputs: data on
asset lives and data on net asset revenues during life. The data on asset
lives leads to a useful life distribution for the type of asset under examina-
tion. This distribution specifies what proportion of new assets of this type
last one year, two years, three years, and so on. The net revenue data
allow net revenue per year to be expressed as a function of asset age.
This "age-revenue profile" specifies how much profit surviving assets of
any given age will earn annually. Given the useful life distribution and
the age-revenue profile, it is possible to compute an expected net present
value for a surviving asset of any given age. For each future year, the
probability that the asset will survive to that year is multiplied by the net
revenue that will be earned if the asset survives to that year. This product
is discounted back to the present using an interest rate that reflects the
time value of money.25'
The sum of the discounted products from all future years is the net
present value of the asset.252 Calculating a net present value at each age
yields a complete age-price profile.2 53
250. See supra note 71.
251. This interest rate should include a risk premium if the revenues are risky.
252. This value is sometimes called the "value-in-use" of the asset. See Treasury Rental
Clothing Study, supra note 24, at 20.
253. The productivity method outlined here does not adjust the values derived for
taxes. Thus, neither revenues nor the discount rate are reduced to an after-tax amount.
This approach is theoretically sound if the end product will be a system that replicates
economic depreciation. If economic depreciation is the rule, then the after-tax present
value of all assets will be independent of the tax rate. See Paul A. Samuelson, Tax Deduct-
ibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant Valuations, 72 J. POL. ECON. 604
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The text example in Part II is derived by applying the productivity
method to an assumed pattern of asset lives and an assumed pattern of
net asset revenues for surviving assets. In particular, the example as-
sumes an exponential distribution of asset lives so that the probability of
survival up to time t is
S(t) = e-,(1
With this distribution of lives, the mean life is 1/A, and assets fail at a
constant rate of A per year.254 In the example, A = .10 so that the expected
life of an asset is 10 years when it is first put into service. Revenues de-
cline exponentially from an initial level at time 0 of R per year. Thus, the
annual revenue rate at time t is
R(t) = Re-". (2)
In the example, the parameter a is set at .20 so that the revenue rate
declines at a rate of 20% per year.
In order to compute the value of the asset at any given time, a discount
rate is necessary to reduce future revenues to present value. The example
assumes a 4% annual rate, equivalent to an exponential rate of r =
ln(1.04) = 0.03922.
Given the assumed asset life distribution, the assumed age-revenue
profile, and the assumed discount rate, it is possible to compute V(T), the
value of the asset at time T:
V () = fR(t)e -rQ - e - (t )dt - Re -aTJ a+r+X,
T (3)
(1964). The reason that this result holds is that the reduction in revenues by taxes is ex-
actly offset by a reduction in the discount rate. See Stmad, supra note 7, at 1853-57. The
result implies that present value computed ignoring taxes will be equal to present value
computed using any given tax rate.
If the tax treatment does not replicate economic depreciation, then calculating present
value by ignoring taxes is only sound if the marginal investor is not subject to tax. See
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 70, at 415-17 (discussing role of marginal investor in deter-
mining market value of assets). However, the qualitative results in this Article would still
apply if the marginal investor is subject to a nonzero tax rate. The only difference would
be that some of the tax effects would be capitalized into asset prices. For a good discussion
of this phenomenon, see Auerbach, Should Interest Deductions Be Limited?, in UNEASY
COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 195 (Henry J. Aaron
et al. eds., 1988).
254. The rate of failure per year is simply
S'(t) _
S(t)
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Normalizing this value by dividing by value at time 0 yields
V(T)
-e
V(O) (4)
Note that the normalized value at time t does not depend on the ex-
pected life of the asset. This fact is a consequence of the assumption that
assets fail at a constant rate. That assumption means that the expected
life and the distribution of future lives remains constant for surviving as-
sets. If an asset is T years old, it has the same prospects for survival to
year T + t as it initially did for survival to year t. The only change is that
revenues are lower in year T + t than in year t. Thus, equation (4), the
normalized value equation for surviving assets, depends only on the level
of revenues.
It is easy to compute the present value of depreciation for the age-price
profile generated by this equation. We first differentiate to obtain the
instantaneous rate of change in value:EV(T)' V ) TaeT
V(O)J V(O) (5)
We now integrate the absolute value of this rate of decline discounted
to present value to obtain the present value of depreciation: 255
SV(7) e -,.'dT = a
0 TV(O) a+r (6)
This present value of depreciation is only valid for assets that survive
indefinitely. Under current law, the remaining adjusted basis is deducted
at retirement. Including these loss deductions as a component of depreci-
ation, as is theoretically proper,256 the expected present value of depreci-
ation is
PV = V(7) e-rTS(T)dT + f V()rl S(T)]e dT.
PV(O) -r(dT0  (7)
We call this expected present value of depreciation, "the retirement-
adjusted present value of depreciation." The first integral is identical to
the integral in equation (6) except that the integrand is multiplied by the
proportion of assets that will survive to each given time. This survival
255. Note that we could have delayed normalizing until after completing this integral.
Normalization involves dividing by the initial value, V(O). This initial value is a positive
constant and is carried through as a multiplicative factor from equation (4) to the current
equation containing the integral.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
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probability is precisely the probability that the asset will be moving down
(and depreciating) along the age-price profile for surviving assets at that
time. The second integral is the present value of retirement deductions.
The term 1 - S(T) is the cumulative probability of failure up to time T,
and the derivative of the term is the density function for asset failure.
This derivative is multiplied by the normalized value of the asset at that
time and the product is discounted back to time 0 by the discount factor
erT. We have
PV = fae aTe _Te -TdT + fe -aT)e -Te -"TdTf a+r+)
0 0 (8)
for the retirement-adjusted present value.
We now turn to the Hulten and Wykoff approach. They adjust the age-
price profile for surviving assets at each age by multiplying by the
probability of survival to that age. Thus, we replace the normalized value
in equation (4) by the new normalized value
NV(T) - S(T)V(T) _ S()V(T)_ -(a +x)TS(O)V(O) V(O) (9)
The integral in equation (6) becomes
f1V'(T)Ie TdT = f(a±X)e -(a+r+)TdT a
a r+X (10)0 0 0
This value is identical to the value obtained in equation (8) for the retire-
ment-adjusted present value of depreciation. Thus, the present value of
depreciation under the Hulten and Wykoff approach is equal to the re-
tirement-adjusted present value of depreciation.
It is important to note that we will obtain a different result for the
retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation if the statutory sched-
ule is based on the Hulten and Wykoff age-price profile from equation (9)
instead of on the age-price profile for surviving assets from equation (4).
When the statutory schedule is the Hulten and Wykoff age-price profile,
instead of equation (7) we have
PV = f I(T)e -rTS(T)dT + fNV(1)[1 -S(T)]e -rTdT
0 0 (11)
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which yields
PV = f(cx+ X)e- {+X)Te-Xre-"TdT + fe -(a-+X)TX ATe -"rTdT
0 0
a +2X
cx +r+2X (12)
The term 2A appears on the right hand side here instead of the term A in
equation (8). Thus, the retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation
based on the Hulten and Wykoff age-price profile is equivalent to the
retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation for the age-price pro-
file for surviving assets if we double the rate at which assets fail when
computing that profile. 257 It is not surprising that using the Hulten and
Wykoff age-price profile as the basis of the statutory depreciation sched-
ule instead of the age-price profile for surviving assets results in dramati-
cally shorter lives.25 8
2. The Treasury Department Approaches
The Treasury Department approach requires two steps. First, the De-
partment derives the retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation
based on the age-price profile for surviving assets. Second, Treasury con-
structs a straight-line schedule that has the same present value adjusted
for retirements.
The Department has two different ways of computing the retirement-
adjusted present value of depreciation. In Section 1 of this Appendix we
have already encountered the first way, what the text calls the "Hulten
and Wykoff variant." For our example, the final result of this variant is
the retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation computed in equa-
tion (10). Section 1 of this Appendix shows that this result is equivalent
to the present value of depreciation under the Hulten and Wykoff ap-
proach unadjusted for retirement deductions. It is this equivalence that
justifies the name "Hulten and Wykoff variant." The text argues that the
retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation computed in this way is
correct. 259
The second way that Treasury uses to compute the retirement-adjusted
present value of depreciation is more complex and involves four steps: 260
257. This doubling is the mathematical basis for the less precise assertion in the text
that using the Hulten and Wykoff age-price profile instead of the age-price profile for
surviving assets in effect provides an improper "double correction" for retirements. See
supra note 59.
258. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 59-60 (large reduction in class life caused by
using Hulten and Wykoff age-price profile).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
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(1) compute an age-price profile for an asset with known life for each
life;
(2) normalize the prices for each profile derived in step (1) by dividing
by initial price;
(3) compute the present value of depreciation for each life;
(4) compute an overall present value of depreciation by weighting the
present value for each life by the probability that the asset will sur-
vive that long.
In our example, to replicate step (1), we need to alter equation (3) to
reflect a fixed and known life, y:
Y
V(T,y) = fR(t)e -r(t-)dt
T
Y
= Re rT fe -(a+r)tdt
T
= R e aT - erTe_(et+r)yI.
a+ r (13)
Normalizing by dividing by the initial price, we obtain
V(T,y) - e T _ e rTe -(a+y)
V(O,y) 1 - e -(a +r)y (14)
Differentiating this expression with respect to T, taking the absolute
value of the result and integrating that absolute value multiplied by the
discount rate erT, yields an expression for the present value of deprecia-
tion as a function of the fixed and known life y:
PV(y) f e -rTdT0
Y 
-(a+r)T 
-(a+r)y
fe -(a+r)y0 Ia rye -(a +r)y
a+r - e(a +r)Y
a + ry
a+r e(a+r)Y _ 1 (15)
where VT(T,y) denotes 8V(T,y)1T.
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This result is identical to the outcome in equation (6), the present value
of depreciation for surviving assets, except for the second term which
"corrects" for the fact that the asset has finite life y instead of an indefi-
nite life. Note that 261
lim PV(y) = I
y-0
and
PV'(y) < 0 for y > 0. (16)
Normalizing initial value to one means that PV, the present value of
depreciation, expresses that present value as a proportion of initial value.
Equation (16) indicates that the present value of depreciation deductions
as a proportion of initial value is lower for assets with longer lives. This
outcome follows from the fact that longer asset lives result in later, more
heavily discounted depreciation deductions. 262
261. The limit result in equation (16) is obvious, but the derivative result requires some
work. Note first that
pV(y) = 1 e(,r)y (+r) ye (a+r)y
r (e 1)2
For y > 0, the denominator is always positive. The numerator is 0 when y = 0 and its sign as
y increases from 0 depends on its derivative. In fact, the derivative of the numerator is
- (cX+r) 2ye (a+r)y
which is less than zero for all y > 0. As a result, the derivative of PV(y) is less than zero for
all y > 0.
262. The outcome may not occur in the absence of normalization. Assets with longer
lives have higher initial value, and thus higher total lifetime (undiscounted) depreciation
deductions. This higher total may offset the heavier discounting that follows from the fact
that longer asset lives mean delayed deductions. If we had not normalized, we would have
r R r
NNPV(y) = JIVr(T, T)k - rTdT = - f[ae-( +')r + re .(a+)r ]dT
0 0+r 
=R [ a
a+rLO+r
for the present value of depreciation deductions. Taking the derivative with respect to y
yields.
NNPV'(r) = R [.(a+)r + re-(a *r)y _ (a + r)r~e- (a+r)r]
oa+r
= Re-(a+r)(1-ry)>O for y<-.
r
Thus, for lives less than I/r years, the net present value of depreciation deductions increases
with asset life.
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It follows from equation (13) that
bV(O,y) = Re -(a+r)y > O.
6y (17)
Thus, longer-lived assets will produce more revenues and have a larger
initial value. Treasury's second variant suppresses this difference by treat-
ing all assets as if they have the same initial value. As a result, that vari-
ant gives more weight to short-lived assets relative to long-lived assets
than is warranted.
To compute the present value of depreciation under the second variant,
we integrate the expression for PV(y) in equation (15) multiplied by [1 -
S(T)]', the probability density function for asset life. The resulting pres-
ent value is
PV = fPV(y)[I -S(y)]'dy
0
- + f X.rye -ar~~
a+r 1 - e-(a+r)y dy.
It is difficult to evaluate the integral on the right hand side analytically.
The present values in the text under the second variant were derived by
computing the integral numerically.
Despite the fact that the integral cannot be easily evaluated, it is not
hard to show that
(X ;rye 
-(ax+r+ .)y dy > +
a+r e -(a+r)y a+r+(0 (19)
That is, the present value of depreciation under the second variant is
greater than the present value under the first, "Hulten and Wykoff" vari-
ant that we derived in equation (8). To see this point, consider that263
I - e -(a+r) < (a +r)y for y > 0. (20)
263. Both sides of equation (20) are zero when y = 0, but the derivative of the right
hand side is greater than the derivative of the right hand side for all values of y greater
than 0. The result in the equation follows.
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As a result,
oo -(c +ro+X)y
+ fx-t e dy
a +r f e - ( a +r)0
> a + -L fe -a+"+x)) dy
a +r cc+rf
0
a rX,
-- +
a+r (a+r)(a+r+)
a +)
a +r+," (21)
In the numerical example in the text, the second variant resulted in a
higher present value of depreciation (and thus a shorter class life) than
the first variant. 264 Here we have demonstrated that this result is true in
general and not just for the particular parameters used in the example.
After computing the retirement adjusted present value of depreciation
using either the first or second variant, the Treasury Department com-
putes an equivalent class life. This equivalent class life is the recovery
period for a straight-line schedule that results in the same present value
of depreciation (after adjusting for retirements) as the retirement ad-
justed present value of depreciation for the asset.
We now develop a formula for computing equivalent class lives.
Straight-line depreciation per dollar of initial asset value over a recovery
period of T years will be at a rate of 1/T per year. Given that et is the
proportion of assets surviving to any time t, the present value of deprecia-
tion attributable to an instantaneous interval dt following time t will be
Ie -t e - .dt
T (22)
where we have weighted the depreciation (1IT)dt during the time interval
dt by e"At, the probability of survival to time t, and have discounted the
result back to time 0 by multiplying by et. Retirements during the time
interval dt following time t will contribute
[ -I [e -rt] [Xe -Xdt]
(23)
where the first term in square brackets is the adjusted basis at the time of
retirement, the second term discounts value back to time 0, and the third
term is the probability of death during the time interval dt following time
¢.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
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Integrating the sum of the terms in equations (22) and (23), we obtain
the following expression for the present value of depreciation per dollar
of initial value under a straight-line schedule:
f I + (T t) -(;L+ -)tdtT
0
1 + ; T . -'rT - "T/ 
- )
- ._-.l -te (- r)tdt
T ( X + r ) T (t) 
( 2 5 )
s (24)
And integrating by parts yields
T
-fle-_(1+r)tdt
TT_2
PVT e) + L - e(A+r)t
ztTf .+ X+r
X ee Z { -+'w]T.
r+r T(X+r) 2  (25)
Adding the result from equation (25) to the first term on the right hand
side of equation (24), we obtain the retirement-adjusted present value of
straight-line depreciation over recovery period T:
PV(TX) =T + T(X +r)2( 6
To compute the appropriate class life, we equate PV(TX) to (8) "PV," the
retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation in equation and solve
for T.2 65
Note that if we had failed to adjust for retirements in computing the
equivalent straight-line schedule, we would have obtained the same result
as in equation but with A = 0:
PV(T)= L1 - e IrT.
rT (27)
This result is smaller than the result in equation whenever A > 0.266 As a
265. No easy analytic solution for T was apparent to the author. The class lives in the
text were derived by solving for T numerically using the MATHCAD engineering
scratchpad program.
266. This assertion can be verified by taking the derivative of PV(T, A) in equation (26)
with respect to A and showing that this derivative is positive. But it is easier to simply
observe that retirement deductions accelerate depreciation compared to depreciation
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result, a smaller value of T would have to be chosen to reach any particu-
lar level of present value.
3. The Known-Life, Fixed Revenue Example in Section 1.C.4
Section II.C.4 uses an example that differs from the one used in earlier
parts of the text. In particular, this example assumes that asset life is
fixed at T years and that revenues flow at a constant rate of R per year.
Under these assumptions, the value of the asset at time t will be
T
V(t) =fRe -r(s-t)ds = . l - er(T-t)]
r (28)
Normalizing by the initial value and taking the derivative yields the in-
stantaneous rate of economic depreciation at each time t:
V1(t) _ -re -r(-t)
V(O) e - -T (29)
Taking the absolute value of this depreciation rate, multiplying by the
discount factor ert, and integrating yields the present value of
depreciation: 67
T -rT -rT
PV = f -red dt = Tr e
01 - e-"T I - e -rT (30)
To compute an equivalent class life for this asset, one equates the pres-
ent value of depreciation from equation (30) with PV(T) from equation
(27) and then solves for T. This class life translates into an equivalent
straight-line schedule, namely the straight-line schedule for a recovery
period equal to that class life.
Section II.C.4 also considers the present value of depreciation along
the equivalent straight-line curve for the first part of the asset's life fol-
lowed by depreciation along the age-price profile for the rest of the as-
set's life. The cross-over time is the time at which the two curves cross. 268
If this crossover time is C and the straight-line curve is based on a class
under the schedule for surviving assets. PV(T) in equation (26) represents exactly the
present value of depreciation under this schedule while equation (27) represents present
value adjusted for the acceleration that results from retirement deductions.
267. Because we have assumed that the asset will last exactly T years, there is no need
to take retirement loss deductions into account. The only retirement is the one that occurs
with certainty at the end of T years. At that point the asset has been fully depreciated on
the tax accounts. Adjusted basis and value (amount realized) are both zero so that there is
no loss.
268. See Figure 9 supra text accompanying note 104.
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life of L, then the present value of depreciation along this "mixed" curve
f- rd fI e - rTPV = f-e t+ dt
-e rT
= -0(1 - erC) + (T - C)r -rT
rT I - e - (1
4. Linking the Results in this Appendix to the Text
We now connect the results in this Appendix to the numerical results
and figures in the text. The following table lists the text figures and nu-
merical results in the left column and the corresponding equations in this
Appendix in the right column:
Text figure or result Equation
Figure 5
Figure 6
class lives in section
II.C.1.
Figure 7
present values in
section II.C.2.
Figure 8
present values and
class lives in
section I1.C.3.
Figure 9
Figure in note 108
present values in
section II.C.4.
Figure 10
Table I in section
II.D.
Table II in section
II.D.
equation (4)
equation (4) (upper curve)
equation (9) (lower curve)
equation (26) (equivalent straight-line schedules)
equations (8) (12) and (26)
equation (9) (curve)
equations (10) and (27) (lower straight-line schedule)
equations (10) and (26) (upper straight-line schedule)
equation (8) (present value)
equations (26) & (27) (straight line)
equation (4) (curve)
equations (6) and (27) (for straight-line schedule)
equation (8) (first variant)
equation (18) (second variant)
equation (26) (to compute equivalent class lives)
equation (28) (curve)
equations (30) and (27) (for straight-line schedule)
equation (4) (curve)
equations (4) and (26) (for straight-line schedule)
equation (28) (curve and straight line)
equation (31) ("mixed curve")
equation (4) (for both curves)
equation (1) (with A = 9/10, 2/3)
equation (8) (with a = .10, .20; A = 9/10, 2/3)
(31)
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APPENDIX B
Neutrality: Cost of Capital Approaches
This Appendix describes the mathematics of measuring the "neutral-
ity" of accelerated depreciation, that is, the degree to which various accel-
erated depreciation schemes give the same investment incentive to
diverse assets. As discussed in the text, there is more than one way to
compare investment incentives for two different assets, and the two prin-
cipal methods are the present value approach and the rate of return
approach.2 69
The present value approach is used in Table II of the text.27" In addi-
tion, the text uses an example of two assets with different survival
probabilities. 271 One asset survives each year with 9/10 probability while
the other survives only at a 2/3 rate. These two assets have the same age-
price profile for surviving units and thus would have the same deprecia-
tion schedule if economic depreciation were the goal. The text points out
that if the depreciation rate for the asset with the lower survival rate is
doubled compared to economic depreciation, the neutral depreciation
rate for the other asset will only be 1.29 as fast as economic depreciation
under the present value approach. 272
This Appendix describes the mathematics behind these numerical re-
sults. This mathematics is derived largely from a paper by Professor Alan
J. Auerbach.2 73 We begin with the following definitions:
t time in years
r instantaneous after-tax interest rate
u the marginal tax rate
z the present value of depreciation deductions for the asset
c(t) the cost of renting the asset on an annual basis at time t
q(t) the per unit value of the asset if placed into service new at
time t
D(t) the depreciation deduction per dollar of asset on an annual
basis at time t
a the instantaneous rate of decline in revenues from the asset
A the instantaneous rate of failure for the asset
Professor Auerbach shows that with these variables, the present value of
gross returns per dollar of asset purchased is
PV(X,(X) = f e rtC(t) dt
0 q (32)
269. See supra note 113.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 112-113.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 111-118.
272. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
273. See Auerbach, supra note 113.
[Vol. 52
TAX DEPRECIATION AND RISK
while the internal rate of return for the asset is
p(La)- c ( )
q (33)
To solve these equations, we must derive an expression for q(t) in
terms of c(t). We note that rents are taxable, so that after-tax rents from
the asset will be (1 - u) times the flow of rents. In addition, depreciation
is deductible so that the after-tax benefit to the owner of the asset will be
u times the stream of deductions. The present value of the after-tax rents
from one unit of the asset combined with the present value of the tax
depreciation benefits from that one unit will be q(t), the value of the unit.
We write
q(t) = f e -r(s-t[(1 -u)c(s)e -(s-t)e -(s -t) + uq(t)D(s)]ds
t
=f e -r(s-')[(1 -u)c(s)e -(s-t)e - (s-t) ls + uq(t)z
, (34)
where
z = f e r-D(s) ds.
0 (35)
We now rewrite equation (34) as
(1 -uz)q(t) = f e -(r+X+a)(s-t)(1 -u)c(s) ds.
t (36)
Since all of our parameters such as t, a and A, are constant over time,
q(t) must be constant over time. We therefore take the derivative of q(t)
in equation (36) and set it equal to zero to obtain
-(1-u)c(s) + (r+,X+a)q(l-uz) = 0 (37)
so that we can solve for c in terms of q:
c= (+Xaq(1 -uz)c= (r+X'c)q(l-U) (38)
Substituting this value of c into equations (32) and (33), we obtain
PV(X,a) (1-uz)(1-u) (39)
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and
(1 -uz) +c).
(I -u) (40)
for the present value and internal rate of return approaches respectively.
Using equation (39) we note that:
8PV -u
8 1 -u (41)
so that increasing the present value of depreciation deductions by any
particular amount lowers the gross present value of returns required by
the proportion u/(1-u). In addition, under the internal rate of return ap-
proach we have
8PV -U
8Z 1-u (42)
so that accelerating depreciation has a similar impact in the internal rate
of return case. The only difference is the proportionality factor.
Equations (39) and (40) are the basis for computing the 1.29 value in
the text under the present value approach. From equation (4) in Appen-
dix A, the age-price profile for surviving assets is given by the normalized
value equation:
V(T)
V(O) (43)
A profile with a = .20 represents depreciation at twice as fast a rate as a
profile with a = .10. If, as in the text example, we assume that the depre-
ciation rate is doubled (starting with a profile based on a = .10) for the
less durable (A = 2/3) asset, then we must solve the following equation for
x in order to determine the degree of acceleration appropriate for the
more durable (A = .90) asset:
PV(X=.90,a=x) = PV(X=.67,a=.20). (44)
From equation (39) it is clear that equality in equation (44) will occur
when x is set such that
z(X=.90,a=x) = z(,=.67,a=.20). (45)
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But equation (8) in Appendix A gives the value of z, the retirement ad-
justed present value of depreciation deductions, so that we need to find
the value of a, such that
0Cx a, __+__2
c,1 +r+.! 0C2+r+X'2
where
-. = .10
1 2 = .6667
X = .20. (46)
This value is .129 so that we must accelerate the curve for the more dura-
ble asset 1.29 times compared to our base level of a = .10 in order to have
neutrality when the curve for the less durable asset is accelerated 2.00
times compared to the same base level. Using a similar analysis under
the internal rate of return approach would yield 1.56 instead of 1.29.
APPENDIX C
Asset Life Distributions and the Nature of Retirement Risk
The examples in Part II of the text assume an "exponential" asset life
distribution while the racehorse examples in Part III assume a "Weibull"
distribution of a certain type.274 This Appendix explains these distribu-
tions and describes the computations used to derive the figures and nu-
merical results in Part III. The discussion has a value that goes beyond
merely explaining the derivation of the text examples. In particular, the
discussion serves as a brief introduction to modeling asset life distribu-
tions for studying the depreciation pattern of particular assets.275
As mentioned in one of the footnotes in the text, an exponential distri-
bution is one instance of the more general class of Weibull distribu-
tions.27 6 There is a theoretical reason for considering the class of Weibull
distributions in connection with studying asset lives. If continuing func-
tioning of an asset depends on many independent components, then asset
failure will occur when the first component fails. For example, a
racehorse's useful life will terminate if the horse breaks its leg, has a heart
attack, or succumbs to a virus. Note that each "component" of the horse
will have a life with a duration that is greater than or equal to zero years.
We can think of the life of each component as a random variable. Since
274. See supra note 124 and text preceding note 38.
275. There is a substantial literature on modeling asset life distributions. These distri-
butions play a critical role in the engineering and design of mechanical and electronic sys-
tems. For a good and very accessible introduction to the field, see P. TOBIAS & D.
TRINDALE, supra note 38.
276. See id.
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the failure of any component means the end of the asset's useful life, the
minimum of these random variables will be the useful life of the asset.
We can now describe in statistical terminology the class of distributions
that would be useful in modeling asset lives. We seek a "smallest extreme
value distribution," the distribution of a minimum of a large number of
similar random variables where the random variables are restricted to be
positive. Mathematicians have shown that this class of distributions is
precisely the class of all Weibull distributions. 277
Each individual Weibull distribution is characterized by two parame-
ters. First, there is the "characteristic life" of the distribution. The char-
acteristic life is the 63.2 percentile so that by the time the characteristic
life is reached, 63.2 percent of the assets have failed. Second, there is a
shape parameter. This parameter determines whether assets tend to fail
around one particular time or whether asset failures are spread out in
time.
If we denote the characteristic life as "c," the shape parameter as "m,"
and time as "t," then the probability density function for the Weibull dis-
tribution is:
t 1 71(47)
277. For a more elaborate discussion with citations to the mathematical literature, see
id. at 63-71.
There is another class of distributions that is used to model asset lives, lognormal distri-
butions. These distributions are theoretically better than the Weibull distributions when
the asset consists of a homogeneous material that wears out from continued friction or
similar stress. A good example would be the pylons that hold up a pier in the ocean. The
amount of wear on a pylon each year depends on how rough the ocean was during that
year. If the ocean is particular rough during a period of years, pylons installed during those
years will have shorter lives. For a discussion of lognormal distributions and their applica-
bility, see id. at 92-98.
Weibull distributions and lognormal distributions clearly differ in their theoretical suita-
bility for modeling the failure rate for particular assets. Nonetheless, for studying the ap-
propriate tax depreciation of most assets, it would not matter very much which class of
distributions is used. This conclusion follows from the fact that both classes are very rich,
that is, both classes admit many possible patterns for the frequency of asset lives. In a real
life problem, we would limit ourselves to one of the two classes and pick the distribution in
that class that most closely approximates the data on actual lives. Each class is so rich that
the curves selected for the two classes would be very similar in the range over which the
data was observed.
The major difference between the two classes occurs where the goal is to extrapolate
from the range of the data to values that are smaller or larger than what has been ob-
served. An example would be a component in the space shuttle booster. This component
need function only for a very short period of time, perhaps only a minute or so. But data
on failure rates may be available only for extended periods such as months or years. In this
case it matters a great deal whether one assumes the distribution is from the Weibull class
or from the lognormal class. Curves estimated from the two classes would be similar over
the range of the data but would diverge sharply outside of that range. When the time
period of concern is shorter than those observed in the data, lognormal extrapolations tend
to be more optimistic (less failure) than Weibull extrapolations. See id. at 97.
In studying depreciable assets, the need to extrapolate outside of the range of the data
will be quite limited. Where data exists, it will tend to cover the time spans of interest.
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To understand the shape parameter, consider the following figure
which graphs the probability density function against time for three dif-
ferent Weibull distributions.
All three distributions have a characteristic life of 10 years. The
sharply peaked curve has a shape parameter of 10, the gently peaked
curve has a shape parameter of 2, and the curve that is convex rather than
peaked has a shape parameter of 1.
A Weibull distribution with a shape parameter of 1 is an exponential
distribution. This distribution is the one that we have used in the exam-
ples in Part II of the text. The distribution describes a situation where the
rate of death is constant. Since the number of units is higher in the begin-
ning, the number of failures per unit time will start out high and decline
gradually if the failure rate is constant. In other words, shorter lives will
be more frequent than longer lives. The result is a probability density
function that starts out high and gradually declines as shown in the figure.
Figure 14
Weibull Distribution-Various Shape Parameters
0.2
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0.0
Exponential (m = I)
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/
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Age
In contrast, consider the sharply peaked curve. This curve concentrates
around the ten year characteristic life and drops off to zero quite sharply
around 13 years. This type of curve would characterize an asset that is
fairly predictable in its durability. Most units will last around ten years,
and almost none will last longer than 13 or less than 5 years. The gently
peaked curve represents a case in between the two other curves.
As an illustration, consider the case of thoroughbred racehorses. Using
a simple ordinary least squares approach based on Treasury Department
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data,278 the three major categories of thoroughbreds have the following
characteristics:
Type of Horse Characteristic Life Shape Parameter
geldings 6.555 2.125
fillies/mares 11.081 1.51
colts/stallions 7.784 1.292
The corresponding probability density functions are plotted in Figure 15:
Figure 15
Thoroughbred Starters-Useful Lives
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The curve that increases the most rapidly and peaks earliest is the curve
for colts/stallions. These horses have a high early death rate. The most
gradual curve is for fillies/mares and the sharply peaked curve is for geld-
ings. It is striking that apparently similar assets (different sexes of race-
horses) have very different asset life distributions.
The example in Part III of the text is based on the asset life distribution
for thoroughbred geldings corresponding to the sharply peaked curve
above. The age-price profiles in Figures 11, 12 and 13 in the text are
derived under the assumption that revenues are constant at some level R
so that the only question is how long the horse will live. The cumulative
278. The data was derived from bar graphs in the Treasury Horse Study, supra note 24.
For estimating Weibull distribution parameters, maximum likelihood methods generally
are considered to be superior to ordinary least squares. See P. TOBIAS & D. TRINDALE,
supra note 38, at 74-81. However, ordinary least squares methods generally are quite accu-
rate for lives within the range of the data. See id., at 80. In any event, attaining the most
precise possible estimates is not critical in this Article.
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density function for the Weibull distribution with characteristic life c and
shape parameter m is
F(t) = I - e-(tic)" (48)
so that the probability of survival up to time t is
S(t) = e-010)'. (49)
Now the value of the asset at time T will be:
V(T) = f Re -r(-)e -[t]'+[xT]ndt
T (50)
where A = 1/c and r is the instantaneous discount rate.279 To derive
Figures 11, 12 and 13, the integral in equation (50) was evaluated numeri-
cally for many different values of T and the results were graphed in the
figures.280
APPENDIX D
Systematic Versus Nonsystematic Risk
Risk divides into two types: systematic risk and nonsystematic risk. 281
Systematic risk is aggregate risk in the economy. Not everyone can diver-
sify away from systematic risk, so this type of risk is "priced," that is,
investors will demand a premium to take on systematic risk. Nonsys-
tematic risk is not an aggregate risk. If capital markets are functioning
well, all individuals can diversify away from this kind of risk. Nonsys-
tematic risk is not priced because no one is ultimately required to bear it.
Professors Bulow and Summers have argued that depreciable assets
subject to systematic risk should be given special depreciation subsi-
dies. 282 This argument is based on distinguishing between two types of
279. In equation (50), the integrand is the revenue rate times the probability that the
asset is still operating at a given time discounted to time T using the instantaneous interest
rate r.
280. Numerical simulation was necessary because equation (50) does not have an obvi-
ous analytic solution. In a few places, Part Ill states a present value of depreciation for
various values of R. These present values also were computed numerically. The pattern of
depreciation was approximated as the change in V(T) over short intervals. These changes
in value were discounted back to time 0 and added up to provide an estimate of the present
value of depreciation. The short intervals were made shorter and shorter until the esti-
mates converged.
281. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 70, at 131-34. Systematic risk is sometimes
called "market risk" and nonsystematic risk is sometimes called "unique risk." See, e.g., id.
at 132.
282. See Jeremy I. Bulow & Lawrence H. Summers, The Taxation of Risky Assets, 92 J.
POL. ECON. 20 (1984). See also Alan J. Auerbach, Corporate Taxation in the United States,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 451, 503-05 (Appendix C) (1983) (explicating
Bulow & Summers' argument using Hall-Jorgenson cost of capital model).
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risk: capital risk and income risk. Income risk is what we have called
"revenue risk" in the text.283 Capital risk is the risk inherent in the fluc-
tuation of asset prices.284 The government shares in income risk through
the tax system. When income is high, taxes are high so that the govern-
ment shares in the upside. Conversely, when income is low, taxes are low
so that the government shares in the downside.
The core of the Bulow and Summers' argument is that this risk-sharing
does not occur with respect to capital risk. 285 Since assets are not traded
each year and since tax depreciation schedules are fixed in advance and
not adjusted annually for actual asset value outcomes, the taxpayer faces
the entire brunt of capital risk alone. This phenomenon distorts invest-
ment by putting assets subject to systematic risk at a disadvantage. 286
The basic problem with the Bulow and Summers approach is that it
does not take the whole lifespan of the asset into account. If the taxpayer
sells or disposes of the asset in the future, then the government will share
in the capital risk faced by the taxpayer. For example, suppose that oper-
ating an asset becomes unprofitable early in its life due to a sharp drop in
revenues, and the asset is discarded. At the time of disposal of the asset,
the taxpayer will deduct the remaining basis as a loss. This loss deduction
early in life means that the overall pattern of deducting the original cost
of the asset will be accelerated relative to the statutory depreciation
schedule. The loss taken at retirement of the asset normally would have
been deducted over a period of years. The taxpayer receives accelerated
deductions, and this treatment partially mitigates the early loss at the ex-
pense of the government. Thus, the government does share in capital
risk.
It turns out that as long as the tax system takes losses and gains from
asset dispositions into account, the effect claimed by Bulow and Summers
will not occur. To fully document this result requires technical analysis
that appears elsewhere. 287 Instead of repeating that analysis here, I pres-
283. See supra text accompanying note 2.
284. Capital risk does not coincide exclusively with revenue risk or retirement risk, the
categories used in the text. Since the value of an asset depends both on its survivability
and on its revenue stream if it does survive, capital risk includes elements of both revenue
risk and retirement risk.
285. See Bulow & Summers, supra note 282, at 25.
286. The impact of the tax system on assets subject to nonsystematic risk is not a con-
cern. This type of risk can be diversified away costlessly. Whether or not the government
will share in nonsystematic risk will not affect investment incentives.
287. See Jeff Strnad, The Taxation of Risky Investments: An Asset Pricing Approach 44-
50 (California Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper No. 546, 1984); Jeff
Strnad, The Taxation of Risky Investments: An Asset Pricing Approach 18-25 (unpublished
working paper, 1988).
The basic reasoning that establishes the point is as follows. Suppose that at the begin-
ning of a particular year an asset has an adjusted basis of $X and that for that year $D is
allowable as a depreciation deduction under the statutory schedule. If the taxpayer takes
this deduction, adjusted basis will be ($X - $D) = $Y at the end of the year. If, however,
the asset falls below $Y during the year, the taxpayer can costlessly sell the asset and
repurchase a substitute at a price below $Y. In fact, with zero trading costs, the taxpayer
can execute this transaction at the lowest value that the asset attains during the year. See
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ent some qualitative arguments of the same nature as the ones in the text.
Consider first the case where trading costs are zero. In this case, strate-
gic trading allows the taxpayer to choose in each time period between
depreciation at the statutory rate or depreciation at the actual rate of
decline.28 Suppose that the statutory depreciation rate for each tax ac-
counting period is set at the average rate over all possible asset value
outcomes during that period. Then, the taxpayer will choose the actual
rate of decline if the actual rate is faster than the average rate, and the
government will share in the downside portion of capital risk. To the
extent that decline in asset value happens faster than average, the tax-
payer receives a larger deduction and pays the government less in taxes.
In contrast, suppose that the actual decline in value is at a slower rate
than the statutory rate. Then, the taxpayer can choose the statutory rate
by not trading the asset. In this case, an "upside" outcome occurs since
the asset declined less than the average expected decline. But the gov-
ernment does not share in this upside outcome since the taxpayer does
not have to decelerate the deductions allowed by the statutory schedule.
It is apparent that in the zero trading cost case, the government shares
in the downside of capital risk but not in the upside. This result is even
better for the taxpayer than what Bulow and Summers find lacking,
namely, a full sharing of risk, both upside and downside, by the govern-
ment. There certainly is no need to allow more generous depreciation
deductions for risky assets in this case. On the contrary, the ability of the
taxpayer to share losses with the government but keep all gains suggests
less generous depreciation deductions for risky assets. This approach is
exactly what is advocated in the text. 28 9
So far the focus has been on the zero trading cost case. Suppose, in-
stead, that the opposite case applies: Trading costs are so high that strate-
gic loss-taking is never profitable. Now the taxpayer knows at the time
the asset is purchased that the asset will be held until it is discarded as
worthless. As a result, the value of the asset during the time it is held will
not affect the net worth of the taxpayer. In finance parley, the cost of the
asset is a "sunk cost." All that matters is the revenue stream that flows
from the asset. This revenue stream is taxed. As a result, the government
fully shares in the upside and the downside risk for the investment. In
essence, capital risk is irrelevant when trading costs are very high.
The "intermediate case" of moderate trading costs is much more com-
plicated. The complications arise from the fact that it is difficult to model
optimal taxpayer behavior. To see this difficulty, suppose that the asset's
actual value has fallen somewhat below its adjusted basis under the statu-
tory schedule. The taxpayer can sell to "accelerate" deductions relative
supra note 13. Suppose that this lowest value is $Z. By engaging in "strategic trading," the
taxpayer has obtained a deduction in the amount ($X - $Z) which is larger than the statu-
tory depreciation deduction of $D = ($X - $Y).
288. This point is established in Part I. See supra text accompanying notes 10-15.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 135-146.
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to the statutory schedule, but this sale is costly. The taxpayer can also
wait in the hope that the asset will continue to decline faster than the
statutory schedule. Then the stream of deductions can be accelerated
even more for the same trading cost. But the asset may go up in value
instead of falling further. Choosing the optimal timing for sales is a diffi-
cult problem.
Professor Williams has solved this problem and has embedded the re-
sulting optimal behavior in a simple model with tax depreciation. He
finds that the tax system will favor riskier depreciable assets unless trad-
ing costs are so high that no trading will occur.29" Furthermore, where
trading costs are not prohibitive, the degree to which riskier assets are
favored is higher when trading costs are lower.291
These results verify the intuitive story presented above concerning the
zero trading cost case and the case of prohibitively high trading costs. 292
In the zero trading cost case, riskier assets are favored. If trading costs
are prohibitive, this effect disappears. Professor Williams' results add to
this picture by indicating that the case of "moderate" trading costs lies in
between the other two cases: Riskier assets will be favored but not as
much as in the case of zero trading costs.
Despite these results, there may be an effect of the kind described by
Professors Bulow and Summers when asset dispositions have no tax con-
sequences. Some of the disposition rules studied in the text do involve an
elimination or reduction of disposition taxes. Consequently, the Bulow-
Summers effect must be kept in mind as a potential problem when con-
sidering these rules. 293
APPENDIX E
Group Accounting: A Brief History and Synopsis of the Rules
Over the last thirty years, four systems of group accounting have been
in use. These four systems each have a different name for group ac-
counts. Only two of the four systems apply to assets placed into service
currently, that is, in 1999. Although the other two apply only to property
placed into service in the past, they either affect current law or play a role
in the policy analysis in Parts III and IV. As a result, all four systems are
described here.
Section A describes the four systems and the assets they covered or
cover. Section B discusses the treatment of asset dispositions under the
four systems, extending the discussion provided in Part III of the text.294
Alternative asset disposition treatments is the feature of group account-
290. See Williams, supra note 128, at 305.
291. See id. at 304-05.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 288-289.
293. See supra note 194 (discussing potential impact of Bulow-Summers effect under
various disposition rules).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 184-192.
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ing that is of most interest for this paper.295
A. A DESCRIPTION OF THE FOUR SYSTEMS AND THEIR SCOPE
From 1971-1980 a taxpayer could elect to depreciate assets under the
Asset Depreciation Range ("ADR") system. This election required that,
with a few minor exceptions, all of the taxpayer's property eligible for
ADR treatment (in particular, most items of tangible personal and real
property) had to be treated under that system. 296 The ADR required the
use of "vintage accounts," a type of group account.29 7
The taxpayer had some flexibility in placing assets in vintage accounts.
Multiple vintage accounts could be established, and the taxpayer could
place as many or as few (including one) assets in each account as de-
sired.2 98 However, each account could only contain assets that were
placed into service the same year, that were subject to the same recovery
period and that were subject to the same depreciation method.299
Electing ADR treatment meant that the taxpayer was allowed to select
useful lives in a "range" from 20% shorter to 20% longer than the useful
lives that otherwise would have applied. The principal motivation for
electing ADR treatment was to obtain accelerated depreciation by choos-
ing the shortest lives in the range.30 0 The administration's main reason
for proposing the ADR system was to stimulate investment by allowing
taxpayers to obtain depreciation at an accelerated rate compared to pre-
vious law.30 1
For property placed in service from 1981-86, the Accelerated Cost Re-
covery System was applied as a mandatory system for the items of tangi-
ble personal and real property to which the ADR applied. This system
replaced both the elective ADR treatment and the treatment that applied
when the taxpayer did not elect the ADR.
295. Group accounting under any of the four systems is complicated and includes many
special rules. Only a few features are presented here. Readers interested in more detail
are encouraged to consult the sources cited in the description of the systems.
296. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b)(5)(ii).
The property eligible for ADR treatment included all tangible personal or real property
that had been assigned a class life and was "section 1245 property" or "section 1250 prop-
erty." See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b)(2); I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3) (1971); 1.R.C.
§ 1250(c)(1971).
297. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)(11)(b)(4).
298. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b)(3)(i).
299. See Treas. Reg. § 1-167(a)-li(c)(1)(iv) and (b)(4)(i); Donald, supra note _, at A-
19 through A-20. Another restriction was that section 1250 property (primarily real prop-
erty) could not be placed in the same vintage account with section 1245 property (primarily
personal property). See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b)(3)(ii); 1.R.C. § 1245(a)(3) (1971);
I.R.C. § 1250(c)(1971).
300. See GRAETZ, supra note 1, at 395.
301. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REVENUE Acr OF 1971, H.R.
Rep. 92-533 (1971) reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1825, 1912-14 (dissenting views of Rep.
Sam M. Gibbons, summarizing and criticizing administration position).
The ADR was proposed and put in place by the Treasury Department in early 1971 and
subsequently approved by Congress (except for a few minor details) in the Revenue Act of
1971. For a discussion of the history of the ADR, see Donald, supra note 244, at A-2
through A-3.
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ACRS allowed the taxpayer to use group accounts called "mass asset
accounts" to depreciate certain types of property on an elective basis.
Only a limited class of assets called "mass assets" was eligible for this
elective treatment. These assets had to be numerous, individual identifi-
cation had to be impractical, and the value of each asset had to be small
compared to the value of the group of assets. 3112 In addition, assets in a
single account had to have the same class life and had to be placed in
service in the same year.3113 These limitations were motivated largely by a
technical concern about recapture of the investment tax credit for assets
sold from mass asset accounts. 311 4 Although asset coverage for mass asset
accounting under ACRS was much more limited than under the ADR,
the Regulations under ACRS did not require the taxpayer to elect mass
asset accounting for all mass assets. The taxpayer could pick and choose
between group accounting and individual accounting for different mass
assets. 3
0 5
In the Tax Reform Act of 1986 the investment tax credit was repealed.
In addition, MACRS replaced ACRS as the mandatory depreciation sys-
tem for tangible personal and real property. Congress continued to allow
an elective group accounting method, now named "general asset ac-
counts," and mandated that Treasury detail the rules covering these ac-
counts in Regulations. Since the investment tax credit was repealed,
Congress directed that the limitations on the assets subject to group ac-
counting for "mass assets" under ACRS be removed so that general asset
accounts could contain "diverse assets. ' 30 6 On its face this directive
would seem to suggest that Treasury's Regulations could or should allow
the same account to include assets placed in service in different years or
subject to different recovery periods or different depreciation methods.
302. More precisely, the Proposed Regulations under ACRS define a "mass asset" to
be
a mass or group of individual items of recovery property (i) not necessarily
homogeneous, (ii) each of which is minor in value relative to the total value
of such mass or group, (iii) numerous in quantity, (iv) usually accounted for
only on a total dollar or quantity basis, (v) with respect to which separate
identification is impracticable, (vi) with the same present class life, and (vii)
placed in service in the same taxable year.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168-2(h)(2), 49 Fed. Reg. 5940 (1984).
This definition seems to have been drawn largely from the existing Treas. Reg. § 1.47-
1(e)(4) which is substantially similar but goes on to say:
This term includes portable air and electric tools, jigs, dies, railroad ties,
overhead conductors, hardware, textile spindles, and minor items of office,
plant, and store furniture and fixtures; and returnable containers and other
items which are considered subsidiary assets for purposes of computing the
allowance for depreciation."
303. See Prop. Treas. Regs. § 1.168-2(h)(2)(vi), (vii), 49 Fed. Reg. 5940 (1984).
304. See Megaard and Megaard, 470-2nd T.M., Depreciation Recapture - Sections 1245
and 1250, at A-116 (Bureau of National Affairs 1989).
305. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168-2(h)(3), 49 Red. Reg. 5940 (1984).
306. The Blue Book for the 1986 Act states that since the investment tax credit was
repealed "the Act contemplates that the definition of assets eligible for inclusion in mass
asset accounts will be expanded to include diverse assets." See Tax Reform Act of 1986
Blue Book, supra note 25, at 108. This idea is also stated directly in the legislative history
of the Act. See Tax Reform Act of 1986 Senate Report, supra note 26 at 104.
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Nonetheless, the final Regulations are quite restrictive with respect to
the diversity of assets permitted in each account: A single general asset
account may only contain assets that are placed into service the same
taxable year and that are subject to the same depreciation method, the
same convention, and the same recovery period.30 7
The fourth type of group accounting consists of "multiple asset ac-
counts." These accounts are currently available as an elective alternative
to individual item accounting for assets put into service that are not cov-
ered by the MACRS system.308 The accounts were also available for
property not covered by ACRS put into service in 1981-86 and for prop-
erty put into service from 1971-80 by taxpayers who did not elect
ADR.309 The taxpayer may set up as many multiple asset accounts as
desired, may allocate assets to multiple asset accounts in any desired pat-
tern (including combining assets subject to different recovery periods or
depreciation methods), and may choose to depreciate some assets under
individual item accounting and others under multiple asset accounts.31o
In addition, in contrast to vintage accounts under ADR and mass asset
accounts under ACRS, multiple asset accounts may be "open," that is,
new assets may be continually added to the account, and accounts are not
limited to assets placed in service in the same year.311
B. THE TREATMENT OF DISPOSITIONS UNDER GROUP ACCOUNTING
The text mentions four alternative tax treatments for dispositions that
have been used in group accounting: the individual item method, the de-
preciation bond approach, the account adjustment method, and the pro-
ceeds tax method. 312 This section presents the mechanics of these four
treatments in a group accounting framework and then specifies the treat-
ments used under the four group accounting regimes presented in Section
A.
There is a special accounting terminology for group accounts, but for
simplicity the exposition here employs the traditional basis/adjusted basis
terminology used in individual asset accounting. 313 Quotation marks are
used for this terminology to indicate that it is technically inappropriate
although substantively correct.
Suppose a group of identical assets is placed into service in a particular
year as a group account. The "basis" of the account will be the sum of the
307. See Treas. Reg. §1.168(i)-1(c)(2)(i), (ii).
308. For example, patents and copyrights are intangible assets and therefore are not
covered by MACRS.
309. See Donald, supra note 247, at A-6 (discussing the availability of multiple asset
account election for taxpayer not electing ADR); Megaard and Megaard, supra note 304,
at A-111 (discussing the availability of multiple asset accounts for nonrecovery, that is,
non-ACRS and non-MACRS, property); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-7(a).
310. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-7(a), (c).
311. See Megaard and Megaard, supra note 304, at A-112.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8 and 171-192.
313. For a rapid and clear introduction to the terminology usually employed for group
accounting, see generally Megaard and Megaard, supra note 304.
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bases of the assets. In the first year the account will generate a deprecia-
tion deduction and that deduction will be subtracted from the "basis" for
the account to arrive at an "adjusted basis" for the account. For both
multiple asset accounts and general asset accounts, the depreciation rates
that apply are the same ones that would be used to depreciate the assets
under individual item accounting. 31 4
There are three general methods for treating dispositions under multi-
ple asset accounts and general asset accounts: the individual item
method, the account adjustment method, and the proceeds tax method.
A fourth method, the depreciation bond approach, was used for some
dispositions under the ADR.31 5 To clarify the operation of these meth-
ods, consider an example. Ten assets with an original cost of $1000 each
are placed in a group account subject to straight-line depreciation over a
5 year recovery period. Thus, the "basis" of the group account starts at
$10,000. Suppose that all of the assets remain in the account for the first
two years except that one asset is sold on the last day of the second year.
Absent that sale event, the adjusted basis would be $6000 at the end of
the two years. We will consider sale of the asset for $800, a "gain" of $200
compared to the "adjusted basis" of $600, and sale for $400, a "loss" of
$200 compared to the "adjusted basis" of $600.
Under the depreciation bond approach, the sale has no tax impact on
the seller. The seller continues depreciating the account as if the sale
asset was still present, and the sale has no effect on the "adjusted basis."
Under the individual item method, gain or loss is taxed at the time of
disposition and the "adjusted basis" attributable to the asset is removed
from the group account. The outcomes in the example are as follows:
(1) Gain case. At the end of two years, $600 in "adjusted basis" is
attributable to the asset. This amount of adjusted basis is removed
from the account, reducing the account "adjusted basis" to $5400.
This $5400 is depreciated on a straight-line basis over the remain-
ing three years. Since the sale price of $800 for the asset is $200
more than the $600 of "adjusted basis" attributable to it, a gain of
$200 is included in taxable income for the second year.
(2) Loss case. In this case, the outcome is exactly the same except that
taxable income is reduced by a $200 loss, the difference between a
sale price of $400 and the $600 in "adjusted basis" attributable to
the asset.
The outcome under this method is exactly the same as under individual
item accounting. 31 6 Gain or loss is realized on the sale of a depreciable
314. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (general asset accounts); supra note 213
and accompanying text (multiple asset accounts).
315. This terminology for all four approaches is the author's.
316. This feature motivates use of the name "individual item method."
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asset and the depreciation of other assets is unaffected. 31 7
Under the account adjustment method no gain or loss is realized cur-
rently upon disposition of an asset. Instead, any loss is added to the "ad-
justed basis" of the account and any gain is subtracted. In addition, the
"adjusted basis" attributable to the asset is subtracted from the "adjusted
basis" of the account. The outcomes in the example are as follows:
(1) Gain case. At the end of two years, $600 in "adjusted basis" is
attributable to the asset. This amount of "adjusted basis" is re-
moved from the "adjusted basis" of the account, reducing it from
$6000 to $5400. Since the sale price of $800 for the asset is $200
more than the $600 of "adjusted basis" attributable to it, a gain of
$200 is subtracted from the "adjusted basis" of the account, reduc-
ing it to $5200 from $5400. The $5200 is deducted on a straight-line
schedule over the remaining three years.
(2) Loss case. In this case, the outcome is exactly the same except that
"adjusted basis" for the account is increased by the $200 loss (in-
stead of being decreased by a $200 gain). The result is $5600 in
"adjusted basis" remaining in the account to be deducted on a
straight-line schedule over the remaining three years.
The effect of this method is to delay realization of the gain or loss from
disposition of the asset. The gain (or loss) will be recovered as decreased
(respectively, increased) depreciation deductions in future years. If a tax-
payer faces a constant marginal tax rate over time, this method treats
gains more favorably and losses less favorably than the individual item
method.
Under the proceeds tax method no changes are made in the group ac-
counts due to disposition of an asset from the account, but the amount
realized from that disposition is included in taxable income without re-
duction for the "adjusted basis" attributable to the asset. The outcomes
in the example are as follows:
(1) Gain case. No adjustment is made to the group accounts. An "ad-
justed basis" of $6000 remains in those accounts to be deducted
over the remaining three years using the straight-line method, just
as it would have been if no sale had taken place. Since $800 was
realized upon sale of the asset, this $800 is included in taxable in-
come for the second year.
(2) Loss case. As in the gain case, no adjustment is made to the group
accounts. The $400 realized from sale of the asset is included in
taxable income for the second year.
In effect, the proceeds tax rule includes not only gain or loss but also
the "adjusted basis" attributable to the asset in income in the year of
317. Thus, in the example, the $5400 of "adjusted basis" attributable to the other nine
assets is deducted at exactly the same rate as it would have been if the tenth asset had not
been sold.
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disposal and then allows this "adjusted basis" to be recovered as depreci-
ation deductions from the group account in the future. For a taxpayer
facing constant marginal rates, this rule is clearly less favorable in its
treatment of both gains and losses than any of the other three methods.
Although the proceeds tax rule may seem punitive, Parts III and IV show
that there may be some justifications for using the rule.318
The following table denotes the treatment of dispositions for each type
of retirement and for each of the four regimes sketched in part A of this
Appendix: 319
318. See supra text accompanying notes 184-186, 232-241.
The proceeds tax rule also has obvious administrative advantages. There is no adjust-
ment of a group account as a result of disposition of an asset in the account, and thus no
need to determine what portion of the "adjusted basis" of the group account is attributable
to the asset disposed of. In the case of accounts consisting of assets with different useful
lives that have been added to the account at different times, this determination could be
quite complicated. The only accounting required under the proceeds tax method is to in-
clude the amount realized in income.
319. For vintage accounts, instead of distinguishing between "normal" retirements and
"abnormal" retirements, there is a distinction between "ordinary" retirements and "ex-
traordinary" retirements. This different terminology is accompanied by some substantive
differences in the category, although there is a qualitative similarity in the categories.
Compare supra note 204 and accompanying text (distinction between normal and abnor-
mal retirements) witi Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11 (d)(3)(ii) (distinction between ordinary and
extraordinary retirements for ADR vintage accounts).
The mass asset accounts rules under ACRS abandoned the distinction between normal
and abnormal retirements, applying the same general rule to all dispositions.
The general asset account rules distinguish between "qualifying dispositions" and other
dispositions rather than between "normal" and "abnormal" retirements. As in the case of
,,extraordinary retirements" under the ADR vintage accounts system, the "qualifying dis-
position" category is similar but not identical to the category of "abnormal retirements."
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
The disposition rules listed in the table are detailed with citations in Megaard and
Megaard, supra note 304, except for the rule covering abnormal retirements under ADR
and the rules that apply to general asset accounts. These rules are set forth in the Regula-
tions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(3)(iv)(a) (ADR); Treas. Reg. § 1.168(i)-i(e)(2)(i)-
(iii), (e)(3)(iii)(A), (C) (general asset accounts).
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TABLE IV: DISPOSITION RULES UNDER
ALTERNATIVE REGIMES
Regime General Rule Special Rule for Certain
Dispositions
vintage accounts DB II
(ADR, 1971-1980) ("ordinary retirements") ("extraordinary
retirements")
mass asset accounts II or PT no special rule
(ACRS, 1981-1986) (elective by account)
(all retirements)
general asset accounts PT II or PT
(MACRS, 1987-present) (elective by asset)
("qualifying dispositions")
multiple asset accounts AA 1I
(non-ADR, non-ACRS and ("normal retirements") ("abnormal retirements")
non-MACRS property,
1971-present)
Key:
AA = account adjustment method
DB = depreciation bond approach
I1 = individual item method
PT = proceeds tax method
